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Summary 
 
Recent sociological observations have indicated that unstable family relations and lone 
parenthood present new social risks to society, posing a challenge to the welfare state 
and threatening to increase gender inequality. Several cross-national studies from the 
US and various European countries have documented that the economic consequences 
of partnership dissolution are more severe for women than men, indicating that divorce 
and separation are significant contributors to gender inequality in society. Norway had 
not previously been included in any such cross-national study, yet research conducted 
on Norway had indicated that there were few income differences between women and 
men after partnership dissolution there. This study had two main purposes; first, to 
introduce Norway into a cross-national comparison investigating whether Norway 
would be a country with lower levels of gender inequality in post-dissolution incomes, 
and second, to explore the role the welfare state potentially plays in reducing gender 
income inequality in relation to partnership dissolution.  
 
A case-study approach was applied where Norway was compared with Britain, a 
country with a well-documented situation of gender income inequality amongst 
separated persons. Analyses of individual level, longitudinal data were carried out, and 
different income measures and methodological designs were applied in order to 
analyse the extent to which partnership dissolution acted as an event leading to a 
downward shift in household income. This methodological approach was used to argue 
that dynamic, quantitative research is particularly suited to examine the links between 
life course changes, gender inequality, and the welfare state. 
 
Crucially, this study found that partnership dissolution did not lead to income 
differences between women and men in Norway, however, in Britain partnership 
dissolution lead to a larger income gap between women and men. Furthermore, this 
study found that women and men differed in their economic dependencies following 
dissolution. Men relied to a larger extent on labour income after dissolution than 
women did. Norwegian women depended equally on labour market income and on 
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economic transfers to secure their incomes after dissolution. British women were 
particularly vulnerable, since they had a weaker connection to the labour market than 
did men and heavier caring responsibilities than men, but at the same time, received 
little in terms of economic transfers. This significantly increased their poverty risks as 
a consequence of partnership dissolution. 
 
In addition, this study revealed how family policies had shifted over time in both 
counties to become closer to an ‘adult worker’ norm. However, despite policy 
developments in the two countries broadly following the same direction, large 
differences in welfare state institutional systems between the two countries were 
demonstrated. Norway had a better system for income protection than Britain, largely 
based on policies that economically compensated parents for having children in the 
household. This reduced the economic risks of lone mothers in Norway. Although 
partnership dissolution rates were similar in the two countries studies, the difference in 
welfare state support was identified as the most important factor in terms of generating 
cross-national variance in the economic situation of women and men after partnership 
dissolution. A key finding was thus that the welfare state matters for reducing gender 
income inequality. 
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1 Introduction and theoretical framework 
1.1 Introduction 
Gender equality has improved greatly in contemporary Western societies over the past 
decades. Despite this positive trend, however, there are processes of social change that 
continue to challenge the progress toward gender equality. One of the major 
challenges is the great rise in partnership dissolution.1   
 
Partnership dissolution challenges gender equality both from the perspective of the 
individual and the welfare state. For a growing number of individuals, the tasks of 
organising caregiving, work and economic resources extends across two household 
units. How this organising takes place remains gendered. Most women have greater 
caring responsibilities after partnership dissolution than do men. And since most 
women also have lower incomes than men, women become responsible for the welfare 
of more people on a lower income as a consequence of partnership dissolution. This 
increases women’s poverty risks (Ruspini 2000). For the welfare state, partnership 
dissolution poses a challenge in terms of securing a reasonable distribution of 
resources and access to paid work between women and men. How welfare states have 
dealt with this challenge varies between countries.  
 
This thesis poses the question of what importance, if any, do welfare state 
arrangements hold on gender inequality in terms of the economic consequences of 
partnership dissolution? And more specifically, what cross-national variation can be 
found between Norway and Britain in this respect? 2  
 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, divorce and cohabitation dissolution are studied jointly under the phrase partnership dissolution. 
The dissolution of same-sex couples is not considered. 
2 The focus on cross-national differences in gender inequality means that other forms of differences, such as 
social class, ethnic relations and sexual orientations are not part of the discussion in this thesis. Another 
restriction in this study is that the study object is those partnership dissolutions that form single-headed 
households, with or without children after the split. However, a non-trivial number of divorces also leads directly 
to other types of family units being formed, such as moving in with new partners, or moving in to share a 
household with own parents or siblings. These family types are left out of this study. The main reason for this 
exclusion is that there is very limited comparative information available on the role of kinship networks and 
friendship networks after a divorce. 
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These questions will be answered by means of analysing and comparing two panel 
data sets: the Norwegian Level of Living Panel Survey (LEVPAN) 1997-2002 and the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1997-2004.  
 
According to existing welfare theory, a comparison between a Scandinavian and an 
Anglophone welfare state context would imply a significant difference in terms of 
women’s post-dissolution economic position, where a lower level of gender income 
inequality is expected in Scandinavia. Such an assumption may be drawn on the basis 
of a welfare state regime model (Social Democratic versus Liberal) (Esping-Andersen 
1990; 1999); in terms of a breadwinner model (weak versus strong male breadwinner) 
(Lewis 1992); or in terms of family support  model (dual-earner versus market model) 
(Andreβ et al. 2006; Andreβ 2003). 
  
However, for understanding the economic consequences of partnership dissolution, it 
is also necessary to pay specific attention to what could be labelled the empirical 
divorce research. A range of empirical studies, both comparative and nation-specific in 
nature, have analysed the economic consequences of partnership dissolution (Finnie 
1993; Holden and Smock 1991; Poortman 2000; Sørensen 1992). Particularly many 
studies have included Britain (Aassve et al. 2007; Andreβ et al. 2006; Dewilde 2006; 
Jarvis and Jenkins 1999; Jenkins 2008; Uunk 2004). A unified conclusion can be 
drawn from this literature: after partnership dissolution, women are the economic 
losers. Gender income inequality has been documented in a range of countries as the 
outcome of divorce, but seems particularly prevalent in Britain. Even studies from the 
other Scandinavian countries, Sweden (Andreβ et al. 2006; Gähler 1998) and Denmark 
(Hussain and Kangas 2009), frequently held to be the frontrunners in terms of gender 
equality, have found greater economic loss for women after separation than for men.   
 
So far, Norway has not been an integrated part of this cross-national literature. In 
Norway, research into the economic consequences of divorce has largely been 
confined to a national policy debate on payment of child maintenance. The driving 
research question has been whether the receivers of child maintenance, mainly the 
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mothers, have the poorest economic situation lowest income levels, or whether 
contributors of child maintenance, mainly the fathers, have the most meagre finances 
(Bratberg and Tjøtta 1999; 2008; Kirkeberg and Pedersen 2000; Kitterød and Lyngstad 
2009; Melby 1997). The most recent study (Kitterød and Lyngstad 2009) found very 
small differences between mothers and fathers in this respect, indicating that income 
inequality following divorce is not gendered in Norway. This research finding does not 
seem to have stirred much controversy within Norway. However, no or little gender 
income difference after divorce is an empirical research finding that goes against the 
cross-national divorce research, which has concluded that partnership dissolution 
lowers the incomes of women the most and thereby increases their poverty risks more 
than men’s. It is a specific aim of this thesis to further explore if and why Norway 
seems to be an ‘anomaly’ or a ‘deviant’ case in terms of economic consequences after 
partnership dissolution.  
 
There is also another set of cross-national literature worth noticing in this context, as it 
has pointed to another ‘anomaly’ associated with the Norwegian case. Within what 
could be labelled a case of feminist comparative welfare state research, Norway has 
frequently been classified as the ‘odd’ or ‘laggard’ country in Scandinavia when it 
comes to gender equality (Knudsen and Wærness 2001; Leira 1989; Sainsbury 1994; 
Sümer 2009). By this is meant that Norway has been supporting a more traditional role 
for mothers, lone mothers and caregivers. A more traditional ‘mother ideology’ has 
also meant that women in Norway enter later into paid employment and work in more 
part-time positions when compared with other Scandinavian women.  
 
However, the notion of Norway as being the more traditionalist Scandinavian country 
sits somewhat awkwardly with the cross-national divorce research, which has found 
that in countries where many women work part-time and hold a more traditional 
pattern of caring and gender roles, are also associated with high poverty risks, 
especially for lone mothers. Hence, a likely assumption to be drawn from this is that 
any country with a more traditional ‘mother ideology’, as in Norway, would lower 
women’s connection with the labour market and increase their caring responsibilities 
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after divorce, which again would raise their economic vulnerability as a consequence 
of divorce. Based on this, it could be tempting to pose the hypothesis that partnership 
dissolution in Norway would lead to increased gender income inequality. However, as 
pointed out above, current research evidence from Norway points in the direction of no 
or little gender income inequality; whereas studies from Sweden and Denmark have 
found gender income inequality as an outcome of divorce. The obvious question to ask 
is: why? 
 
In order to answer this question, this thesis will seek to explore the links between 
gender, income inequality and partnership dissolution by carrying out a cross-national 
comparison of the economic consequences of partnership dissolution in Norway and 
Britain. An important contribution of this thesis is to introduce Norway into the world 
of comparative divorce studies, which to the author’s knowledge, has not previously 
been done. For this purpose, this thesis favours a cross-national case study design. 
Comparing different countries is useful for testing the validity of general findings and 
to uncover inconsistencies that cannot be understood in single-nation research (Kohn 
1987:713). Britain has been chosen as a contrast case to Norway because, in the cross-
national divorce research, Britain has been a key case. It has been included in many 
such studies and is one of the countries where gender income inequality following 
separation has been well documented. In addition, comparable data is available for 
analysis. The author of this thesis also has personal knowledge of this country.  
 
In addition to relying on a cross-national comparison, this thesis also applies a 
longitudinal, quantitative research design, which is particularly useful for assessing 
gender inequality (Ruspini 2002). Despite a long-standing interest amongst feminist 
researchers on engendering welfare research, little attention has been paid to the topic 
on of how to be gender sensitive in longitudinal research (Ruspini and Dale 2002b:3). 
This is in spite of the massive growth and popularity of carrying out empirical studies 
within the wide field of welfare and economic analysis based on various household 
panel studies that follow individuals’ life courses over time. The use of longitudinal 
rather than cross-sectional data can be a powerful tool for informing discussions on 
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gender inequality, as it allows for exploring gender differences in light of social 
change. In the case of partnership dissolution, longitudinal data can track income 
changes over time, making it possible for empirical research to document income 
shifts that take place both before and after partnership dissolution. In that way, income 
changes can, with greater probability, be related to the intervening critical life event. 
Access to longitudinal data and the application of appropriate techniques for analysis 
may therefore make for a valuable contribution to the empirical study of how a critical 
life event poses different challenges to women and men. Longitudinal analysis 
therefore may make a valuable contribution to studying gender equality progress.  
 
To summarise, this thesis will build on a research approach put forward by Ruspini 
and Dale (2002a) of applying a gender-sensitive, longitudinal and comparative 
perspective on understanding women’s life courses. Moreover, an empirical 
investigation of gender inequality in post-dissolution incomes in Norway and Britain 
based on panel survey data will be carried out. How this can be anchored theoretically 
is the topic for section 1.3, and how to anchor this methodologically is the topic for 
chapter two of this thesis, how this can be embedded institutionally in the welfare 
context is the topic for chapter three.  
 
But first, the outline of the rest of this chapter is as follows; First, the chapter turns to 
an outline of the background research on how partnership dissolution has evolved 
within British and Norwegian societies and how partnership dissolution may be 
understood as a ‘new social risk’ (section 1.2). Next follows the theoretical framework 
for this thesis, theorising the gendered links on caregiving and gender, on the 
(comparative) welfare state literature and gender and on the life course perspective and 
gender (section 1.3). Finally, the chapter is rounded off with an outline of the rest of 
the thesis (section 1.4). 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
Divorce rates have increased massively over the last few decades throughout the 
Western world as it has in the two countries studied here, illustrated in figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1.1: Divorce rates for women in Norway, England and Wales, per 1000 
married/separated woman 
 
 
Source: Statistics Norway and Office for National Statistics (FM2, No. 34, Table 4.1) 
 
The great rise in divorce rates in England and Wales came before 1980, whereas in 
Norway there has been a more gradual growth with a peak in the early 1990s (see 
figure 1.1). England and Wales have had higher divorce rates than Norway since 1970 
but the two countries are now approaching the same level of approximately 11.5 
divorces per 1000 married/separated women. The most current trend shows a slow 
decline in divorce rates in both countries. However, this is not to say that partnership 
dissolution has declined in society. Rather, in the same period that divorce rates have 
increased (and marriage rates have gone down), the numbers of unstable non-marital 
unions have gone up. In Norway, around half of people aged 25-34 years are 
cohabiting (Aarskaug Wiik 2009), and in Norway, a majority of first births are now 
given by unmarried mothers, most of whom are cohabiting.3  In Britain, cohabitation is 
on the increase but numbers are lower than in Norway. In the age group between 25-34 
years, 43 percent of women are cohabiting, with corresponding numbers somewhat 
lower for men (ONS 2002). Many cohabiters convert their relationships into 
marriages, but many relationships also end. Therefore, although the dominant family 
pattern in both countries is still that of the couple relationship (married or not), there is 
                                                 
3 Statistics Norway “Statistikkbanken” http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken, information downloaded 
13.07.2011. 
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a growing likelihood that relationships that are formed will be dissolved. This in turn 
increases the number of one-person and single-parent households in the population.  
 
The evolving trend of growth in marital and non-marital dissolution has been an 
important part of societal debate. During the 1960s and 1970s, divorce was regarded as 
positive for women, and those trapped in bad marriages were encouraged to seek 
personal autonomy and independence (Maclean 1991; Stang Dahl 1994). However, 
this initial focus of divorce as a liberation strategy for women has, in pace with 
increasing divorce rates, shifted to a greater concern for poverty. For women, bad 
marriages have in reality been swapped for bad economic prospects (Maclean 1991; 
McLanahan 1992).4 For the welfare state, the increasing numbers of economically 
vulnerable one-income families, of which lone mother households is the most 
disadvantaged group, has added to the already existing groups of economically 
disadvantaged: the unemployed and welfare dependent (Ruspini 2000).  
 
Corresponding with the growth in partnership dissolution, there has been an increase 
in women’s labour market participation. The increase came mostly before 1998 and 
has remained relatively stable since that time (see figure 1.2). In 2009, around 80 
percent of Norwegian women and 70 percent of British women were employed. It 
needs to be added that this conceals a higher share of part-time work amongst women. 
In 2009, 41 percent of Norwegian women in employment worked part-time (ssb.no), 
the corresponding share for British women is around 50 percent (statistics.gov.uk). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Although qualitative research has reported that this was still a preferred situation for many women who 
regarded it better to be in full control over the spending of a small amount of money than having sufficient 
money within a marriage, but where the husband controlled the spending (Maclean 1991). 
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Figure 1.2: Employment rates for women aged 15-64 in Norway and United Kingdom 
1975-2009, in percent.   
 
Source: OECD annual labour force statistics (stats.oecd.org) 
 
The exact link between divorce and the women’s labour market participation is in 
dispute. A well-known hypothesis from economic theorist Gary Becker (1981) claims 
that an increase in women’s labour market participation and economic independence 
decreases the desirability to marry or to stay married, indicating a positive correlation 
between divorce risk and women’s incomes.5 The sex-specialisation hypothesis 
suggests that as women’s economic dependence on men is reduced, the gain to 
marriage for both women and men is also reduced. The complementarity and 
interdependence in a partnership, where one spouse specialises in market production 
(the husband) and the other in domestic work (the wife), is dissolved when both 
spouses become employed in paid work and share housework (Becker 1981).  
 
However, this view has been challenged. It has been claimed that women’s increased 
participation in paid work is not to be interpreted as a direct increase in women’s 
economic independence. Increasing women’s income has, in turn, raised the total 
family income as women contribute more money to the household. This, in turn, 
generates a mutual interdependence between the spouses on each other’s incomes to 
                                                 
5 But as pointed out by Jane Lewis (2001:9), there is, in fact, nothing about this theory that makes it particular to 
marriage. It may be just as applicable to cohabitation, as Becker’s model is ignoring what has made the marital 
relationship special, namely that it has been supported on a much broader societal level through legislation of 
marriage and divorce, in public policies and in the general opinion. 
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improve the household’s standard of living. It can therefore be argued that with more 
women making substantial contributions to the family economy, more men start to rely 
on their partner’s incomes, and a mutual interdependence on a two-income family is 
generated. This should make high-earning women attractive partners as men are no 
longer solely responsible for the family income and they are allowed a share in their 
wife’s earnings (Oppenheimer 1997; Sørensen 1991).  
 
Empirical support for this hypothesis has been pointed out by US research, which finds 
that single parenthood and divorce is increasingly biased towards the least educated 
and lower earners (Esping-Andersen 2009; McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Research 
from Norway has also documented a negative association between educational level 
and divorce risk, meaning that the risk of divorce is higher for less educated women, 
who are likely to be the lowest earners (Lyngstad 2004). This suggests that it is not 
necessarily the women with the highest earnings and best economic prospects that 
actually divorce. With the risk of divorce high among low income women, the 
likelihood of relying on welfare state support after divorce remains high. Welfare state 
dependencies among women after partnership dissolution will be analysed later in this 
thesis.  
 
This societal concern for growth in partnership dissolution is reflected in 
contemporary welfare theory which points to family change as one of the new social 
risks facing citizens, especially women with caring responsibilities, and with which 
welfare states have to deal (Bonoli 2006; Esping-Andersen 1999; Taylor-Gooby 
2004).6 After the Second World War, Western welfare states experienced a growth in 
income protection systems supporting family income provision, largely through the 
male breadwinner. Income protection was developed to secure income for families 
whose needs were not adequately met through the market. Systems such as retirement 
pensions, unemployment, sickness and disability benefits were developed and 
enhanced. During this historical period, welfare states did not invest to the same extent 
                                                 
6 Other new social risks groups are the low skilled and immigrants. These are not considered in this thesis 
(Bonoli 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2004). 
  
17 
in systems to cater for care for young children, which was largely managed through 
the family system by women, although cross-national differences must be 
acknowledged (Taylor-Gooby 2004). This means that welfare states (implicitly) relied 
on women’s unpaid labour in the family as an important provider of caregiving 
services. The transition to post-industrial society with the associated changes in 
women’s education and labour market participation changed this. Women started to 
enter into the paid work force and changes in the labour market facilitated this trend. 
In particular, more flexible and part-time jobs were generated in the expanding welfare 
state service sector (health and education). This enabled women to combine their roles 
as workers and caregivers and improved women’s economic status. However, men’s 
caregiving patterns have not changed as much, meaning that women are still more at 
risk of poverty after divorce, having less profitable jobs and greater caring 
responsibilities than men (Lewis 2009; Ruspini 2000). 
 
But where the welfare state previously tended to meet the old social risks with income 
protection policies, welfare state responses in terms of new social risks are shifting 
more towards policies such as labour market activation, expansion in care for children 
(and the elderly) and the promotion of equal opportunities (Mätzke and Ostner 2010; 
Taylor-Gooby 2004). This means that welfare states now increasingly meet citizens 
exposed to new social risks with a reduced focus on income replacement and a 
stronger emphasis on assisting self-sufficiency in the market. This is also evident in 
policies enacted towards single parents, with stronger demands for activation of this 
group.7 This development is also frequently referred to in the literature as the growth 
in the adult worker model assumption. 
 
Where labour market participation protects against poverty, however, it remains 
unclear as to whether the market will ensure gender equality. As feminist-inspired 
research has pointed out – the activation demand put on lone mothers, and the 
assumption made by the government that it is possible to activate all lone parents, may 
                                                 
7 See chapter 3 for an overview of policies directed towards lone parents and the increased demand for labour 
market activation.  
  
18 
become counterproductive in terms of protecting children and their mothers against 
poverty. Reducing income replacement polices and introducing stronger activation 
criteria alone will not make lone parents employable leaving single parents and their 
children vulnerable to poverty (Haux 2010; Lister 2006). This may be more pertinent 
in a national context where, to a lesser degree, the welfare state is supporting women’s 
work, which is more the case in the Liberal welfare model than the Scandinavian 
model (Esping-Andersen 2005; Taylor-Gooby 2004). It is thus important to assess 
what importance variations in state welfare policies have for minimising gender 
income inequality as a consequence of divorce.  
 
There are two ways in which partnership dissolution contributes to an increase in 
gender income inequality. First, it generates gender inequality within the divorcing 
population. Cross-national studies has shown that men experience moderate income 
losses after partnership dissolution, whereas women and their children suffer greater 
economic losses (e.g. Andreβ et al. 2006). However, income loss outweighs income 
gain in relation with partnership dissolution, regardless of gender. Therefore, a second 
inequality arises in the population between those who divorce (‘divorcing couples’) 
and those who do not divorce (‘intact couples’) (Esping-Andersen 2009; McLanahan 
and Percheski 2008). This is not initially a gendered inequality, as male and female 
one-income households are generated equally after divorce. However, as long as single 
mothers continue to be the most economically vulnerable group, this inequality is also 
gendered (Ruspini 2000).8 This means that for quantitative research to evaluate the 
extent to which gender inequality is rising in society as a consequence of partnership 
dissolution, it is necessary to take into account inequalities between separating men 
and women, as well as between intact and separating couples. This is also the approach 
taken in this thesis.  
 
                                                 
8 With this tendency to higher divorce risks amongst the lesser educated, it can also be claimed that gender 
inequalities in divorce may tangent on class inequalities in divorce. However, this will not be a topic for further 
investigation in this thesis.  
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In terms of explaining how gender income inequality is related to partnership 
dissolution, feminist literature has pointed out that it is inadequate to regard divorce 
alone as the ‘generator’ of gender inequality. Rather, marriage acts as a concealer of 
gender inequality. An important argument amongst feminists has been that divorce 
unmasks and makes visible gender inequalities that already exist within couple 
relationships before they dissolve. Divorce reveals women’s true economic position, 
since after divorce they come to depend solely on their own income (Lewis 2001b; 
Orloff 1993; Smock et al. 1999; Stang Dahl 1984). This gendered inequality is 
strengthened by the fact that women’s greater caregiving responsibilities continue after 
divorce, but without access to a men’s income. As Jane Lewis has commented on the 
situation for women “…marriage may now be perceived more as a risk than a 
protection against risk, as was traditionally the case” (Lewis 2009:4). The 
sociological study of divorce and partnership dissolution therefore makes for an 
essential contributor to the understanding of gendered inequality in Western societies 
today.   
 
An important argument in this thesis is that in order to study gender differences in the 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution, it is necessary to relate post-
dissolution income to the household economy before the relationship ended (a 
longitudinal design). This has important theoretical and methodological implications. 
Theoretically, it becomes relevant to engage in social explanations that can explain 
gender differences in access to money arising from the gendered distribution of paid 
and unpaid work. Women’s incomes have increased as a consequence of their greater 
participation in paid work, but women on average still earn less than men. In addition, 
caregiving work and domestic labour remain unequally distributed between women 
and men and are types of work that remain largely unremunerated (Knudsen and 
Wærness 2008). Researchers have claimed that couples do not necessarily have a 
system of financial management that reflects women’s extra effort in unpaid work, and 
that inequalities within marital or cohabiting relationships can be related to the power 
held by men to allocate and control financial resources (Pahl 1980; Phal 1995; Vogler 
1998). In addition, an increasing number of married and cohabiting couples have 
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separate and independent systems of financial management. This in turn leaves women 
more economically subservient in the couple relationship if they do not contribute as 
much income as the male partner, and increases women’s economic risks in relation to 
partnership dissolution (Knudsen and Wærness 2009; McLanahan and Percheski 2008; 
Phal 1995). Studying the effect of partnership dissolution therefore provides an 
opportunity to understand women’s economic vulnerability compared with men’s in 
contemporary societies. The household economy is however not a function of men’s 
and women’s work efforts alone, but is also closely linked to the wider institutional 
context. The welfare state is therefore an important factor to consider when examining 
any gender differences in post-dissolution income (Andreβ et al. 2006; Daly and Rake 
2003).  
 
From a methodological point of view, examining the income transition from a couple 
to a single household context taking place as a consequences of partnership dissolution 
requires access to longitudinal data on household income. Longitudinal data gives 
income information on the same individuals over time and thus makes it possible to 
trace income changes in light of a changing household context (Ruspini and Dale 
2002b). The use of longitudinal data is outlined further in chapter two. But first in the 
section below theoretical explanations linking gender income inequality to the welfare 
state, the labour market and family contexts are discussed.  
1.3 Theoretical framework  
The aim of the following section is to draw on insights from social sciences theory in 
order to develop a gender-sensitive, comparative and longitudinal framework for 
analysing economic consequences after partnership dissolution. For this purpose, three 
sets of theory are highlighted: theories on gender-relations and the welfare state, 
theories on cross-national welfare state variation, and life course theories concerned 
with the dynamics of social life. These theories in various ways explain the links 
between the individual life course and the larger societal welfare state structures and 
their impact on gender relations. The data available for analysis in this thesis are on a 
household level and the empirical focus in this thesis is therefore on the micro level. 
However, a central argument in this thesis is that any changes in the micro household 
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economy is closely correlated with, and determined by, the wider welfare state macro 
structure. It is therefore necessary to consider changes and developments in welfare 
state structuring in order to understand gender inequality in the household economy.  
 
The following is not to be considered a literature review in the sense of going through 
each of the main works or providing a chronological account. Rather, the purpose is 
more modest in that the aim is to engage with the literature to provide theoretical 
insights for the subject matter.  
1.3.1 Feminist welfare state theorising: care and employment  
Norwegian feminist scholars during the 1970s and 80s have been pioneering in 
theorising the relationship between women and the welfare state and the link between 
gender relations in the couple relationship, and how gender inequalities in the marriage 
institution relates to the welfare state (Hernes 1987; Hernes 1984; Stang Dahl 1984; 
1994; Wærness 1984). Many of the insights these Norwegian feminist scholars have 
developed have later been echoed in the more recent British and wider international 
feminist debates (see for instance Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 2003; Lewis 1992; Orloff 
1993; Sainsbury 1996).  
 
The nature of welfare state interventions into private life has been the specific focus 
for a Scandinavian scholarship theorising the special presence of the welfare state in 
women’s lives. Coining the Scandinavian welfare states as ‘women-friendly’, Helga 
Maria Hernes (1987; 1984) draws attention to the fact that women’s lives are more 
dependent upon and determined by state polices than are those of men. A division of 
labour between the family, market and the state is decisive for the welfare of women. 
Generous systems of parental leave and public childcare services have enabled women 
to participate in paid work. In addition, the service-intensive welfare state has 
generated labour market opportunities for women, in particular in the education and 
health sectors. This welfare state intervention means that women come to rely on the 
welfare state both as an employer and as a provider of caregiving services, which 
otherwise would have been carried out in the private home by women. Welfare 
policies have therefore enabled women to combine motherhood and employment .  
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Hernes emphasises that the relationship between women and men is one of 
‘dependence’ and not partnership – pointing to elements in the labour market that 
continue to disadvantage women: women continue to earn on average less than men, 
women form the great majority of part-time workers, the labour market is still highly 
gender-segregated by occupation, and there are few women in top management. These 
characterisations which remain largely unchanged today, in particular in Scandinavia. 
Despite this, Hernes also points out that the transition from private to public 
dependency for women is an advantage as state intervention assists with an 
organisation of daily life which prevents women from being tied up with family and 
domestic issues (Hernes 1987). Despite Scandinavian women’s great dependency on 
the state Hernes concludes that the state is the best-suited societal agent to secure 
gender equality and relative economic independence for women (Hernes 1987). As 
such, the state, in the form of the Nordic democracy, holds the potential for being 
women-friendly and promoting women’s agency, as opposed to being patriarchal and 
repressive of women (Hernes 1987:15). 
 
Whereas Hernes’ theory links state and gender, other feminists have been theorising 
the relationship between the gendered organisation of work and care in the family and 
how this organisation is sustained by the welfare state. The theory of a ‘tripartite 
maintenance system’ links a woman’s economic status to the marriage institution and 
her status as a mother (Stang Dahl 1984). Embedded in social expectations, marriage 
becomes a woman’s main pillar of income. The other pillars are wages, which for 
married women are usually supplementary, and social insurance where access is 
guided through paid work and again is supplementary for women. The exception being 
welfare rights based on motherhood. This means that women and men in marriage 
have unequal access to money. Women’s incomes are not only dependent on the 
husband’s income but also on his employment status, her own employment status and 
motherhood (Stang Dahl 1984).9 The way economic resources are generated within the 
                                                 
9 The essay by Tove Stang Dahl was first published in T.Støren and T.S Wetlesen: Kvinnekunnskap, Gyldendal 
1976, under the title “Ekteskapet, den modern husmannskontrakten. Noen kvinnerettslige problemstillinger”. 
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marriage has therefore in turn generated a ‘men’s track’ and a ‘women’s track’ in the 
welfare state, the former being based on rights achieved via the labour market, the 
latter on the merits of motherhood or otherwise on means-testing (Stang Dahl 1984; 
1994).  
 
This brings to light several important aspects on the relationship between the welfare 
state and women. First, it illustrates the gendered power relations between individuals, 
and the way in which the state acts to control women by prescribing the role of mother 
for them (Daly and Rake 2003). Second, it demonstrates how principles of entitlement 
to benefits construct different rights for men and women, so that men become more 
represented on the rights-side and women on the means-tested side of the welfare state 
insurance arrangements (Daly and Rake 2003:16; Sainsbury 1996). Third, it points to 
the institution of marriage, and a gendered distribution of labour, as the sources for 
economic inequality between men and women. Albeit the marriage contract is gender-
neutral and is entered into voluntarily by two parties on equal footing, in reality, it 
entails  social pressures and expectations that are different for men and women. Hence, 
without independent access to money for women, gender inequality will continue to 
exist (Stang Dahl 1984; 1994).  
 
Feminist scholarship envisages mainly two routes for improving the economic 
conditions for women and for ‘bringing gender in’ to welfare state analysis. The first 
route is granting women access to paid work (Gornick and Meyers 2005; Ray et al. 
2010), and the second route is a greater societal appreciation and/or economic 
compensation for unpaid care work by the welfare state (Daly and Rake 2003; Stang 
Dahl 1984; 1994; Wærness 1984). Feminists differ in terms of which of these routes 
should be the favoured track for enhancing gender equality. A ‘women’s employment 
perspective’ presented in the international debate particularly by US feminists has 
emphasised the need to insert women into paid work to avoid poverty, and has argued 
that a substantial number of women would benefit from stronger (not weaker) links to 
the labour market (Gornick and Meyers 2005; Ray et al. 2010). The ‘care perspective’ 
has been presented by feminists both in Norwegian and British contexts and holds that 
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women’s economic conditions must not solely be improved by making women more 
similar to men but by valuing women’s distinctive connection to care and unpaid work 
(Daly and Rake 2003; Stang Dahl 1994; Wærness 1984).  
 
The care perspective has been prevalent in Norwegian feminist thinking (see e.g. 
Wærness 1984), but is also put forward by British feminists as an alternative 
theoretical approach to the role of the welfare state (Daly and Rake 2003; Graham 
1983). Care is a special social category that includes both the dimension of labour as 
well as emotions. A distinction can be made between two types of care work. Personal 
service, which is typically provided to a healthy, adult husband and older children, and 
caregiving work, typically provided to young children, the sick and the elderly 
(Wærness 1982; 1984). It is really only the latter category that should count as care 
work (Wærness 1984). Personal service work looks similar to care work in the tasks 
being performed, however it is distinguished by the fact that it could in principle be 
carried out by the person ‘cared for’ him- or herself. Although difficult to make this 
distinction in real life, it theoretically demonstrates that caring as an activity is not 
always carried out in cases where the person receiving care is ‘in need’ (Wærness 
1982; 1984). The care perspective is a relational perspective. For instance, in the case 
of personal service work (typically to a husband), the care receiver has a higher status 
than the care provider (typically the wife). However, there is also interdependence 
involved with these services. Men’s relative independence in the public sphere and 
working life is based on a great dependency on personal caring services executed by 
women in the private sphere (Wærness 1984:85). This interdependence may be 
weakened by welfare states that take on greater responsibilities for caregiving 
activities. However, in the caring sector within the welfare state, the great majority of 
employees are women, which means that it is women who have the monopoly on care 
work in the public sector, as well.  
 
The care perspective provides several important insights. First, caring provides a lens 
through which the welfare state can be studied, but not in terms of a patriarchal body 
serving men’s interests more than women’s. Rather, the state must be regarded as a 
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social actor that intentionally or unintentionally forms gender relations (Daly and Rake 
2003). The welfare state tends to overlook the economic value of care work because 
the low female labour market participation acts as a precondition for the welfare 
state’s societal organisation of care. This means that women’s unpaid caregiving 
services in the private sector are crucial not only for the welfare of individual families 
but for the welfare of society at large (Daly and Rake 2003; Wærness 1984). Second, 
as a social explanation for women’s life choices, ‘caring rationality’ is characteristic 
for women’s agency and constitutes a contrast to the dominating ‘rational actor’ 
model, embedded in economic theory. Viewing care work as embedded in personal 
relations provides an insight into power relations in the family sphere where 
differences in gender roles are perceived of as rational action within the context of the 
human experience of feeling concern for and taking responsibility for the well-being of 
others, especially exemplified with women’s identities as mothers (Wærness 1984). 
Third, it underlines that caregiving must be regarded as part of welfare analyses as 
care is always embedded in personal relations. But rather than assuming that these 
relationships are dominated by male suppression and power, caring must be 
understood as embedded in a complex set of social relations where feelings and 
emotions such as senses of obligation, commitment, trust or loyalty justify and ‘make 
rational’ the act of caring (Wærness 1984). Fourth, the care perspective may serve as a 
reminder that care work and personal services will always form part of interpersonal 
relations. Even within the context of a service-intensive welfare state, there will 
always be the additional need for care and domestic work in the private home. This 
points in the direction of a limitation as to the extent that gender inequalities pertaining 
to unequal distribution of caregiving and domestic work in the private household can 
be solved by state intervention and regulation alone. 
 
In the last decade, several feminist welfare state scholars have aimed to combine the 
two routes, employment and care, into a blended social model, the so-called ‘dual-
earner/dual-carer’ model (Crompton 1999a; Ellingsæter 1999; Sainsbury 1999). This 
perspective does not disregard the care-perspective but makes a stronger call for 
strengthening women’s ties to employment and men’s ties to caregiving. The notion 
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for gender equality in this model is therefore that men and women engage 
symmetrically in care for children and in paid work. This, however, requires state 
intervention, in particular to support parental caregiving (Ellingsæter and Leira 2006a). 
However, the theories on ‘the woman friendly welfare state’ (Hernes 1987), the notion 
of a man’s track and a woman’s track in the welfare state (Stang Dahl 1984),  as well 
as the notion of ‘dual-earner/dual carer’ society (Crompton 1999b; Ellingsæter 1999), 
all underscore the need of the welfare state to secure gender equality.  
1.3.2 Comparative welfare state theory and gender  
What could be labelled a feminist comparative welfare state perspective has been 
devolved as a response to the highly influential ‘conventional’ welfare state regime 
theory developed by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) and the underlying 
political-economy perspective in general.10 Viewing the welfare state as a settlement 
mainly shaped by class-related conflicts, the welfare regime perspective emphasises 
the influence of political and economic actors, such as political parties and trade 
unions, when explaining how welfare is organised in society. Applying the principle of 
de-commodification, Esping-Andersen refers to the degree that social rights allow 
people an adequate living standard, independent of pure market forces. By 
strengthening workers’ rights vis-à-vis employers, a link is made between class 
stratification and the type of social policy promoted. From this background, welfare 
state variability can be identified as a response to how welfare states react to 
competing pressures for de-commodification. The degree of de-commodification 
determines whether the state responsibility begins only when the market (and the 
family) fails in providing services. On this basis, Esping-Andersen identifies three 
clusters of welfare state regimes: the Social Democratic, the Liberal and the 
Conservative.11 Norway is listed as a Social Democratic regime, which is characterised 
by high levels of de-commodification, and thus lower market dependence. Britain is 
                                                 
10 Ann Orloff (1993) refers to Walter Korpi and Gøsta Esping-Andersen as representatives for the ‘power 
resources school’. Here I follow Esping-Andersen (1999) and Daly and Rake (2003), who classify these 
theoretical viewpoints as the political-economy perspective. 
11 In particular, two large debates followed in the wake of Esping-Andersen (1990). One contested the lack of 
gender focus (for an overview see Sümer 2009, Daly 2000). The second contested the appropriate number of 
regimes and the positioning of individual countries within regimes (see for instance Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
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classified as a Liberal regime with low levels of de-commodification. The conservative 
welfare states, such as Germany, rank in the middle.  
 
The early version of Esping-Andersen’s theory was heavily criticised by feminists for 
being insensitive to gender.12 Several feminist contributions have been put forward in 
order to engender cross-national welfare state analysis. The main feminist critique has 
been directed at the use of the analytical category de-commodification, and the state 
responses to economic compensation for paid work. According to the feminist critics, 
to base the analysis on this, is to base it on a male standard and disregards the social 
rights of citizens that are economically dependent, the majority of whom are women 
(and children) (Orloff 1993). De-commodification requires that one is first 
commodified, a designation that applies to men to a larger extent than women. A 
gender-sensitive analysis of the welfare state therefore needs to recognise the unpaid 
caring and domestic work carried out by women (Orloff 1993), which was also pointed 
out by Norwegian feminists early in the debate (Hernes 1987; Stang Dahl 1984; 
Wærness 1982). Being attuned to class-differences, the political-economy perspective 
is less sensitive to analyse how the welfare state is an important contributor in terms of 
generating gender hierarchies by privileging full-time paid workers over workers who 
do unpaid work or combine part-time paid work with care and domestic work (Orloff 
1993). 
 
Several feminist approaches were suggested in order to capture cross-national welfare 
state analyses. Orloff (1993) suggested to supplement Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
welfare regime approach with two additional dimensions to capture gender variation, 
namely the right of women to be commodified, expressed as women’s access to paid 
work, and the capacity of women to form and maintain autonomous households 
without a male head.13 This latter dimension is particularly relevant for a study of 
                                                 
12 See Sümer (2009) for an extensive overview of the feminist critique raised against Esping-Andersen.  
13 This is basically the same approach taken by Stang Dahl (1984), but where Stang Dahl emphasised the right of 
women to gain access to a husband’s income inside marriage, Orloff (1993) does not to the same extent base 
women’s rights to money to the married relationship.  
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partnership dissolution as it investigates the extent to which women are free from 
compulsion to enter and stay in marriages for reasons of economic provision.  
 
Another alternative approach to engender cross-national welfare state theory has been 
to look at cross-national variations in terms of male breadwinner regimes. Jane Lewis 
(1992; 1997) has identified three breadwinner regimes: strong, moderate and weak. 
These are distinguished by the extent to which state policies adhere to a male 
breadwinner ideology reflected in the way social policy treats women, and mothers in 
particular. Focussing on the provision of unpaid work in society, cross-national 
variation can be found in the level of social service provision and married women’s 
participation in the labour market (Lewis 1992; 1997). 14 Britain is classified as a 
strong male breadwinner state, and the Nordic countries as weak breadwinner states. In 
her later works, Lewis refers less frequently to this model, and more to a general 
societal trend of an erosion of the male breadwinner and a shift in family and work 
policies in the form of an adult worker model, steering the policy development in the 
direction of pushing everyone – women and men – into paid work (Lewis 2001a; 
Lewis 2001b; Lewis 2009).  
 
Another cross-national policy model has been suggested to specifically explain 
variations in economic consequences of partnership dissolution between men and 
women (Andreβ et al. 2006; Andreβ 2003). This classification scheme draws on the 
principle issued by Orloff (1993) that cross-national variation should be reflected in 
terms of the extent to which family policy grants economic autonomy and enables 
women to establish independent households without a male head. Four prototypical 
models of family support are distinguished on the basis of how much economic 
autonomy is granted the weakest family member: the market model (Britain), the 
extended family model (Italy), the male breadwinner model (Germany) and the dual-
earner model (Sweden). Belgium is used as an example of a state with a family policy 
that fits both the male breadwinner and the dual-earner model (Andreβ et al. 2006; 
                                                 
14 Other important feminist cross-national and comparative work has also been contributed by Diane Sainsbury 
(1996, 1999) and her development of a model of three gender policy regimes. 
  
29 
Andreβ 2003). Although Norway is not included in this analysis of family support, it 
has been suggested that Norway, as in line with Belgium, is also a country that does 
not fit squarely within one model. Norway has a family policy dualism, supporting 
both the dual earner as well as the male breadwinner/general family support model 
(Ellingsæter 2003; Korpi 2000; Sainsbury 1994).  
 
Classifications of family policy to capture cross-national variation have been 
important, but increasingly it has become popular to characterise the development 
within European welfare states in terms of erosion of the male breadwinner model and 
a general shift to an ‘adult worker’ model (Daly 2011; Mätzke and Ostner 2010). The 
adult worker model thesis holds that social policy is increasingly treating women and 
men as individual workers, an argument relying largely on sociological theory drawing 
on the individualisation thesis. This holds that there has been an erosion of tradition, 
structures and roles in the family and a shift towards a society that values individual 
autonomy over social inter-connectedness. This gives the individual greater 
opportunity to create her own biography (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Giddens 
1991). However, caution needs to be taken as to whether the adult worker model 
signifies a conceptual framework for a new normative model underpinning social 
policy or a characterization of real life (Daly 2011). As to the former, Lewis has 
argued that policy developments indeed increasingly assume the adult worker model 
and that this involves a set of assumptions about individuals, their work and family 
practices (Lewis 2001a). However, there remains a gap between this policy 
assumption and reality (Daly 2011; Lewis 2001a). Reality is better described in Britain 
as a ‘one-and-a-half earner’ family arrangement, extending to a ‘one-and-three-quarter 
earner’ family in Scandinavia (Crompton 2006; Lewis 2009). The gender neutral 
language of the adult worker model furthermore serves to mask gendered practices 
within work and family life (Daly 2011). The adult worker model does not stand in 
opposition to the ‘dual earner/dual carer model’, however, it more strongly 
underscores the earner aspect, pointing out a policy development more concerned with 
‘pushing’ women into the labour market than ‘pushing’ men into family obligations, 
but again cross-national variation is to be expected. 
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Esping-Andersen has largely been admitting to the feminist critique raised against him, 
and has revised his early welfare state regime model to better reflect the family 
institution, as well as the relationship between market and state. 15 Applying a 
theoretical concept originating in feminist work,16 Esping-Andersen attaches 
‘familialism’ to describe a welfare regime that assigns a maximum of welfare 
obligations to the household (Esping-Andersen 1999). ‘De-familialization’ 
characterises a regime that maximises individuals’ command over economic resources 
independent of family background. ‘De-familialization’ thus implies that households’ 
welfare and caring responsibilities should be assisted, either by the welfare state or by 
market provision. Esping-Andersen applies four criteria by which to measure level of 
de-familialization: service commitments to families, subsidies to child families, degree 
of public childcare for under three year-olds and supply of care to the elderly. Esping-
Andersen finds that the Social Democratic regime scores high on de-familialization, 
providing good opportunities for both men and women to participate in paid work via 
welfare state intervention, the Liberal regime scores low. In Britain, day care is largely 
left to the market, and, compared to the Nordic countries, is costly. This leaves the 
families mainly in charge of care for pre-school children, which is provided mainly by 
mothers and other relatives (grandparents).17  
 
                                                 
15  “The lack of systematic attention to households is painfully evident in my own Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. It starts out by defining welfare regimes as the interaction of state, market, and family and 
subsequently pays hardly any notice to the latter” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 47, in footnote). 
16 Esping-Andersen (1999) makes reference to the feminist Chiara Saraceno (1996) as the user of the concepts of 
‘familialism’ and ‘de-familialization’.  
17 Another dimension Esping-Andersen (1999) claims to pick up with the de-familiarization concept is an 
explanation for variations in fertility rates across Europe. Inserting women into paid work has meant that welfare 
states can no longer rely on the availability of women as housewives and full-time carers. Welfare states are 
actively or passively encouraging familialism, and this in turn is diminishing welfare as it leads to lower fertility, 
lower household incomes and higher risks of poverty. This threatens the future of the welfare state (Esping-
Andersen 1999; 2002; 2009). Here the theme of maternalism is found in Esping-Andersen’s analysis, but as 
observed by Sümer, “Esping-Andersen moves to a feminist position through an economic argument” (Sümer 
2009:33), stating that women’s paid employment is economically efficient as lack of de-familialisation  leads to 
low fertility. This is in opposition to the feminist position, demanding recognition for the role of motherhood and 
women’s unpaid care work. In feminist work, the theme of motherhood and the welfare state has rather been 
expressed as an ideology underpinning social policy and in the focus on care work, which regardless of level of 
welfare state service are tasks that need to be performed, especially in relation to small children (Daly and Rake 
2003; Lewis 1997; Wærness 1984). 
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The political-economy perspective in general, and the welfare regime model of 
Esping-Andersen in particular, brings important insights in terms of studying the 
welfare state from a gender perspective (Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 2003). First, 
embedded in empirical measures, the regime theory has been able to demonstrate that 
welfare states cluster into regimes. Great explanatory power is offered in the 
observation that cross-national differences in welfare state intervention contribute 
different logics to which variations in the state-work-family connections can be 
explained. The regime theory is therefore powerful in serving as a sensitizing device 
for exploring cross-national variation. Second, this scholarship has brought to the 
foreground that the welfare state involves, and indeed is shaped by and shapes, 
conflicts of power (although it has tended to express this in the form of stratification 
along class lines, rather than in terms of gender inequalities). Third, in continuation of 
this point, redistribution of welfare in the political-economy approach has tended to be 
seen as a reflection of a series of power balances in society. This has been important in 
bringing to the foreground the understanding that welfare is indeed contested and 
influenced by ideology, and has also demonstrated the links between democracy and 
capitalism (Daly and Rake 2003).  
 
But the political-economy perspective has also played down the need to theorise 
gender relations (Orloff 1993). In the view of some feminists, this has meant that too 
little attention has been directed towards “the nuts and bolts of policy” and to the 
redistributive effects of welfare policy (Daly and Rake 2003:12; Lewis 1992; Lewis 
1997). The way gender is recognised in the welfare state regime model is in the 
distinction made between familization/defamilization. This integrates the family into 
the analytical framework, but is less attuned to capture how different welfare states 
operate to underpin gender relations within the family unit (Daly and Rake 2003; 
Ruspini and Dale 2002a). Furthermore, this analytical distinction on the family is 
expressed in relatively static terms, and hence bears little recognition that the family 
unit may be changing in its construction and societal functions (Daly 2011).  A similar 
critique is also directed at the use of typologies in more general. 18 They remain 
                                                 
18 For a general overview of the critique of welfare regimes as ideal types, see Arts and Gelissen (2002). 
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‘frozen’ in time and therefore are constraining in terms of generating significant new 
insights and to capture policy developments that could lead countries to shift regimes. 
The typologies also serve to significantly downplay within-regime variations. National 
policy models are more complex than what a regime model would suggest, as national 
states in practice will combine policy elements from various cases. Besides, policy 
models develop and change over time, hence new developments, complexities and 
opposing trends within national cases may not be entirely captured by conventional 
typologies (Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 2003; Dewilde 2003; Ellingsæter 2006). 
Following this position, it makes sense to more carefully examine national policies in a 
country comparison, allowing for a more detailed explanation of cross-country 
differences. This is an approach more closely associated with a case study design and 
is also the line of argument which will be pursued in this thesis, a position that will be 
developed in the next chapter. 
 
Although the political-economy perspective and the feminist perspectives presented 
above are important for a gender-sensitive analysis, they share a common weakness in 
terms of acknowledging change (Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 2003). This is possibly 
due to the relatively fixed notion that underlies these theories, either that of the welfare 
state as serving the interests of capitalism or patriarchy. 
 
An alternative comparative welfare state approach has been suggested by Daly (2000) 
and Daly and Rake (2003). Rather than assuming that countries adhere to an 
underlying model in the form of welfare state regime, breadwinner regime or family 
policy variation, a gender-sensitive welfare state analysis is more meaningfully 
elaborated by applying an approach closer to the case-study, where each country is 
recognised and described as qualitatively different units. This also makes it less 
problematic to position cases, such as the Norwegian, into a certain regime model. The 
relations between the welfare state and gender is best observed via three lenses: care, 
work and welfare (Daly and Rake 2003). But rather than building a case from a ‘clean 
slate’, the various cross-national ideal types may serve as ‘sensitizing’ tools from 
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where discussion can proceed. In the next section a more dynamic social theory, the 
life course perspective, is outlined. 
1.3.3 The life course perspective, state and gender  
To study partnership dissolution with the intention of analysing gender inequality 
requires a research strategy sensitive to social and individual change. The life course 
perspective holds a promising avenue for this purpose (Dewilde 2003; Mortimer and 
Shanahan 2006). Life course research concerns transitions, trajectories and events 
made by persons across the life course. The study of life course dynamics may span a 
relatively long time period such as implied by the concept of trajectory, or over a short 
time, as is the case in this thesis, through the study of events or life transitions (Elder 
1985; Hagestad 1991). It offers to the study of the dynamics in women’s and men’s 
life courses both a theoretical notion at the micro and macro level. This notion of 
analysing economic welfare as the outcome of ‘lived life’, i.e. how the life course 
shifts over time, can also be meaningfully paired up with a methodological framework 
for analysing longitudinal panel data. This will be further discussed in chapter two.  
 
At the micro level, divorce or partnership dissolution is as a phenomenon inherently 
dynamic in nature and is therefore in a life course perspective treated as a transition 
between two separate life domains: between being in a relationship and being single 
(Hagestad 1991). In a study of social and gender inequality, it can be helpful to make a 
further distinction between a life course ‘event’ and a life course ‘transition’ (Dewilde 
2003). A transition refers to changes that are in accordance with a socially constructed 
life course, and is therefore tied in with generally accepted age and gender norms. 
Transitions may be more or less predictable for the individual, but they are less 
problematic as they are expected be experienced by a majority of the population. 
Transitions are normative in the sense of being “socially created, socially recognized 
and shared” (Dewilde 2003:125). An example of a normative transition is for a young 
person to move away from the parental home to set up an independent household. An 
‘event’, on the other hand, may not a priori be differentiated by age and gender norms 
and it may be more or less predictable. The lack of foreseeability in relation to events 
are therefore more likely to lead individuals into certain situations such as poverty 
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(Dewilde 2003). This happens as individuals better prepare themselves for transitions 
than less predictable events. Similarly, the social support of institutional (welfare state) 
and informal (kinship) structures may be more comprehensive in terms of life course 
transitions than events. Partnership dissolution and unemployment are examples of life 
course events. This thesis is therefore first and foremost interested in the economic 
impact of events and not transitions.  
 
Situating partnership dissolution as a life course event means that the life course 
approach draws focus to the dynamics in male and female life courses, and how these 
are interlinked, in the sense of partly being shaped by and partly shaping social policy, 
with the social processes or mechanisms that generates this inequality (Daly and Rake 
2003; Dannefer 2003; Ruspini 2000). 
 
Another feature of the life course perspective is that it draws attention to the 
importance of where and when an event takes place when exploring its significance 
(Elder et al. 2003; Kohli 2009). Historically, divorce has shifted in meaning quite 
rapidly over the past decades, from carrying a strong stigma, being if not prohibited, at 
least limited by law (especially in Britain), to becoming both a socially and legally 
acceptable and ‘normalised’ life course event (Sørensen 1991). In addition, the growth 
in cohabitations and subsequently non-marital dissolutions has created a ‘new’ 
phenomenon of partnership dissolution, as opposed to merely divorce. Cohabitation 
started out as being limited to a specific and very young population segment but has 
now become widespread and has started to mirror marriage behaviour. In Norway, 
three out of four persons born in 1950 or later either lives in or has lived in a 
cohabitation (Dommermuth et al. 2009) Legislation has also, to some extent, followed 
this trend, so that now cohabitation and marriage are treated more similarly in a legal 
sense, particularly in Norway. This means that as a life course event, marital and non-
marital dissolution have become more similar, and so it also becomes sociologically 
meaningful to study the two together, as is done in this thesis. 
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From a macro level, the life course perspective is furthermore instructive in the way it 
links the significance of historical time to gender. In the industrial era, the state and 
market institutions influenced men’s life courses the most. The structuring of women’s 
life courses have been more influenced by the demands of the family and reproduction 
(Mayer 2005). In the post-industrial era, this has shifted as women’s behaviour has 
changed in relation to participation in paid work, but also in terms of reproduction 
(fertility) choices. This has led women’s life courses to become increasingly structured 
by state and market forces, which is what is being reflected in the theoretical notion of 
the masculinisation of the female life course (Esping-Andersen 2009). But despite this 
trend, the female life course is still strongly shaped by discontinuity in the sense of 
moving between different spheres of activity, between work and care, compared with 
the more continuous male life course. This is captured in the notion of a lesser degree 
of feminisation of the male life course. Gender inequality is therefore upheld as 
women’s life courses have changed more than men’s. In terms of women’s role in 
society, this process has in popular terms been coined ‘gender equality light’ (Skrede 
2004), ‘a half-changed world’ (Gornick and Meyers 2005)19 or ‘the incomplete 
revolution’ (Esping-Andersen 2009).    
 
The life course perspective also theorises the link between the welfare state and the 
individual, or between the macro and the micro level. A central argument is that the 
shape of the state, market and family nexus constitutes an opportunity structure for the 
individual, as well as a constraining structure (O'Rand and Krecker 1990). That is, the 
shaping of the macro structures has a direct impact on the living conditions on the 
micro level (Leisering and Leibfried 1999; O'Rand and Krecker 1990). The outcome 
for the individual of a life course event at the micro level must be analysed in relation 
to this macro structure.  
 
There is a disagreement as to the importance the state holds in the shaping of the 
macro structure. The ‘institutionalisation of the life course’ hypothesis regards the 
                                                 
19 19 Gornick and Meyers has borrowed the term “a half-changed world” from the writer and journalist Peggy 
Orenstein’s book (2000) FLUX: Women on sex, work, kids, love and life in a half-changed world. Anchor 
Books: New York. 
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state as the most important actor (Leisering and Leibfried 1999; Mayer 2005; Mayer 
and Müller 1986; Mayer and Schoepflin 1989). By integrating some life course 
transitions into its safety net and excluding or ignoring others, the state is an effective 
agent in structuring the outcomes of life course events and social risks (Leisering and 
Leibfried 1999). The way the state is effective in achieving this is by basing policy 
measures on normative models reflecting class and gender divisions. Social policy 
therefore explicitly or implicitly influences the life course. For instance, the state has 
income protection systems in cases of unemployment, but not an income protection for 
a divorced housewife whose labour efforts have been invested in care work for the 
family. This means that the link between the institutionalisation of the life course by 
the welfare state and poverty is quite direct in the institutionalisation of the life course 
perspective: “people who are affected by non-insured social risks and who lack 
private resources will end up relying on welfare, if they are eligible” (Dewilde 
2003:121).  
 
However, it may be more complicated from the perspective of the state than to simply 
shift its normative constitution and to offer better protection against gender and class 
related risks (Dewilde 2003). A second ‘de-institutionalisation of the life course’ 
hypothesis plays down the role of the state in forming individual’s life courses, and 
points to other important macro structural changes outside the state with wide impact 
on the resource distribution at the micro level. Changes exogenous to the state take 
place within the family unit and inside the labour market, which in turn weakens and 
alters the links between the state and the family.20 The de-institutionalisation 
hypothesis is not ignoring the state influence on shaping individual life courses, but it 
is concerned with analysing a range of exogenous factors that contribute towards a 
stronger degree of de-institutionalisation of the life course. The outcome is highly 
diversified life courses, changed risk structures, a weakening of the public 
management of risk and increased inequality (Bonoli 2006; Esping-Andersen 2005; 
Esping-Andersen 2009; O'Rand 2003). Labels like ‘de-institutionalisation’, ‘de-
                                                 
20 Another important exogenous factor constraining the state’s possibility of shaping individual’s life courses and 
generating new social risks is immigration. The immigration factor is not further theorised in this thesis. 
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standardisation’ and ‘individualisation’ have been used to claim that the link between 
the welfare state and the life course has been transformed (Dewilde 2003). For 
example, whereas Western states have found it relatively easy to form systems for 
income protection against some important life course transitions, e.g. between youth 
and adult life and between adult life and old age,21 exogenous forces like family 
change become more challenging for state regulation, and hence new social risks are 
generated as a result of exogenous forces weakening state influence (Bonoli 2006).  
 
Welfare states have responded differently to exogenous pressures generated by family 
change. This has resulted in cross-national variation in the economic outcomes of 
partnership dissolution. In Britain for instance, policies that could be regarded as 
intervening into the private sphere of family life have generally been shunned by 
politicians, whereas Norway has had a tradition of a stronger regulation of family life. 
It is therefore not just the increase in divorce rates per se which represents a risk but 
rather the societal response and economic provisions made to meet these changes.   
 
In sum, there are some considerable advantages with the life course perspective for the 
study of gender inequality following partnership dissolution in a cross-national 
perspective. Drawing attention to gendered variations in the continuity and 
discontinuity in the life course, the perspective sees micro level changes in light of 
larger structural changes in society. Hence, the life course perspective is concerned 
with linking societal change at the micro and macro societal levels. The life course 
perspective also deals theoretically with variation, something which also makes this 
perspective suited to explain cross-national differences between welfare states and the 
variations in underlying normative life course models and state policies (Leisering and 
Leibfried 1999). The perspective is also useful in that it shares a notion of agency both 
at the individual level and at the level of the welfare state. At the individual level, the 
term life course has a double meaning: both in terms of a regulated path that lives 
should follow and where deviations from this path may lead into poverty, and second, 
                                                 
21 Education in the early life stages secures the individual economic provision during adult life, and retirement 
pension provides economic security for the inactive years in old age. 
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in the individual biographical sense as the notion of the individual’s encounter with his 
or her own history (Leisering and Leibfried 1999:37). The agency of the state is 
captured in the notion of how the welfare state holds the power to shape individuals’ 
lives by accommodating both individuals’ material and ideological circumstances. 
This is not to say that the welfare state acts as one agent, rather the agency of the 
welfare state is exercised through many agents, which may sometimes act 
contradictorily, but where the totality of their actions make up the agency of the 
welfare state (Daly and Rake 2003).  
1.3.4 Discussion and assessment of the theories presented 
Combining the care perspective with the life course perspective contributes to shed 
light on the gendered impacts of partnership dissolution. Female caring choices that 
seemed rational within the context of the couple family logic may turn ‘irrational’ in 
hindsight, especially for women who have invested in caring for children and family. 
For men, a similar division of labour where men are the main earners and 
supplementary carers within the couple family may, in the event of partnership 
dissolution, turn irrational in the sense of feeling a loss of closeness to one’s own 
children. The care perspective offers a theoretical understanding of life decisions being 
driven by forms of rationality other than economic ones, but where these decisions 
may still become economic in their consequences. Or, put in the language of the life 
course perspective: a life course event such as partnership dissolution may carry 
unintended (and negative) consequences that constrain life course opportunities in the 
future. This also means that in light of increasing divorce rates, relying on a male 
breadwinner increasingly becomes a risky life course strategy for women. The 
dominant normative welfare state model is also shifting towards the adult-worker 
model (Mätzke and Ostner 2010). But since the adult-worker model is a reality to a 
greater extent realised for men, the economic risks associated with partnership 
dissolution are disproportionally borne by women. The empirical investigation of 
partnership dissolution therefore needs to be embedded in an understanding of the 
influence of the past on the present economic situation, but also situated within a 
larger macro-structural context.  
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Here, this macro-context is reflected in the functioning of the welfare state, delimited 
to the national contexts of Norway and Britain. Drawing on the literature review 
above, however, there are several facets to the welfare state. Most obviously, the 
welfare state is an economic actor in that it intervenes, via its policies, in a way that 
reallocates and distributes resources. In its redistributive impacts, the welfare state also 
reallocate life chances (Daly and Rake 2003). However, welfare state non-provision, 
for instance in terms of caregiving services or economic redistributive policies, may be 
equally important in its implications for gender inequality (Daly and Rake 2003). This 
brings to light a second important aspect of the welfare state, that the way it influences 
men’s and women’s life courses is through often-contradictory gender ideologies. For 
women, the welfare state may grant women economic autonomy (e.g. allowing them 
to live as lone parents), while at the same time create new welfare state dependencies, 
in the form of provisions, services, and also as a flexible employer (Hernes 1987). The 
welfare state thus forms a crucial role in creating and reinforcing social values, 
including those attached to social roles such as spouse, worker and carer. The welfare 
state functions both in terms of redistributive, political and social processes. Hence, 
cross-national welfare state variation may be envisaged in terms of “welfare states’ 
involvement in the regulation, production, distribution and politicization of welfare” 
(Daly and Rake 2003:36). 
 
Scandinavia and Norway are regarded as front-runners in terms of gender equality. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the particular meaning of gender equality 
promoted in these countries is largely based on a notion of sameness (Bygnes 2010; 
Holst 2007).22 Hence, the explicit goal for gender equality policies has been to achieve 
gender neutrality within the family and society at large (Hernes 1987).23 In practice, 
                                                 
22 Feminist scholars have long been debating whether gender equality for women is best achieved via sameness 
or difference. This is sometimes portrayed as Wollstonecraft’s dilemma, after Mary Wollstonecraft, women’s 
activist and suffragette. She early pointed out that striving for gender equality means on the one hand striving for 
sameness, in the sense of becoming the same as men. But this is to demand the impossible because it excludes 
precisely what patriarchal citizenship also excludes, namely the distinctive attributes, capacities and activities of 
women (Pateman 1992). 
23 This is not to say that there have not been policy initiatives in Norway which could be taken in the support of 
gender equality based on the notion of difference. For instance, supporting the role of men as care-takers as well 
as cash-for-care reforms which remunerate care work, are examples of this. These policies will be discussed 
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this has mainly involved women changing their behaviours to become more similar to 
men, although more recent policy initiatives, particularly in Scandinavia, have started 
to focus on altering the behaviours of fathers (Ellingsæter and Leira 2006b). The 
notion of sameness is also reflected in quantitative and empirically-oriented social 
research which has held as the most important success criterion of gender equality, that 
women are included in politics and the labour market, at largely the same level as men 
(see for instance Kjeldstad 2001; Skrede 1999). This has resulted in gender equality 
being measured after a ‘50/50’ distribution principle or a form of ‘balance feminism’ 
(Holst 2007).24  
 
The task for quantitative research in commenting on gender equality has therefore 
largely been confined to providing gender distributions on a range of indicators based 
on cross-sectional data. In this sense, quantitative analyses of gender inequality can be 
said to carry the implicit notion that the problem in question is solved when 
distributions between men and women look the same. This is, however, unlikely to be 
a very ‘gender-sensitive’ approach, as a 50/50 balance may coexist with large 
inequalities between men and women, as long as the group distribution is balanced 
(Holst 2007). Furthermore, it potentially undermines the usefulness of statistical 
measures informing gender inequality debate in several ways. First, if used unwisely, 
these types of quantitative measures may actually contribute to conceal existing 
gender inequality. Second, the use of cross-sectional aggregate measures sit 
uncomfortably with the insights from social theory that women’s poverty and the 
experience of new social risks come about as an outcome of social change, such as 
family change, and that past experiences may structure future life outcomes. Third, the 
50/50 measures are also unsuited to reveal how any gender equality outcomes come 
about, and whether women depend more on the welfare state than men, as suggested 
by social theory (Esping-Andersen 1999; Hernes 1987; Stang Dahl 1984). Gender 
                                                                                                                                                        
more in chapter 3. The point here is that in a context of quantitatively measuring gender equality, a 50/50 
distribution has been the dominating strategy. 
24 A 50/50 distribution between men and women is for example applied in the quantitative measures used in the 
Norwegian ‘Barometer of Equality’ (2000-2005) (Ombud for Equality) and ‘SaLDO’ (the new joint Ombud for 
Equality and Anti-Discrimination) (2007-2010) which is a series of reports with the purpose of monitoring the 
equality and discrimination situation in Norway.  
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differences in welfare state dependence is important to explore, not the least in terms 
of discussions around which groups in society will be most hit by welfare state 
retrenchment and economic recession.  Therefore, ‘gender sensitive’ research needs to 
apply a strategy and methodology which can evaluate women’s and men’s economic 
vulnerability in light of changing household contexts and in terms of gender 
differences in state and market dependencies.  
 
A necessary prerequisite to achieve this goal is the access to comparative and 
longitudinal data, which follows individuals over time, and thereby contains 
information about how household incomes fluctuate in light of changing household 
and work contexts (Jonsson and Mills 2001; Ruspini and Dale 2002a). It is therefore 
not the life course seen from the perspective of the individual that becomes interesting, 
where life events may be rationalised according to biographical stories of more or less 
intentional character. Rather, it is the aggregate of individual life courses which 
become the study object and where gendered social inequalities, vis-à-vis changing 
family contexts, in need of explanation may be revealed (Jonsson and Mills 2001). 
1.4 Outline of rest of thesis 
In sum, divorce and partnership dissolution is an important subject for ‘revitalising’ 
the discussions on gender and the welfare state. But since the role of the state varies 
between countries, it is also a topic that is suited for cross-national comparison. This 
means that partnership dissolution constitutes an intersection of many important 
dynamics in contemporary societies: family and work changes, income loss and 
poverty and welfare state challenges. As such, partnership dissolution makes for an 
interesting case into the study of gender inequality.  
 
To follow up on this theme, the outline of the rest of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 
two is the methodology and data chapter where advantages of the comparative and 
longitudinal approach applied in this thesis are outlined. The chapter also contains 
information on the two data sets analysed in this thesis: the Norwegian Level of Living 
panel study and the British Household Panel Survey.  
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Chapter three looks closer at the institutional background in the two countries 
compared by looking at family policy measures and marriage law. It is assumed that 
cross-national variation in institutional frameworks will have an impact on the 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution.  
 
Next follows the three empirical chapters in this thesis, all contributing in different 
ways to analysing whether gender income inequality is a consequence of partnership 
dissolution. The first, chapter four, analyses the risk of experiencing income poverty 
following two different events that leads a household to deviate from the dual-earner 
norm, namely partnership dissolution and employment related events. The poverty line 
approach is applied as a yardstick for assessing gender inequality, hence drawing on 
the argument that if women have a higher risk of poverty following partnership 
dissolution than men, than this can be understood as gender inequality. Furthermore, 
this analysis also draws out comparisons between those who do not experience the 
event of partnership dissolution (‘intact couple’) versus those who experience 
partnership dissolution (‘broken couples’).  
 
Chapter five further examines the role of the welfare state in its impact on the post-
dissolution economic situation of a household, looking at the extent to which the 
welfare state acts as a buffer to prevent gender inequality as a consequence of 
partnership dissolution by protecting women against income loss. Drawing on an 
income-decomposition analysis, this chapter makes for an opportunity to discuss the 
extent to which women and men differ in their dependencies on the state and the 
labour market for securing their own economic welfare  
 
The last analysis, chapter six, shifts the focus from differences in macro welfare 
context to exploring the extent to which differences in individual level characteristics, 
more precisely caring responsibilities and employment relations, impacts women’s and 
men’s post-dissolution incomes.  
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Chapter seven is the concluding chapter where the main issues raised by the theoretical 
framework, including policy outline, the methodologies applied and the empirical 
investigations carried out are discussed.  
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2 Methodology and data  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to account for the research methodology applied in this 
thesis. The chapter expands on the gender-sensitive, comparative and longitudinal 
approaches to the study of gender income inequality following partnership dissolution, 
sketched out in the previous chapter. The methodological strategy rests on two pillars. 
The first is the use of a comparative approach, more specifically, a comparison 
between two welfare state contexts, the Norwegian and British, treated as two different 
cases. The choice of a comparative approach is related to the theoretical framework 
presented in the previous chapter. The second pillar is the use of a longitudinal 
approach and the application of longitudinal survey data in the analysis, which is 
particularly useful for examining how major life course events, such as partnership 
dissolution, impacts on women’s economic vulnerability (Dewilde 2002; Ruspini 
2002b:21).  
 
The chapter is divided into four parts. First, the comparative case-study approach is 
presented in section 2.2. Second, the longitudinal approach is outlined in section 2.3, 
and discusses in particular how it benefits a gender-sensitive study. Third, the 
assumption of pooling household income is assessed as well as two different strategies 
of ‘engendering’ pooled household income measures. Fourth, extending the previous 
point, the two longitudinal panel data sets applied in this thesis are described in section 
2.5. The final section 2.6 contains the definition of partnership dissolution applied in 
this study and an assessment of the income measures used. Further descriptions of 
samples, variables and methods of analysis used in the thesis are presented in the 
empirical chapters four, five and six. 
2.2 Comparative and cross-national case study design  
The linkages between women’s economic vulnerability and women’s positions in paid 
employment and their caring obligations in the family can be seen in light of the wider 
welfare state structures and the constitution of the female life course. Interruption of 
women’s employment in relation to childbearing and rearing, women’s tendency to 
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work part-time (in order to accommodate their family work), and women’s 
concentration in relatively few occupations with low salaries and career prospects may 
curb women’s economic positions and increase women’s poverty risks in relation to 
divorce (Ruspini 2002b; Stier 2009). However, to some extent, the nation-specific 
shaping of the welfare state will enable or constrain women and men in their 
employment and caring choices, which will have implications for women’s economic 
vulnerability after partnership dissolution (Andreβ and Hummelsheim 2009b; Stier 
2009).  
 
From a methodological point of view, a challenge for this study is related to how the 
interplay between welfare state contexts, the individual life course and gender relations 
is to be examined and incorporated into a survey-based analysis.25 The welfare state 
comprises many institutions, sometimes with opposing effects on an individual’s 
welfare. This means that the significance the welfare state holds is of such a nature that 
it cannot easily be reduced to single indicators to be ‘estimated’ in a regression model. 
In appreciation of the complexity of the welfare state and its specific agency, the 
methodological strategy adopted in this thesis is a comparative case-study design.26  
 
The general aim of case-oriented research is to relate the phenomena being studied to 
the wider economic, social and historical context in which they take place (de Vaus 
2008; Ragin 1987). Observed gender income differences in a case-study are therefore 
linked to a detailed and complex description of differences and similarities in policies 
and regulations between the countries compared (Sigle-Rushton 2009a). This requires 
an in-depth knowledge of the nation-specific welfare state framework. Relevant 
welfare state influences which will be considered in this thesis are: how welfare states 
provide monetary transfers and fiscal relief, how the public infrastructure enables 
                                                 
25 Administrative registers such as marriage, divorce and income/taxation records may also be exploited in such 
a study and can be useful in the sense that they contain more individuals than a survey sample. However, such 
registers were not available for this project. There are also other problems with register information. For 
instance, information about cohabitation is normally lacking. Without being able to include cohabitation in the 
analysis, it also becomes problematic to estimate post-dissolution household size. This may have a serious 
impact on post-divorce household income estimates, as they cannot be controlled for household size. The use of 
register data may therefore be ill suited for researching post-dissolution incomes (Kirkeberg and Pedersen 2000). 
26 Another common research strategy is to capture the significance of the welfare state through a regime 
approach, e.g. welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
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family members to participate in the labour market, and how the state enact laws 
which protect children and former partners from economic loss (Andreβ and 
Hummelsheim 2009b). The first comparison presented in this thesis is therefore 
between the Norwegian and British welfare state policy contexts, and is presented in 
chapter three. The reference unit in the comparison is the nation state, the level at 
which family policy and law is directed. This is not to disregard that there may be 
intra-national differences in the impact of welfare policies, but it falls outside the 
scope of the thesis to examine these any further.  
 
A case-oriented strategy compares outcomes by being sensitive to the context in which 
the outcomes are produced (Ragin 1987:35). This is a strategy that works best when 
focusing on only a small number of cases, and studying in depth the determinants 
affecting the outcome, i.e. the institutional shaping of the welfare state and the nation-
specific gendered care and work relations (Stier 2009). With many countries involved 
in the analysis, this rapidly becomes an insurmountable task. Therefore, this thesis 
limits the comparison to two countries, Norway and Britain.27  
 
There are several reasons for why these two countries were selected for comparison. 
As was pointed out in chapter one, an important task at the outset of this PhD project 
was to introduce Norway to the field of cross-national and comparative research into 
the economic consequences of partnership dissolution. It was therefore pivotal to find 
an appropriate contrast case. Britain was selected for this purpose for several reasons, 
both substantive and pragmatic. First, Norway and Britain have similarly high divorce 
rates but differ in the significance the role welfare state plays for gender equality. The 
advantage of comparing two relatively different cases is that this method can be 
thought of as being similar to an experiment (De Vaus 2001:51). Hence, the analysis 
of whether the economic consequences of partnership dissolution under differing 
welfare state conditions yield predictable differences in outcome will contribute to the 
                                                 
27 Another strategy often applied by researchers wishing to follow a case-study approach is to gather several 
‘single country cases’ into one book volume where different authors contribute different single country analyses, 
and where the editors draw the links between them in a concluding chapter (Andreβ and Hummelsheim 2009a).  
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development of greater confidence that the causal process of income change is related 
to the differing welfare state contexts (De Vaus 2001). 
 
Second, systematic cross-national comparisons may be valuable for research seeking 
to determine whether an explanation developed in one or more cases has wider 
applicability (De Vaus 2001:51; Hantrais 2009:49). Previous cross-national research 
into the economic consequences of partnership dissolution has concluded that 
women’s incomes are more negatively affected by this critical life event than men’s 
incomes. However, research conducted only for Norway had found less evidence of 
gender income inequality following dissolution. The use of deviant cases integrated 
into a cross-national comparative research design is useful for testing the wider 
applicability of research findings and for forcing potential re-evaluation of key 
theories and concepts (Hantrais 2009:49). Hence, in this instance, the comparison 
between Norway and Britain is interesting because it can highlight the wider 
applicability of the negative impact of partnership dissolution for women, and also 
force a possible refinement of theory, concepts and measures used to understand why 
economic outcomes between women and men differ after partnership dissolution. 
Third, for more pragmatic reasons, data were easily available for Britain in the form of 
the BHPS study, which made Britain well-suited as a contrast case. Finally, the author 
has also lived and worked in both countries and hence has a comparatively better 
knowledge of these two country contexts compared with other countries.  
 
With this comparative research strategy, the welfare state takes a central role in 
explaining why gender income inequality differs between countries. Behind this 
methodology also lies a specific notion of the welfare state. Welfare states must be 
seen as “complex and integrated wholes” (Daly and Rake 2003:42). This means that 
the ‘effect’ of the welfare state cannot be reduced to the specific and ‘narrow’ 
influence of particular institutional arrangements. The welfare state must rather be 
understood in a holistic manner. The aim of this thesis is therefore not to test the effect 
of one or more specific national policies on the economic outcome after separation 
(i.e. not to do an effect evaluation, of for instance the direct effect of child support on 
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women’s economic outcome after divorce). To do this, a different comparative 
approach would have had to be applied.28 The explanatory power assigned to the 
welfare state is not derived via statistical testing, but is ‘observed’ in the cross-national 
comparison of variations in access to income after dissolution. This thesis is therefore 
first and foremost designed to outline the general influence the nation-specific welfare 
state system holds on individual’s economic status, after separation. It is less attuned 
to identifying specific mechanisms (i.e. specific policy programmes) within the 
broader welfare state context that may affect individual’s income situation.  
 
A case-oriented, comparative design also holds the advantage that it is possible to test 
whether the same change in life circumstances leads to the same outcomes in the 
countries compared. The other cross-national comparison in this thesis is that of 
women’s and men’s income changes following partnership dissolution, based on 
household panel survey data (presented in chapters four, five and six). These analyses 
examine whether experiencing the same event (here: partnership dissolution) leads to 
the same economic outcomes between different countries and between women and 
men, or not. If differences in outcomes are observed, than this poses the question of 
why gender income inequality following divorce and separation differs cross-
nationally. To answer this, observed income differences are in the next instance 
attributed to divergences in national welfare state contexts. This is a common strategy 
in cross-national survey research where the aim is to explain diverging outcomes with 
reference to the nation-specific linkages between welfare state and the phenomenon 
being studied (Andreβ and Hummelsheim 2009a; Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 2003; 
Sigle-Rushton 2009b). The case-study is thus an evidence-oriented strategy (Ragin 
1987), and where explanatory statements about the gendered linkages between work, 
care and welfare state can be developed on the background of empirical analyses 
coupled with a broad economic, social and historical welfare state context (Daly and 
                                                 
28 For an overview of other comparative methodological research designs for measuring the direct effect of 
different policy measures see for instance Sigle-Rushton (2009) or Stier (2009). Statistical tools frequently 
applied in ‘policy impact evaluation’ research are for instance difference-in-difference and matching methods, 
regression discontinuity design and (quasi/natural) experiments. Such tools will not be used here, and the view 
taken here is that to isolate a few factors or elements of the welfare state institutional structure, with the aim of 
testing the isolated effect of these policy measures, may be misleading, or at least a too narrow analysis strategy 
for interpreting the impact the welfare state holds on the economic consequences of partnership dissolution.  
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Rake 2003:42). In a case study, contextual information is collected about the case, so 
that there is a context within which to understand the causal process being observed 
(De Vaus 2001:50). 
 
The case-study approach to some extent stands in opposition to another common 
strategy in the comparative literature, which is to explain cross-national differences by 
means of a typology, such as a regime model. Whereas this study does not disregard 
the important insights gained from regime comparisons, and how such comparisons 
have been able to demonstrate how welfare states cluster according to more or less 
coherent embodiments of institutional arrangements (e.g. Esping-Andersen’s (1990; 
1999) welfare state regime model), this thesis is not concerned, for instance, with 
testing the internal validity or positioning of specific countries within such typologies 
(e.g. Uunk 2004), or in developing new typologies for understanding cross-national 
variation in the economic consequences of separation (Andreβ et al. 2006; Andreβ 
2003).  
 
The position taken here is that the regime literature has an inherent weakness in that it 
positions countries into models, whereas countries may not always fall neatly into 
these pre-defined typologies.  Moreover, policies may develop over time and regime 
models are not necessarily able to capture how nations develop and perhaps shift their 
regime positioning. Since a primary aim of this thesis is to introduce a country that has 
not previously been analysed to the comparative divorce literature, the Norwegian 
case, this thesis has opted for a methodology that is more attuned to national 
complexity than studies relying on the regime logic. To the extent that this study is 
engaged in the regime literature, it is more on the level considering to what extent the 
Norwegian case can be said to be fitted into existing regime classifications, such as the 
Social Democratic welfare state regime of Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) or family 
support typology of Andreβ (2003). Deviant case studies are useful in theory building 
as they can contribute to refine and sharpen existing hypotheses (Hantrais 2009).  
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Of course, there are limitations to the comparative case-study approach. As in all case-
oriented research, the goal of appreciating complexity is given precedence over the 
goal of achieving generality (Ragin 1987). This means that the findings from this study 
are not necessarily directly transferable to other country contexts. Furthermore, the 
‘holistic’ position taken on the welfare state means that it is not possible to determine 
the effect of specific policy programmes or benefit initiatives on the outcome in 
question (Stier 2009). This may leave the research less relevant for policy makers, who 
are often more interested in specific policy initiatives rather than the general welfare 
state influence on the household economy.  
2.3 Longitudinal research approach  
The use of a longitudinal approach in this thesis refers first and foremost to the survey 
data that are analysed. ‘Longitudinal’ is an imprecise term but is here taken to mean 
that the data consists of repeated observations, gathered over several consecutive 
waves, so that individuals can be followed over time. The longitudinal approach is 
therefore a dynamic approach, analysing relations between phenomena which evolves 
over time (Ruspini 2002a).  
 
The writer of this thesis wishes to contribute to a research programme exploiting 
longitudinal data to ‘engender’ analyses of income change (Ruspini 2000; Ruspini and 
Dale 2002b). This includes a clear strategy to empirically demonstrate the underlying 
processes by which women and men fall into, experience, and escape economic 
vulnerability. For this purpose, the interaction between critical events and changes in 
resource distribution in the family, labour market and welfare state institutions are 
analysed. Understanding the impact of life course dynamics on income change and 
poverty risks requires access to longitudinal data. Despite this particular advantage of 
observing shifts in gendered distributions of economic resources, longitudinal data 
analysis has not been widely applied in feminist-inspired analyses of gender 
inequality. A problem for feminist researchers wishing to query into gendered 
distributions of economic resources has often been the lack of longitudinal data or the 
lack of knowledge on how to analyse longitudinal data (Ruspini and Dale 2002c). This 
is unfortunate given the unique opportunity provided by longitudinal data in 
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understanding the gendered impact of family change on women’s income risks. The 
impact partnership dissolution has on the household economy can be disentangled by 
linking changes in the life situation of women and men to the interaction between 
individual action and the wider social structures (Ruspini 2002b).  
 
The more common approach within feminist-inspired cross-national empirical studies 
has been to apply cross-sectional data, and focus on different groups of economically 
disadvantaged women such as women receiving benefits or lone mothers (Daly 2000; 
Daly and Rake 2003; Hansen et al. 2006; Sørensen 1994). However, cross-sectional 
studies do not integrate into the analysis how women enter into the economically 
difficult situation, for instance, that the most common way in which to enter lone 
motherhood is through separation and divorce. Therefore, instead of studying lone 
motherhood per se (in a cross-sectional fashion), analysing partnership dissolution as a 
transition is a more direct way of examining the link between family change and 
income change.29 This provides a strategy of empirical analysis that is better equipped 
for pointing to the causes behind economic risk and poverty, in that conditions 
preceding the dissolution can be taken into account into the analysis. Longitudinal 
research is therefore better for making statistically valid conclusions on causality, or at 
least aims in that direction (De Vaus 2001). Panel data provide information on the 
same individual for several consecutive years and can therefore be used to identify the 
order in which events take place, hence it is possible to determine whether income 
changes take place before or after the dissolution. Observing the income of a 
household before partnership dissolution (‘pre-test’) and the household income after 
partnership dissolution (‘post-test’) assigns explanatory power to the critical event 
between the two time points compared as being the presumed causal variable behind 
the income change (De Vaus 2001:43). Therefore, any income change between two 
observation points can be connected with great certainty to the inter-mediating event 
of partnership dissolution. The drawback of focussing uniquely on partnership 
                                                 
29 An admitted weakness is that this approach only analyses those cases where lone parenthood starts when a 
relationship ends, and excludes from the analysis those who have children without having a partner.  
  
52 
dissolution as an event is that it excludes from the analysis other economically 
vulnerable women such as lone mothers who never had a partner present.  
 
A longitudinal research design is superior to a cross-sectional design. Longitudinal 
data, and the appropriate techniques of analysis, make it possible to examine the 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution as a function of both past and 
contemporary experiences (Dewilde 2002; Poortman 2000; Smock 1994). This means 
that the direction of change and causal connections can be studied. With longitudinal 
panel data, it is possible to identify whether an event occurs before or after another 
event, and thereby it is possible to establish whether one event is the cause of another 
event with greater probability. Here in this thesis it is established how incomes shifts 
after partnership dissolution, which thus lends explanatory support to the assumption 
that partnership dissolution caused the income change (De Vaus 2001). 
 
Longitudinal research methods, such as panel data methods, therefore have greatly 
improved the possibility of making inferences with regard to the mechanisms behind 
poverty, exploring which critical events may act as triggers of income changes 
(DiPrete and McManus 2000; Ruspini and Dale 2002b). In addition, longitudinal data 
and the application of appropriate techniques of analysis greatly improve statistical 
analysis by allowing the researcher to be in a better position to control for unobserved 
explanatory variables (Petersen 2004). 30 
 
The application of longitudinal data also more closely corresponds with a theoretical 
life-course perspective, where life course events are seen as advantages and 
disadvantages accumulated over the life course (Dannefer 2003). That is why the use 
of longitudinal data reflecting family change is particularly important for informing 
research interested in establishing the links between gender inequality and the 
dynamics of women’s life courses (Ruspini and Dale 2002b). However, a small but 
growing number of studies are applying these methods when analysing women’s 
income risks related to divorce and partnership dissolution in particular (see section 
                                                 
30 See also chapter 4 and the use of fixed effects models.  
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4.2 for an overview). By applying a feminist-inspired theoretical framework for the 
analysis, and by including Norway into this scholarship, it is this research literature to 
which the writer of the thesis wishes to contribute. 
 
In the data, individuals are tracked once a year, so that changes in life circumstance 
can be compared between one year and the next. This makes it possible to distinguish 
between short- and long-term economic consequences of partnership dissolution, and 
to directly associate the event with corresponding income changes. Due to the lack of a 
long time series (for Norway), it is the short-term economic consequences of 
partnership dissolution that is the focus of this thesis. 
 
The other way in which a longitudinal analysis approach is sensitive to gender, is in 
the way it opens up the opportunity to examine the impact the welfare state has on the 
household income for women and men. Household incomes are comprised of several 
income sources, such as wage income and welfare transfers. Longitudinal data makes 
it possible to examine women’s and men’s dependencies on different income sources 
by tracing them, both before and after the partnership dissolution. In this way, shifting 
dependencies on market and welfare state incomes for women and men can be 
determined. A longitudinal approach is therefore to be preferred when analysing the 
redistributive effects of the welfare state.  
 
The growth in access to longitudinal household panel data for different countries have 
thus started to make the empirical basis for disentangling the complicated links 
between large scale societal trends, such as gender equality, and the micro-level life 
courses of individual men and women, and to study variations in these links between 
countries (Dewilde 2006; DiPrete and McManus 2000).  
 
Of course, there are weaknesses to this methodological approach. The greatest 
disadvantage for doing research on partnership dissolution in this way is the limited 
access to information about divorces and separations in the data. To apply this strategy 
and analyse partnership dissolution as an event in a person’s life course, it is necessary 
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to measure what has changed since the subjects were married or cohabiting, using 
information from recently separated couples. Although partnership dissolution rates 
are high and on the increase, separated couples still represent a minority of the 
population at any given point in time. This means that to obtain sufficient numbers of 
partnership dissolutions in panel data, it is necessary to gather date from a relatively 
long observation period. Small sample sizes are also common weakness in studies of 
the consequences of divorce (Andreβ and Hummelsheim 2009b). In this thesis, six- 
and eight-wave panels have been analysed. This provides an observed number of 
partnership dissolutions about in line with previous studies, however, the sample size 
for Norway is admittedly low. Hence, low sample size is a possible source of error in 
subsequent analyses (see also section 2.5). 
2.4 The use of income measures to assess gender inequality  
The absolute main concern in this thesis is to measure the extent to which partnership 
dissolution has a more negative impact of women’s economic situation than men’s. To 
achieve this aim, a range of different income measures are applied, which in sum total, 
it is argued, makes for an empirical strategy ‘sensitive’ to gender income inequality. In 
this section, the empirical strategy regarding the incomes measures used is outlined. 
2.4.1 Income pooling 
Initially, it needs to be underscored that this thesis analyses changes in household 
income. This also means that this study relies on the same pooling assumption as the 
majority of quantitative income studies, namely that all members of the same 
household pool the economic resources available in that household, and that all 
persons in the same household therefore share the same level of living. This makes for 
a reasonable presumption that during the time couples whose relationships have lasted 
for some time are likely to make several joint investments related to sharing the same 
dwelling, inventory and food and thus, arguably, share the same standard of living. 
The problem with this assumption is that it, rightfully, has been criticised by feminist 
researchers for not being particularly gender-sensitive. Moreover, the pooling 
assumption likely hides the fact that women have less power to spend and control 
economic resources in households where they are the lowest earners (Millar and 
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Glendinning 1989; Phal 1995). This means that the pooling assumption poses a 
particular problem to feminist research interested in gender inequality in the household 
economy, in that it is likely that a measure that uses pooled household income 
contributes to the concealment of gender inequality and hides differences in women’s 
and men’s relative contribution and dependencies in the household economy (Daly and 
Rake 2003:119; Lewis 2001). Typically, it is difficult for survey-based research to 
observe and determine how individuals contribute and share economic resources inside 
the household. Hence, the household economy appears as a kind of ‘black box’ to 
researchers interested in intra-household income inequality (Ruspini and Dale 2002a).  
 
Although the exact distribution of economic resources within households is not 
known, some scenarios assuming different degrees of pooling of economic resources 
can be developed. First, for a couple who have relatively equal incomes, a high degree 
of income pooling means that the joint household income will provide a higher level of 
living for both spouses together as a family than separate. This may also decrease the 
economic incentives to end the relationship, but the strength of this effect is not 
necessarily independent of income level (Oppenheimer 1997). Two high earners will 
together pool a large family income. This in turn makes it difficult for either of the two 
spouses to replace the income of the other in case of partnership dissolution, creating a 
high degree of economic interdependence within the relationship. Partnership 
dissolution will in this case represent a relatively great loss of economic welfare for 
both ex-spouses. But this loss of welfare may not have a large impact on the decision 
to separate, as both spouses are likely to sustain an independent household without 
being threatened with poverty. However, avoiding poverty does not mean the same as 
not experiencing an income loss, which can still be substantial for both women and 
men, if both earn the same and pool these resources during the relationship. 
  
In a household where both spouses earn about the same, but both are low earners, the 
relative loss of one income would be less compared with the higher earning couple. 
Hence, the binding effect of a pooled household economy might be considered lower. 
On the other hand, a pooled family income from two low wages is nevertheless more 
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than one low wage, and if money is scarce in the first instance, the loss of one income 
might be decisive on the whether to divorce or not, since poverty is a likely outcome 
of partnership dissolution. For example, it could be difficult to pay a housing mortgage 
or a car loan alone on a single low income. The economic outcome of partnership 
dissolution would then either be poverty or dependence on other sources of income, 
like welfare transfers.  
 
If a separate or independent money management scenario is assumed, then the income 
difference between the two spouses could mean a great deal in terms of economic 
incentives to divorce or to stay married.31 On the one hand, it could be argued in the 
same vein as Becker (1981), that independent money management will increase the  
incentive to end the relationship, as the economic situation inside and outside marriage 
would be more or less the same. Independent money management gives women the 
opportunity to become independent households, and thus the opportunity to divorce. 
However, if separate money management means that both spouses contribute the same 
towards shared expenses like housing and food, then the size of any income difference 
between the two spouses really matters, as the highest earner will keep a larger 
independent share for him (or her)self after the shared expenses have been paid. This 
means in turn that for a couple with two incomes but where the husband is the higher 
earner, the husband, with a separate money management system, will have a higher 
level of living than the spouse inside the same marriage, since he will dispose of the 
most money after shared expenses have been paid. The economic independence of the 
lower earning woman inside this marriage will relate to how much of the income she 
has left after the joint expenses have been paid. But her economic independence is 
nevertheless greater than if she had no income. After divorce, the relative welfare loss 
for the higher earner will still be lower than for the lower earner, since the level of 
welfare outside marriage will be directly related to individual income. The lowest 
earner will have relatively more to lose in the case of divorce, since that person has 
                                                 
31 It should be noted that independent management of money within couple relationships is the model most 
different from the modelling assumptions made in most economic analyses of family economics, including here, 
which assumes pooling of income to the extent that all individuals in the same household share the same level of 
living (see also chapter 4).  
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more limited access to money, unless other sources of income are available such as 
welfare transfers.  
 
What is not answered in the scenarios above is what steers the decisions to pool or not 
pool incomes during a relationship. It is argued here that this may not be seen as a 
conscious choice based on rational economic calculations of potential loss of income 
in the anticipation of a future end of the current relationship. Rather, the pattern of 
money management within the family must be seen as being influenced by a range of 
factors, including gendered norms guiding the division of unpaid work in the family. 
Societal norms guiding the recognition of the value of the unpaid work carried out may 
play a role for a couple with one high and one low earner, which is the typical situation 
today with many part-time working women; the willingness to pool household income 
might be greater if the higher earner has a high appreciation of the unpaid work 
contributions made by a lower earner. Hence, decisions to pool or separately manage 
money cannot be seen as disconnected from norms guiding gender relations to earning 
and care, a theme which will be followed up in this thesis. 
2.4.2 ‘Gender-sensitising’ income measures 
This study aims to find an empirical strategy than can make income analyses more 
gender-sensitive and that can contribute to ‘engender’ the pooling assumption. The 
most important step taken is to apply a longitudinal approach to the investigation of 
household income.  
 
The longitudinal study of partnership dissolution can be used to discover how 
processes of income change can be gendered and linked to sudden changes in the life 
course. The extent to which women are more negatively affected by partnership 
dissolution must be interpreted as the outcome of a gender income imbalance existing 
in the relationship prior to dissolution. Observing partnership dissolution is the same 
as observing the end point of a longer process of accumulating inequality within the 
household. This inequality does not show when analysing the joint household income 
of a couple, as the pooling assumption presupposes that all members of the same 
household share the same level of living (i.e. they pool their economic resources). 
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What is suggested in this thesis is that studying the partnership dissolution event 
provides a window through which gender income inequality in the household can be 
studied and observed. This window opens up when, by the means of longitudinal data, 
having the possibility of observing how the income situation shifts between two 
different time observations, where the first observation is of the household economy 
while the couple is ‘intact’ and where the second observation is after partnership 
dissolution and the new and separated female and male household economics have 
been established. Hence, studying partnership dissolution as an event means that the 
analysis tracks changes in household income from a joint-couple household income 
(pre-dissolution) into sex-segregated household incomes (post-dissolution). Thus, 
studying income changes in relation to partnership dissolution can contribute to 
making gender inequality transparent to empirical investigation, drawing the veil from 
the ‘black box’ that the household economy represents and providing  a gendered gaze 
on contemporary income risks (Ruspini and Dale 2002b).  
 
The drawback of making inferences about gender income inequality based on 
comparing changes in pre- and post-dissolution household income is that the gendered 
distribution of pre-dissolution economic resources is unknown to the researcher. To 
further ‘gender sensitise’ the analysis, two strategies are applied. First, in chapter four, 
a relative income poverty line approach is taken.32 This is a commonly applied 
approach in the context of studying economic inequality in general and the economic 
consequences of partnership dissolution in particular (Dewilde 2002; Ruspini 2000). 
The income poverty line approach holds several advantages.33 First, from a 
methodological point of view, a dichotomous distinction between entering or not 
entering a poverty spell as the outcome of an event may be implemented, transparently 
and relatively easily, by the use of logistic regression that regresses the dichotomous 
dependent poverty variable on a set of independent variables coded as events (Ruspini 
2000:130). Second, from a comparative point of view, the large amount of existing 
                                                 
32 A relative poverty measure is used; more specifically the poverty line is drawn at 60 percent of median 
equalised household income in the particular country studied. See also chapter 3. 
33 The poverty line approach has also been criticised for being founded on an arbitrary measurement strategy as 
there are no theoretical sound reasons for exactly where to set the poverty line. For an overview of this critique 
see for instance Veit-Wilson (1997). 
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studies in the research literature also relying on a poverty line approach, means that the 
findings from this study may be more easily compared with the existing research 
literature. Third, from a philosophical point of view, it has been argued that a 
particular organisation of society which contributes to a redistribution of material 
resources in such a way that it leads to poverty and economic inequality is 
incompatible with a just society (Fraser 2003). 34 If, for instance, it is possible to 
determine that poverty risks are greater for women than for men as a consequence of 
partnership dissolution, there is reason to also argue that the current societal 
organisation and redistribution of resources has not lead to gender equality (Ruspini 
2000). Lastly, this makes research more relevant for informing the policy-making 
processes, as clearly identifiable injustices may make a more direct call for political 
action.  
 
Second, in chapters five and six, different income sources are analysed in order to 
become more sensitive to gender income inequality. Breaking the household income 
down into wage earnings and economic contributions from transfers makes it possible 
to determine who contributes most to the household economy. In this way, examining 
different income sources can reveal whether women have greater or different 
economic dependencies than men following partnership dissolution (Daly and Rake 
2003; Ruspini 2002a).  
 
There are some limitations to the income measures applied in this thesis. First, it needs 
to be noted that it is income and not consumption that is used as the indicator for 
economic well-being. This means that differences in consumption needs are not taken 
into account. The most obvious example is that housing expenses, a necessary 
consumption expense for all households, are not included in the income measure. 
Furthermore, the income measures also ignore private transfers such as gifts. Second, 
income measures are made annually. Income fluctuations within one calendar year are 
                                                 
34 Feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser states that economic redistribution needs to be based on a distribution of 
material resources in a way that secures everyone’s ‘voice’ and independence. This precludes an organisation of 
society that results in gross disparities in wealth and income. To build such a just society necessitates a 
redistribution of material benefits such as income and property (Fraser 2003). However, Fraser leaves it an open 
question as to how large any economic inequality must be before it becomes unjust (Holst 2007). 
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not addressed. Third, the effect of indirect benefits from public spending (other than 
cash transfers) are not reflected in the income measures. For instance, the effect of 
affordable day care for children, schooling and health care are not directly reflected in 
any of the income measures used. The wider effect of the welfare state system is not, 
and cannot, be treated as a quantitative entity. Rather, the effect of differences in 
family and welfare policy system are addressed theoretically, above, and also outlined 
further in chapter three.  
2.5 Data 
The following two national household panel surveys are used for all analyses in this 
thesis: Norwegian Level of Living Panel Survey (LEVPAN), 1997-200235 and the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1997-2004.36 In addition, some of the income 
information from BHPS was obtained from an additional release of the BHPS 
containing derived variables on net household income.37  
 
Both surveys are high quality data sets collected by serious actors, and provide rich 
opportunities for empirical analysis. The reason why these two data sets were chosen 
for this thesis is that they were the only sources available at the time when this PhD 
project started, which both had information on partnership dissolution and income 
changes over time and was collected in a way that made the surveys comparable.  
  
Both data sets were provided as ‘flat files’. All data preparation (setting up files in 
long data format), tabulation and regressions have been performed using Stata. 38 To 
the author’s knowledge, no previous study has compare the LEVPAN data with BHPS, 
                                                 
35 The Norwegian Level of Living Panel Study (in Norwegian: Samordnet levekårsundersøkelse, 
panelundersøkelsen), was collected and made anonymous by Statistics Norway. Data for this project were 
provided by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither the original data collectors nor NSD bear 
any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.  
36 The British Household Panel Survey data were made available through the UK Data Archive. The data were 
originally collected by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, 
(formerly known as ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change). Neither the original collectors of the data 
nor the UK Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.  
37 The data file for ‘Derived Current and Annual Net Household Income Variables, BHPS waves 1-14’ (SN3909) 
was put together by ISER at the University of Essex and made available for this study by the UK Data Archive. 
None of these institutions are responsible for the analyses and interpretations made here. 
38 I am sincerely grateful to Prof. Stephen P. Jenkins at ISER, University of Essex, for kindly proving Stata 
routines for converting BHPS into long file format. He also provided Stata routines for how to analyse household 
changes across time in the BHPS data.   
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although it has always been the idea that these Norwegian data should be comparable 
with a range of other European panel data surveys (Vatne Pettersen 2004), 
consequently a considerable amount of time was spent in order to prepare the data for 
analysis and to ensure comparability for all applied measures.39 
 
 Both panels are unbalanced, with different numbers of time observations (ti) for each 
individual. They are short panels with a relatively large number of individuals but with 
few observations on each (‘a large n, small t panel’).40 The panels are not compact and 
there are ‘gaps’ where some individuals leave the panel for one or more waves and 
then re-enter the panel.  
 
To attribute differences in survey findings to real differences between the countries, 
rather than to differences in data collection methods, there must be equivalence in the 
survey data compared (de Vaus 2008). There is a high degree of methodological 
equivalence between LEVPAN and BHPS data, for instance for the data analysed here 
the question asked to respondents are comparable. However some differences between 
the surveys exist which are pointed out below.  
2.5.1 The Norwegian Level of Living panel study (LEVPAN) 
Whereas levels of living surveys have been running regularly in Norway over the past 
35 years, the history of the Norwegian Level of Living panel study is much shorter. 
The panel analysed here comprises six waves of data from 1997-2002. 41  
 
                                                 
39 This applied a particular challenge to the LEVPAN data from Norway, which were provided without little 
survey guidance and documentation. I am therefore very thankful to Silje Vatne Pettersen at Statistics Norway 
for spending her time on answering all my LEVPAN related questions.  
40 The BHPS is really a long running panel but not all available waves of data have been analysed in this theis.  
41 After 2002 LEVPAN became part of EU-SILC. Technically it is according to Statistics Norway possible to 
extend the LEVPAN panel survey with additional waves from EU-SILC as the new EU-SILC is partly based on 
the same sample as LEVPAN. But such data was not made available for the current study. Direct communication 
with Statistics Norway only offered LEVPAN and EU-SILC as separate data files with no way of linking the 
two. In addition, the new Norwegian EU-SILC data are also unsuited to analyse the economic consequences of 
partnership dissolution. This is due to an administrative change made in the child maintenance in payments 
system in 2001, where child maintenance was made non-taxable. In addition it was opened up for the possibility 
of making private arrangements for child maintenance payments. In 2004 between 35 and 40 percent of child 
maintenance was based on private arrangements (Lyngstad 2008:20). These alterations means that Norwegian 
tax authorities no longer have any complete registers compiling information on child maintenance. This has also 
made it more difficult to analyse the economic consequences of partnership dissolution in Norway without 
issuing separate surveys to collect income information.  
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The LEVPAN survey has a representative sample of the Norwegian population aged 
16-79 years, however, all analyses in this thesis are of samples restricted to individuals 
of working age (18-66 years in Norway).42 The original sample from 1997 consisted of 
5000 individuals with a close to 80 percent response rate in the first wave, declining to 
about 70 percent in 2002. In 2002, a total of 3590 persons were interviewed. For more 
information about the survey, see Vatne Pettersen (2004). 
 
A key aim of this thesis is to analyse changes in household income, using the 
household as the unit of analysis. This poses a challenge in terms of the Norwegian 
data, which is not a ‘true’ household panel but comprises a sample of individuals. In 
LEVPAN, only one person has been interviewed per household. This person has 
however been asked about which other persons live in the same households, as well as 
information about key characteristics of other household members. This information 
has been exploited to generate household level information. The unit of analysis in this 
thesis is therefore the household, and not the individual level. This procedure also 
makes the analyses from LEVPAN comparable with BHPS, which uses the household 
as sampling unit (see below).  
 
The other way in which the LEVPAN and BHPS differ is in the way income 
information is obtained. Income information in the LEVPAN is based on official 
income, tax and benefits registers. This register information is matched to each 
interview upon completion. This is possible through the Norwegian person number 
system. The matching is done by Statistics Norway and the data is made anonymous 
before given to researchers. Information on income from registers is an advantage for 
data accuracy, since errors generated by people not remembering their own incomes 
and transfers accurately are avoided.  
2.5.2 The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) has a long-running history and has been 
carried out every year since 1991 for a total of 18 waves of data in 2009. In 1991, a 
                                                 
42 Since this thesis is concerned with relating post-dissolution income changes to women’s and men’s positions 
in paid and unpaid work, it makes sense to only include those in the population who potentially can be in paid 
work. People in retirement age are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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nationally representative sample of 5500 households was selected for interviews. All 
members over 16 years in a sampled household are interviewed, totalling to interviews 
with more than 10000 individuals annually.43The survey has a response rate of about 
60 percent.  
 
The sample analysed in this thesis comprises the waves 7-14, containing data from the 
years 1997-2004. This data range is approximately from the same years as the 
Norwegian data. The year 2004 was the last year for which derived current and annual 
net household income information was available when this PhD projected commenced 
and is therefore selected as the last analysis year.  
 
The BHPS is a ‘true’ household panel survey in that the sampling frame is based on 
households and not individuals. For instance, this means that in a couple household 
both partners are interviewed, and in terms of partnership dissolution both partners can 
be followed after the split.44 This contributes to increased sample sizes, as for couple 
households both the man and the woman of that couple is interviewed, and for 
subsequent partnership dissolution, possibly two persons can be followed after the 
split.  
 
Whereas income information in LEVPAN is taken from registers, income information 
in BHPS is based on interview information. In the BHPS, people are asked about their 
gross incomes. In order to obtain information on net income, researchers at the 
Institute for Economic and Social Research (ISER) at the University of Essex have 
developed a set of derived income variables which accompanies the BHPS data 
(Bardasi et al. 2007; Levy et al. 2006). ISER also have a routine for imputing incomes 
in cases of non-response. Income information in this study is taken both from the 
official annual gross measures and the derived net income measures. Both the annual 
                                                 
43 The BHPS also carries out an interview with children between 11 and 15 years in the selected households. 
This youth information has not been analysed in this thesis.  
44 There are some instances where not both persons are followed after the split see Taylor, Marcia Freed (ed.) 
with John Brice, Nick Buck and Elaine Prentice-Lane (2010) British Household Panel Survey User Manual 
Volume A: Introduction, Technical Report and Appendices. Colchester: University of Essex. 
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gross and net income includes values imputed by BHPS staff where there were items 
of non-response.  
 
2.5.3 Assessing income in LEVPAN and BHPS 
A central focus in this thesis is analysing the economic situation of the household 
before and after separation. The national panel studies provide various income 
indicators. For LEVPAN the time period for the income variable is year, BHPS has 
information on weekly income, which has been aggregated to yearly income. Hence, 
for this thesis, it is yearly household income that is analysed.  
 
Household income consists of income from several sources, e.g. labour market, assets, 
and public and private transfers such as child support. The sources that have been 
included in the analyses are described further in chapter four.  
 
To analyse income changes before and after separation, income from the wave before 
dissolution (t-1) is compared with the income in the wave the dissolution takes place 
(t). A weakness of this approach is that there is no way of knowing when, in the time 
period between t and t-1 that the actual dissolution took place (date and month of 
partnership dissolution). Hence, income information from the year t can partly refer to 
a period where the couple was still not separated (Poortman 2000).  
 
There is also an added problem with this approach related to how income information 
is obtained in the LEVPAN data. In Norway, income information is taken from official 
tax registers. However, there is a one-year lag in this information. This means that 
income information added to a specific wave of data refers to household income in 
wave t-1, the year prior to the interview. When analysing the LEVPAN data, it is 
therefore necessary to lag the income variable by one wave before analysing it. The 
consequence of this is that wave one is missed for analysis purposes due to left 
censoring of the income variable. This also further reduces sample sizes for Norway. 
This particular problem of left censoring does not apply to the BHPS. 
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2.6 Definition of partnership dissolution and sample characteristics 
With the growth in longitudinal panel data, the possibility to empirically investigate 
partnership dissolution as a dynamic event has become customary in the research 
literature (Andreβ et al. 2006; Dewilde 2006; DiPrete and McManus 2000; Jarvis and 
Jenkins 1999; Poortman 2000; Smock 1994; Uunk 2004). People are regarded as 
having experienced partnership dissolution if they make the transition from living with 
a partner (married or cohabiting) at time t to be living alone at time t + 1. This means 
that someone has to first be identified as having a spouse or partner, then observed as 
no longer living with that partner. 45 Both married couples and consensual unions with 
and without children are included. In terms of marriage, dissolution is registered when 
the partners stop living in the same household, and not when a legal separation or 
divorce takes place, as these are events often occurring years after the ex-partners 
actually lived together. This is important since the aim is to measure the short-term 
economic impact of partnership dissolution, and not the economic situation when 
divorce papers are finally signed perhaps years after the partners stopped living 
together. By then, the economic situation may have already stabilised or changed 
again.  
 
Persons who after dissolution move to share a household with any other adult person 
(such as one’s own parents, siblings or friends) after the relationship ended are not 
included in the study. This restriction is made since the primary aim is to focus on 
gender differences in economic vulnerability and it is more difficult to study these in 
households which are ‘mixed’ in structure and consists of relatives, friends and other 
household constellation. The income pooling in these ‘mixed’ household contexts is 
opaque with the available data and consequently these households have been kept out 
of the analysis.  
 
                                                 
45 In the event that someone experiences multiple separations within the time-period, observed only the first 
observed event of partnership dissolution is included in the sample.  
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Based on this procedure, a total of 248 partnership dissolutions were identified for 
Norway and 549 partnership dissolutions were identified for Britain (see table 2.1).46 
However, there is no valid income information in the surveys for all these dissolutions, 
hence some analyses presented later are based on a smaller sample (see chapter four).  
 
It is difficult to determine whether this choice of definition of partnership dissolution 
results in a certain sample bias. For example, it could be argued that by only analysing 
those separations which after dissolution establishes an independent household, would 
bias the sample towards ‘high resource partnership dissolutions’. It is possible that 
only those with the most resources will be able to set up an independent household, 
and that by excluding those persons from the analysis who move in with relatives and 
friends after dissolution, means that those with few resources are left out of the 
analysis. If this is the case, the sample analysed will be biased towards high resource 
people, and negative income shifts may be underestimated.  
 
In order to make an assessment of such biases, the same strategy as applied by Jarvis 
and Jenkins (1999) is followed.  The sample of persons who separate during the 
observation period (before they end their relationships) is compared with the base 
sample of all couples47 in wave 1 of the panel. Table 2.1 shows some, but not 
substantial differences between the groups. Commenting on the resource situation first, 
separating persons in the Norwegian sample have a somewhat larger share in the 
lowest income group and the highest income group, compared with intact couples. 
This should not indicate a particular bias towards ‘high resource’ dissolutions being 
analysed but rather heterogeneity in income within the separating group. In Norway, 
those who separate are also somewhat younger than intact couples but the distribution 
of children is about the same for both groups. The largest difference is found in 
relationship status. Those experiencing partnership dissolution are strongly skewed 
towards cohabitation. Just over 20 percent of the Norwegian couples are cohabiting; 
                                                 
46 Making this identification is a complicated process in particular in BHPS involving analysing and matching 
different files. I owe thanks to Professor Stephen Jenkins for providing Stata syntax and assistance on how to do 
this matching correctly.  
47 The ‘intact couple’ category includes those couples who later dissolve their relationships, measured in wave 1. 
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but 70 percent of the men and 61 percent of the women who experience partnership 
dissolution in Norway were cohabiting before the split.  
 
Turning to the British sample, the income situation prior to dissolution does not 
indicate large pre-split income differences between the two groups, which do not 
support an assumption of the sample of separated persons being biased towards high 
resource groups. Furthermore, the table shows that about half of the people who end 
their relationships are married prior to dissolution, the other half being cohabitors. In 
terms of other characteristics in the British sample, the separating population is 
younger and British women who separate more frequently have children before they 
separate, which could indicate that separating fathers are to some extent dropping out 
of the survey. Analysing the first four waves of BHPS data, Jarvis and Jenkins 
(1999:242) have previously documented that separating husbands have a higher 
attrition rate than separating wives,  and there is an indication of the same effect found 
here.  
 
If comparing sample characteristics between Norway and Britain, there are some 
differences that could indicate that the separated persons in Britain constitute an 
economically more vulnerable sample group. First, people separate at a younger age in 
Britain than in Norway, and younger persons may more often have fewer economic 
resources and may have lower salaries. Second, separating persons in Britain more 
often have children prior to the dissolution compared with Norway. This may also be 
an indicator that the British sample of separated persons analysed here constitutes a 
more vulnerable group. Third, the net income for separating persons in Britain is more 
skewed towards the lower income group than in Norway.  
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of persons experiencing a partnership dissolution measured in 
1997, Norway and Great Britain. In percent. 
 
Column percentages Norway Great Britain 
 Separating couples Intact couples Separating couples Intact couples 
 Men 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
Women 
(4) 
Men 
(5) 
Women 
(6) 
Men 
(7) 
Women 
(8) 
Relationship status at t          
   Married 
   Cohabiting 
30 
70 
39 
61 
78 
22 
79 
21 
50 
49 
51 
48 
76 
24 
78 
22 
Age at wave t (years)         
   < 26 
   26-34 
   35-44 
   >=45 
12 
46 
29 
13 
16 
39 
23 
22 
4 
23 
28 
40 
5 
27 
28 
40 
23 
38 
23 
17 
20 
38 
29 
13 
9 
30 
29 
31 
8 
30  
29  
33 
Dependent children at 
wave t 
        
   Has children 
   No children 
47 
53 
48 
52 
59 
41 
57 
43 
54 
46 
62 
38 
54 
46 
54 
46 
Net income at wave t (as 
% of  wave 1 mean) 
        
   < 50 
   50-100 
   > 100 
8 
39 
53 
5 
45 
50 
4 
49 
47 
3 
52 
45 
10 
38 
52 
13 
36 
51 
10 
41 
49 
10 
42 
48 
         
Base N 118 130 1052 1125 244 345 2045 2009 
Wave t for separating persons indicates the panel year in which the partnership dissolution takes place. All 
income information is indexed to 2001 price levels using “Statistics Norway consumer price index” for 
LEVPAN and using “Before Housing Costs” index for BHPS. Income is adjusted to take account of variations in 
composition and size between households using the modified OECD (EU) equivalence scale. Totals may differ 
from 100 percent due to rounding.  
 
Another significant difference found in table 2.1 between Norway and Britain is the 
larger number of persons cohabiting prior to the break in Norway. This could indicate 
that cohabitation is the more volatile relationship status in Norway and that marriage is 
more unstable in Britain. An alternative explanation is that Norwegians favour 
cohabitation and that there is a ‘higher threshold’ to get married in Norway than in 
Britain. It is however difficult to make a firm conclusion based on these numbers, 
since the length of relationship is not taken into account here. A number of 
cohabitations end in marriage later and the apparently volatile nature of British 
marriage could also reflect that British cohabiting couples marry sooner than 
Norwegian cohabiting couples. 
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3 Family policy, marriage law and household economy in 
Norway and Britain 48 
3.1 Introduction 
Exploring the impact family policy has on household income is important for 
understanding the economic consequences of partnership dissolution. Policy 
frameworks interact with and influence women’s and men’s work and family lives in 
various ways and, thereby, also their incomes. For instance, any gender differences in 
how economic resources have been acquired and accumulated before partnership 
dissolution is partly a result of existing policy measures, which create opportunity 
structures for women and men and shape their economic well-being. This policy 
influence continues after dissolution (Andreβ et al. 2006; Stier 2009). The economic 
consequences of ending a partnership are therefore the result of a complex relationship 
between gendered work and family practices and institutional frameworks, such as 
work and family policies, specific for when and where a partnership dissolution takes 
place.  
  
In this chapter, the aim is to address the role family policy plays in the household 
economy. The focus will be on policies and policy developments that influence 
women’s and men’s access to money after partnership dissolution.49 According to 
Millar (2008), this takes place via three different policy influences.50 First, policies 
may regulate the access to money through marriage law. States have regulations for 
how a couple divides assets (such as money, pensions and savings) if a marriage ends. 
With the rise in cohabitations, the legal regulation of non-marital unions has also 
                                                 
48 I am very grateful to Professor Julia Brannen for commenting on an early draft of this this chapter and [please 
spell out and capitalize] prof. dr. juris Tone Sverdrup for commenting on a later draft.  
49 It should be acknowledged that it is not just the state and its policy institutions that are of importance in 
deciding the economic outcome after partnership dissolution. Other important agents can be family and friends 
as well as volunteer organisations. The role these agents play in the economic provision for people after 
partnership dissolution is however outside the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, it should be noted that the way 
the labour market acts to influence the economic position before and after partnership dissolution is not a direct 
result of work policies alone, also work availability and the operation of for instance stock markets and 
economic recessions are of importance. The impact of those macro factors on the household economy falls 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
50 The threefold distinction used here largely follows the three areas of activity for family policy sketched out by 
Millar (2008:170): The legal regulation of family behaviour; policies to support family income; and the 
provision of services for families. 
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become a policy concern. But although marriage and cohabitation law may be seen as 
important regulations for influencing gender income imbalances, its impact on the 
gendered income distribution on a societal scale is limited, since it only regulates the 
economic settlement between two divorcing spouses and their already-existing assets. 
Hence, if concerned with gender income equality on a macro level, policies adding 
additional economic resources to some households may prove more influential in 
altering gender imbalances in post-dissolution incomes. This means that the part of 
state regulation concerned with the potential ‘future income’ of a household may be 
more crucial to understand when analysing the economic consequences of partnership 
dissolution. Adding economic resources to lone mother households for instance may in 
turn neutralize gender inequality on a societal level. Policy measures adding money 
include various benefits, allowances and other economic transfers (e.g. payment of 
child maintenance and alimony payments) or transfers that remunerate care work for 
instance, such as cash-for-care measures.51 But states also issue regulations regulating 
potential ‘future income’ such as payments of child maintenance and alimony. The 
effect of these policy measures on reducing gender income inequality is largely 
dependent upon the level of generosity of any particular benefit paid, eligibility criteria 
and the level of take-up in the eligible population group. The measures in place vary 
between countries and over time. 
 
Increasingly, however, welfare states seem to prefer a third policy strategy to influence 
households’ access to money. By issuing policy measures that promote labour market 
participation, so-called activation policies indirectly influence the household economy 
by encouraging individuals to participate in paid work (Millar 2008). Policy measures 
under this heading are wide ranging and include for instance (affordable) childcare, 
                                                 
51 The focus on access to money means that I consider policies with an impact on households’ net income 
situation, but I disregard household spending. This is a limitation of this study. However, it needs to be 
appreciated that policies aiming to reduce the cost of necessities such as electricity, food and heating thus serve 
to reduce the spending needs of households can also be efficient tools for fighting poverty. But with the 
emphasis made here on net income means that I consider transfers such as housing allowance but leave out 
policies that regulate prices in the housing market or the costs of necessities, for instance.  
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support for education, and work stimulation through tax credits.52 The general aim of 
these policies is to reduce the need for welfare state support and intervention in order 
to ensure households’ access to money. Hence, underpinning policy development is an 
‘adult worker’ assumption where all citizens should be self-sufficient through own 
labour market participation. As discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter, 
whether these measures are efficient in achieving gender equality in incomes after 
partnership dissolution has been questioned by feminist policy researchers, as this to a 
large extent leaves gender equality to the devices of the market  (Daly 2011; Haux 
2010; Lister 2006; Mätzke and Ostner 2010; Orloff 2006).  
 
Historically, Norway and Britain have followed different tracks in family policy 
development. For instance, they have differed in the extent to which cohabitation and 
partnership dissolution have been regarded as important trends that welfare states need 
to accommodate, or whether such family changes should be a private concern and off-
limits for policy regulation (Daly 2010; Ellingsæter and Leira 2006b; Skevik 2001a). 
Britain, with a liberal heritage, has put forward an ideology of limited family 
intervention, carrying the assumption that families themselves make decisions, such as 
whether to divorce, and that the families must also bear the financial costs of these 
decisions (Daly 2010). Families have been encouraged to find solutions without state 
assistance. State economic provision has been minimalist, and focussed on means-
testing and poverty alleviation. Family forms alternative to marriage such as 
cohabitation have largely been ignored until recently, and policy has indirectly been 
supportive of marriage as the preferred family form (Hatland 2001; Lewis 2001c). In a 
Scandinavian context, there has been a much stronger tradition for policy interventions 
into family life that has not only been widely accepted, but indeed, expected 
(Ellingsæter and Leira 2006b:2). A central premise for family and work policy has also 
been to achieve gender equality, when this has been challenged by family diversity. In 
terms of lone parenthood, Norway stands out in a Scandinavian context as having 
developed particularly comprehensive policies towards this group, not only by offering 
                                                 
52 It could be debated whether taxation measures should rather be classified as policies that directly increase 
individuals’ access to money. This is not a clear-cut issue but taxation measures are positioned in this outline as 
policies to promote work, since tax reduction presupposes that individuals actually work (i.e. are commodified). 
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economic protection but also in terms of supporting lone mothers economically in their 
role as mothers and carers (Skevik 2006:247). As for cohabitants, more regulations 
relevant for this group have been developed in Norway than in Britain (Hatland 2001; 
Noack 2010:201). 
 
By outlining policy development within family policy in Norway and Britain, this 
chapter will seek to explore how policy generates specific and gendered state, market 
and family ‘dependencies’ for households after partnership dissolution. The aim is to 
understand how and to what extent the welfare state via its family policy can 
influence, or potentially offset any gender inequalities in post-dissolution incomes. To 
make a full and detailed account of family policy development in the two countries 
studied is a massive undertaking. What is presented here is therefore a mere skeleton 
and by no means a full account of the field of family policy and marriage law in the 
two countries. This chapter primarily focuses on family policies that may come into 
play in relation to partnership dissolution.  
 
The structure of the chapter broadly follows the distinction between the three areas of 
family policy and marriage law sketched out by Millar (2008). First, the legal 
regulation of family behaviour, in particular, marriage law (section 2.2) and legislation 
for cohabitation (section 2.3) are considered. Then, developments in policies that 
support the family income by adding economic resources are outlined. An emphasis is 
placed on policies towards single parents. In addition, the more recent measures in 
promoting labour market participation, especially for women and single mothers, are 
considered (section 2.4). The chapter is rounded off with a discussion of how, over the 
last decades in Europe, family policy has shifted in the direction of an ‘adult worker 
model’ (section 2.5).  
3.2 Developments in marriage law 
In terms of influencing individuals’ access to money via marriage law, the most 
important regulation to consider is how assets are divided between the spouses after 
the break. However, the law also regulates access to divorce. In the following, the 
regulation of access to divorce is first outlined, before the statutory regulation of the 
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division of assets is discussed. Differences are found between Norway and Britain in 
both instances. 53  
3.2.1 Regulation of access to divorce  
Access to divorce is considered easier in Norway, which operates a so-called ‘no-fault’ 
divorce system, which means that no proof of why the divorce should take place is 
needed.54 Divorce is seen as a private matter and an individual right. The only 
requirement is a waiting period of minimum one year to make sure the parties do not 
change their minds. England and Wales, on the other hand, have a ‘fault-based’ 
divorce legislation system.55 This means that divorce cannot take place simply because 
the parties no longer wish to be married. Divorce is not treated as a right; but must be 
proven to a judged as having ‘irretrievably broken down’. There are five proofs that 
are legal grounds for divorce: adultery, unreasonable behaviour (‘cruelty’), desertion 
for two years, separation for two years where each party consents, or separation for 
five years (no consent needed).56  
 
After a period of separation, divorce can be granted in both Norway and England, but 
separation holds different meanings. In Norway, it is regarded as a ‘cooling-off’ 
period, emphasising that this is a period where the partners can change their minds, 
and if they do not, they can file for divorce.57 In England, with a fault-based system, 
separation is treated as a proof that the marriage has actually broken down (Skevik 
2001). It has been discussed for a long time in England whether to shift to no-fault 
                                                 
53 The outline here is based on divorce legislation for England and Wales.  
54 Divorce in Norway is regulated by the 1991 Marriage Act. Additions to this regulation has been added in 2008 
concerning same-sex couples, which are not further considered in this outline. 
55 Divorce in England and Wales is governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 73). In Scotland, a no-
fault divorce system was implemented in 2005. 
56 The principle of ‘irretrievable breakdown’ in English divorce legislation was included in the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969 but was not enacted until it was included as part of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. This 
principle represented the end result of an initiative to reform divorce laws that had been in force throughout the 
1960s in England. Through the new Act, divorce was made easier to carry out, since no particular reason other 
than a period of separation was included as a legal ground for divorce. But the problem in England is that if both 
parties do not wish to divorce then one of the partners is forced to have a long waiting period in order to end the 
marriage. To accelerate this process, people have felt forced to engage in adultery (and subsequent accusations 
of fault) to get a divorce. 
57 In Norway, a divorce can be legally demanded of one of the spouses without a period of separation if the other 
spouse has intentionally attempted to kill him or her or the children. 
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divorce law.58 In particular, it has been argued that a fault-based system is not in the 
best interest of the children, as the ex-partners in the separation period leading up to 
divorce become more concerned with establishing proofs for why the marriage must 
end, rather than trying to establish a dialog and collaboration with the ex-spouse. This 
may make collaboration between the ex-spouses more difficult with potential negative 
consequences for the children (Smart 2000).  
3.2.2 Regulation of division of marital assets after divorce in England 
and Wales 
Marriage law dictates how a couple can divide material assets after a marriage has 
ended, which may have direct consequences for the access to money after divorce. In 
England and Wales an important development in this law came with the Divorce 
Reform Act of 1969 and the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973. Here the principle of a 
‘clean break’ for regulating division of assets was introduced. This is a settlement that 
ends all future obligations the spouses have towards each other forever, including after 
one of the spouses dies.59 This does not include future obligations towards children, 
which is a separate issue. Clean break divorce settlements are based on the principle 
that people should not be burdened for a lifetime with financial responsibilities based 
on unfortunate personal decisions, that a husband should not be economically 
responsible for an ex-wife for the rest of his life, for example.60  
 
The underlying assumption in the clean-break regulation was that re-marriage would 
follow from divorce. The clean-break regulation would facilitate the move from a bad 
marriage to a good new marriage with few remaining financial ties (Smart 2000). Re-
marriage would in turn obviate further financial support to ex-wives and it would 
                                                 
58 ‘No fault divorce’ was suggested in Part II of The Family Law Act 1996 for England and Wales (FLA 96). But 
this section of the FLA 96 was put on hold indefinitely and has to date (2010) not been introduced. 
59 In England and Wales, a divorce ends the contract of marriage (and thus makes it legally possible for a person 
to re-marry) but a divorce does not automatically prevent an ex-husband/wife from asking the Court to make an 
order to pay him or her money in the future. Hence, it is possible, for example, for an ex-wife/husband to make a 
claim on future lottery wins, pensions, incomes, assessments of properties that the ex-partner might obtain after 
the marriage ended. However, the clean-break order stops any such future claims. 
60 Also, the clean-break order must be approved by a judge. A financial clean break will not be possible if one of 
the spouses cannot earn at all or can only earn much less than the other unless substantial assets are transferred 
or a lump sum payment of money is made which is sufficient to meet that party’s needs. However, it is possible 
to have a financial clean break order where there is an agreement to pay maintenance for a fixed period (for 
example, to enable a spouse to re-train, or attend a course of education).  
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provide fathers for children (Sigle-Rushton 2009; Smart 2000). In hindsight, this may 
seem an unlikely assumption, however, it has to be borne in mind that at the time this 
law was introduced, marriage rates were still extremely high and divorce rates had yet 
to skyrocket. 
 
The 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act stated that a financial settlement after divorce 
should ‘restore the parties to their original financial position’. This entailed a clear 
maintenance requirement, in particular on men, in order to raise the material standard 
for ex-wives. However, with the underlying assumption of re-marriage, it was assumed 
that the economic needs of ex-wives would be met in the future by a new husband and 
a new marriage would make further alimony payments void. The underlying 
assumption was therefore that men should be primarily economically responsible for 
their new wife and potential step-children, and less economically tied up with the 
previous family (ex-wife and his own biological children) (Smart 2000).  
 
For many divorcing couples it was, however, not possible to reach a ‘clean-break’ 
agreement. In these cases, the law states that the distribution of matrimonial assets 
must be left to the discretionary powers of the court (Barlow 2008).61 During the 
1980s and 1990s, most court cases focused on the spouse with caregiving 
responsibilities. In practice, for families with low levels of assets, this meant that 
courts favoured the person who was caring for the children (usually the mother). But 
in wealthier families, a larger share (typically two-thirds) was awarded to the male 
spouse (Sigle-Rushton 2009).  
 
The clean-break legislation was intended to make divorce easier, but as divorce rates 
grew rapidly during the 1980s, it soon started to become clear that the re-marriage 
assumption did not occur. This also meant that maintenance requirements made after 
                                                 
61 In contrast to most other European countries, a marriage in England and Wales has no direct effect on a 
couple’s property, which continues to be owned separately unless specifically purchased jointly. In cases where a 
clean-break settlement is not made, the courts instead have wide discretionary powers in terms of redistributing 
income and capital assets in order to achieve a fair outcome between the parties (Barlow, 2008). It was not until 
year 2000 that the House of Lords ruled that the starting point should be an equal division of assets (Sigle-
Rushton, 2009). 
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clean-breaks were hard to implement. The maintenance requirements set down in the 
1973 Act were broad and men who re-married had great difficulty in meeting the 
maintenance requirements while adequately supporting a new family. In particular, 
women did not re-marry to the extent that had been envisaged, and often remarriages 
did not last (Smart 2000). This meant that more and more ex-wives and their children 
became dependent on social security support throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The 
proportion of single mothers dependent on state benefits in England grew from 20 
percent in 1961 to 66 percent in 1987 (Bradshaw and Millar 1991 quoted in Sigle-
Rushton 2009:163).  
 
In an attempt to ease the economic burden on divorced men, the 1984 Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act introduced a clause stating that maintenance would be paid 
according to the earning capacity of the recipient as well as of the payer. However, this 
ruling pushed ex-wives with less wealthy ex-husbands further into social security and 
increased the costs of divorce for the welfare state (Smart 2000). As shall be seen 
below, this later resulted in a shift in state policies to a greater focus on the role of 
fathers as economically responsible for their own biological children after divorce 
(Smart 2000). 
3.2.3 Division of marital assets in Norway 
The Norwegian Marriage Act of 1927 states that as a main rule, division of the marital 
estate should happen according to the principle of equal division. Unequal division 
was an exception to the rule. Another important legal principle introduced in 1927 was 
independent ownership rights for married women. Before, husbands would have been 
able to dispose of a wife’s inheritance and gifts. This law was of significance for 
women’s liberation but in practical terms it has been less important since during a 
marriage, most spouses would use each other’s possessions regardless of formal 
ownership (Sverdrup 1999a).  
 
The system of separate ownership rights worked well for a long time in Norway 
(possibly because it took time for married women to accumulate property 
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separately).62 However, after World War II there were cases brought before the court 
where there were questions as to whether the wife could be regarded a co-owner, even 
though the husband had bought the house and it was registered in his name. This 
meant that in a court ruling, whoever had paid for an item was the owner of that item. 
With the gendered work and caring practices of typical 1950s and 1960s marriages, a 
shared house or other items acquired during a marriage were almost always paid for by 
the husband’s wages, and became his possessions after divorce.63 The question was 
whether a wife’s indirect contribution such as covering the family’s current 
expenditures on food and clothing should count as contributions towards acquiring  
property rights for the wife (Sverdrup 1999b). After all, this legislation was best 
adapted to men’s style of life as women had much lower incomes than men (Hellum 
1985; Melby 1996 cited in Sverdrup 1999a).  
 
In Norway, women increasingly demanded that a housewife’s caring contribution 
during marriage should give her ownership rights, in particular to the joint home. 
There were cases during the 1950s and 1960s dealt with by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court where it was tested whether the wife could be counted as a co-owner of a house 
purchased by the husband and registered in his name through her ‘indirect’ 
contribution in the form of care work, working for the family business and by 
contributing to other household expenses. For instance, this was the issue in two 
Supreme Court cases in 1956 and 1966 where the wife was granted co-ownerhship on 
these terms. However, in 1975, the Norwegian Supreme Court made a special ruling, 
the so-called “housewife’s contribution judgement’ (‘Husmordommen’), where the 
court gave the wife separate ownership rights solely based on her contribution in the 
form of unpaid care work during marriage (Sverdrup 1999b). This meant that the 
Supreme Court broke with the common principles in contractual law, since not only 
the person who paid for the property, but also indirect caring contributions to the 
marriage made by a wife gave grounds for ownership rights (Sverdrup 1999b). This 
principle became important seen from a gender equality perspective, since it 
                                                 
62 When the new system was initiated all joint property was transferred to the husband in 1928 in Norway. 
63 Unless for wealthy couples where women brought heritage or own money into the marriage. 
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contributed to the remuneration of unpaid care work in cases of divorce (Sverdrup 
1999a). This principle may therefore be seen as a policy supporting the role of married 
mothers as carers, and where the gender-division of work with a male breadwinner and 
a female caretaker, the normal practice in marriages of the time, was recognised after 
divorce.  
 
But in 1991, the Norwegian Marriage Act was revised again, and partly broke with 
previous policies. A tightening up of the equal division of assets principle was 
undertaken. The main rule of equal division of the marital estate was kept.64 However, 
the “unequal distribution rule” (‘skjevdelingsregelen’) was established. In divorces, 
one of the spouses could now withhold all assets that could clearly be traced back as 
having been in his or her possession before the marriage, or that had been inherited or 
received as a gift from the other spouse during the marriage, to be kept out of the 
marital estate before the equal partition of the rest of the estate would take place.65 In a 
context where marriages started to end after a relatively short duration, this additional 
legislation can be regarded as sensible, as there is less access to ‘divorce to money’ 
(Sverdrup 1999a).  
 
It should be mentioned that there is also a ruling in Norwegian divorce legislation that 
if one party is left worse off financially than the other when the marriage ends, this 
should be compensated by the better-off party through the payment of maintenance or 
alimony. But with the rapid increase in numbers of divorces during the 1970s and 80s, 
it was no longer self-evident that one spouse should bear the economic responsibility 
for the other after divorce. In this same time period, more women also entered the 
labour market and the payment of spousal maintenance became increasingly rare 
(Skevik 2001b; Sverdrup 2006). If alimony towards the ex-partner is paid, typically in 
the case where the marriage has been a long one, it is normally paid for a limited 
period of three years. An ex-partner can in some instances also get a stake in an ex-
                                                 
64 The equal division rule states that the divorcing parties can keep all assets and property he or she brought into 
the marriage or had inherited or received as a gift during the marriage, undivided. The rest of the marital estate 
should be split equally (Lødrup and Sverdrup 2004) 
65 ‘Skjevdelingsregelen’ § 59 in the 1991 Marriage Act for Norway. 
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husband’s pension, if the marriage has been a long one and typically the wife has not 
worked. However, the diminishing significance of alimony signals a trend where 
divorce regulation is less concerned with securing wives’ future economic situation (as 
it is assumed that women will work and earn) and more about making the economic 
outcome after the marriage “fair” according to an economic rationality (Sverdrup 
1999b). 
 
It can be argued that the legal justification behind the “housewife’s contribution 
judgement” and the “unequal distribution rule” are the same. The spouses have 
engaged in a community of work, where both parties have made a contribution. These 
two sets of rules were initially thought to provide individual and community interests, 
but have drawn closer to each other. Both sets of rules rest on the idea that marriage is 
a community of work (Sverdrup 1999b). This means that ownership rights, in the eyes 
of the law, are not gained as a consequence of marrying, but are achieved, and 
therefore should be economically compensated, according to spouses’ individual work 
efforts during the marriage. That unpaid care work is counted as a way of acquiring 
ownership rights does not deviate from this economic way of reasoning behind 
Norwegian marriage law (Sverdrup 1999b). The normative idea underlying 
matrimonial legislation is marriage as a community of work (Sverdrup 1999b). In the 
“housewife’s contribution judgement” the economic element emphasised was unpaid 
care work, recognised as a way of gaining ownership rights during marriage. In the 
case of  the “unequal distribution rule”, the increase in women’s labour market 
participation rates and the increase in divorce rates have started to emphasise the 
individual earning potentials of spouses, by limiting or denying the ex-spouse 
ownership rights to assets acquired before the marriage, because of his or her lack of 
economic contribution in acquiring these items (Sverdrup 1999b). 
 
The developments in divorce regulations have had different impacts on gender income 
equality in Norway. The principle laid down in 1927 was an equal participation of 
marital estate. With women being predominantly housewives, this turned out in 
practice to generate gender inequality after divorce, something which the “housewife’s 
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contribution judgement” tried to adjust for. After 1991, the new marriage law provided 
access to unequal division of the marital estate. This positively regulates so that one of 
the spouses will be better off financially than the other after the divorce. In cases 
where the marriage has been a short one, this could be seen as being in line with the 
general sense of justice, and that it is fair if a spouse has inherited money or owned 
property before a marriage that that person should also dispose of these assets after 
marriage. Nevertheless, it means a move towards treating marriage less like a joint 
project between spouses and more like thinking of the spouses as separate individual 
economic units (Sverdrup 1999b).  
 
Sverdrup (1999b) has argued that the economic reasoning behind these legal changes 
is problematic. The notion of marriage as a community of work equates it to a business 
partnership, where sharing of profit is made in accordance with investments. This, 
however, disregards the particular uniqueness of marriage in the legislation and that 
the spouses during marriage constitute one consumption unit. Whereas business 
partners make arrangements to secure their individual economic interests, it is less 
obvious that spouses would, or should do so, in order to maximise their own economic 
gains in the case of a future divorce. It has therefore been suggested that divorce 
legislation should have reflected the uniqueness of marriage in a better way, as a 
community of life where “feelings, work and money are all interwoven” (Sverdrup 
1999b:20). In a marriage, the distinction between “yours” and “mine” is blurred in 
practice, and not pre-agreed as in a business contract. Applying the same economic 
logic to marriage as a contract and to base marriage legislation on subtracting input 
from output, seriously disregards the uniqueness of marriage where the intention is to 
live a life and not to make economic surplus (Sverdrup 1999b). 
3.3 Developments in regulation of cohabitation 66 
There are mainly two ways in which cohabitation has challenged family policy and 
marriage law. First, it has been debated whether cohabiting couples should be treated 
as married for benefit and taxation purposes. Second, it has been debated whether the 
state should issue regulations for dividing property and assets at the end of a 
                                                 
66 This outline excludes the legal regulation of same sex relationships. 
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cohabitation, as they do for marriages ending in divorce. Again, Norway and Britain 
have differed in their approaches.  
3.3.1 Regulation of cohabitation in Norway 
Despite its widespread popularity today, it is interesting to note that cohabitation was 
actually forbidden in Norway until 1972. The so-called ‘concubinage paragraph’ stated 
that anybody who lived together with a person of the opposite sex in an indecent 
relationship which caused public indignation could face fines or imprisonment.67 
Marriage could nullify conviction (Bradley 2001; Noack 2001). However, it remained 
a ‘sleeping paragraph’, as we know of no cases which resulted in conviction (Noack 
2001). 
 
In more recent times, the challenge of cohabitation to Norwegian state regulation has 
been less of a moral, and more of an economic concern. It has long been debated 
whether Norwegian cohabiting mothers should qualify for lone parent benefits or not. 
The background for this was that in 1964, Norway introduced out-of-work benefits for 
unmarried and widowed mothers, extended to include separated and divorced women 
in 1971 (Syltevik 1999).68 This meant that Norway developed a system for 
economically supporting lone mothers of all types (widows, mothers living alone, 
divorced and separated alike) in their role as carers. Hence, it was installed as a clear 
obligation from the state not just to support women who had lost a male breadwinner, 
i.e. widows. Rather, lone motherhood as a category, regardless of how the lone 
motherhood came about, was eligible for economic support (Syltevik 1999). 
Cohabiting mothers were not excluded from these benefits, on the basis that enforcing 
control on cohabitation would intrude on family privacy (Skevik 2001a:156). 
However, already in 1980, politicians raised a concern for the fact that cohabiting 
‘single’ mothers were receiving lone parent benefits. This was thought not only unfair 
towards ‘real’ single mothers but was also worrying because it could make unmarried 
                                                 
67 In Norwegian: ‘Konkubineparagrafen’ 
68In 1971, separated and divorced women and men also became eligible for out-of-work benefits. In 1972, this 
right was withdrawn from unmarried mothers who were cohabiting with the father of the child. However, 
unmarried mothers cohabiting with another man who was not the father of the child were eligible for these 
benefits until the changes made in 1994 and 1999, see below. 
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cohabitation more economically profitable than marriage (Noack 2010:148; Syltevik 
1999).  
 
The concerns for benefit misuse and strategic behaviour, which had worried 
politicians, were finally addressed during the 1990s. Regulation was altered so that 
‘marriage-like’ cohabitations were treated the same as actual married couples for 
benefit and taxation purposes (Noack 2010:201). A ‘marriage-like’ cohabitation refers 
primarily to two groups: cohabiting couples with a shared child (as well as previously 
married cohabiting couples69), and cohabiting couples without a shared child but who 
had lived in the same dwelling for a certain period of time, typically one year. More 
specifically, this meant that single parents in Norway who started cohabiting lost the 
right to extended child benefit in 1994, and to transitional allowance as well as other 
single parent benefits, in 1999. Also in terms of pension rights, cohabiting couples 
were now treated as married couples (Noack 2010:184). Ending the practice of treating 
unmarried cohabiting couples as single, not only stopped strategic behaviour but also 
meant that the state could save expenses on benefit pay outs, and this is also a likely 
motive for why these changes were issued (Noack 2010:202). Syltevik (1999) has 
commented on this development in family policy that this represents a shift in Norway 
towards greater individualisation. The state ceases to regard lone mothers as carers in 
need of state support. Instead, a more marked understanding of lone mothers as 
potential wage workers is developed, where non-working mothers are treated as 
having a deviating behaviour in terms of citizens’ general obligation to work (Syltevik 
1999:95). In a juridical sense, this development means that cohabitation and marriage 
have become similar for benefit and taxation purposes. 
 
Where marriage and cohabitation still differ are in terms of legal regulation for the 
sharing of assets. Whereas marriage law contain such regulation, the ending of a 
cohabitation is instead regulated by private property law. There is no law regulating 
the sharing of assets and hence each cohabiter keeps his or her property, assets and 
                                                 
69 The inclusion of previously married cohabiting couples was made in order to reduce the risk that someone 
would divorce for economic profit (Noack 2010:185). 
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debts when the relationship ends (Lødrup and Sverdrup 2011:72). However, as is the 
case in marriage law, co-ownership is based on what the parties contributed to the 
acquisition of property, and therefore also for unmarried cohabitation, a homemaker’s 
indirect contribution in the form of care for small children is sufficient to make 
her/him an equal co-owner of the family home or other items bought by the partner 
with her/his money during the relationship (Sverdrup 2006:476) There are however 
two exceptions to this regulation. The first is related to “Husstandfellesskapsloven”70 
which since 1991 has provided an option, given certain conditions, for one partner to 
buy the house which has served as a family home from the ex-partner. This may be in 
cases where children need to stay in the family home or in cases where, due to illness 
or old age, a cohabiting partner needs to stay in this property. However, the property 
must be bought from the other ex-partner at market value. This regulation does not 
therefore give access to any of the ex-partner’s valuables or assets (Lødrup and 
Sverdrup 2011:75-6; Noack 2010:169).71 The second exception is that one of the 
partners can be awarded an amount of money as remuneration in cases where this 
partner has “enriched” the other. This may take place if one of the partners has paid for 
improvement of property formally owned by the other, or has contributed indirectly 
through domestic work or payment of current expenses during the lifetime of the 
relationship. Such remuneration will apply only exceptionally, however (Lødrup and 
Sverdrup 2011:73-4).  
 
One critique which has been directed at regulating the end of a cohabitation on the 
basis of private property law is the great emphasis it places on fact-finding. Evidence 
must be gathered on ownership rights, and on what valuables have been acquired 
during the relationship and who has paid for them (Sverdrup 2009). This emphasis on 
finding proof may increase a conflict between separating partners. The legislation is 
therefore ill-suited for making peaceful settlements after relationship breakdown, 
which is particularly unfortunate in cases where cohabiting parents split up (Sverdrup 
                                                 
70 The Norwegian name of the law is “Husstandfellesskaploven” or “Lov om rett til felles bolig og innbo når 
husstandsfellesskap opphører” (Law on rights towards joint home and chattel when households cease to exist). 
71 In practice, this means that even though only one of the partners has signed on a housing mortgage, this person 
has no automatic or sole right to the house and may be required to buy half the house from the other person. This 
person can also not sell the dwelling to a third person if the ex-partner wishes to buy it. 
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2009). Sweden, for instance, has regulation where the value of the family home and 
household goods are divided equally at the end of a cohabiting relationship, regardless 
of whether the house is financed with inherited gifts or funds. This makes for a less 
conflict-producing statutory model, since less emphasis is put on fact-finding for 
proving ownership rights at the end of a cohabitation (Sverdrup 2009). Other 
researchers have interpreted the exceptions found in the principle of property law as 
‘mimicking’ the Norwegian Marriage Act, and to be steps in Norwegian jurisdiction 
towards juxtaposing  cohabitations and marriages (Noack 2010:169).  
 
All in all, the Norwegian government has been rather eager to alter family policy and 
law regulation in pace with the growth in cohabitation.72 Social researchers such as 
Hatland (2001) have concluded that policy response to family change in the 
Scandinavian countries has been pragmatic, following a pattern of piece-meal reforms 
to the social security system, something which could be expected in states grounded in 
universalist social security programmes, where the state has taken a relatively large 
economic responsibly for family support (Hatland 2001). This pragmatic adaption has 
continued throughout the 2000s where cohabitation has been even further integrated 
into child law, for instance, by introducing automatic joint parental responsibility for 
cohabiting parents, (limited) inheritance rights for cohabiting couples, and an option 
for cohabiting couples to take the other persons’ surname if the couple share children 
(Noack 2010:204:ff).  
3.3.2 Regulation of cohabitation in Britain 
Cohabitation has not had the same influence on British legislation as in Norway. In 
fact, many cohabiting couples falsely believe that they have the same legal rights as 
married couples, something which is not the case (Barlow 2008). This is the so-called 
‘common law marriage myth’ that cohabitation will, after a while, count as a real 
marriage. The practice of regarding someone as a common law wife or husband has 
historically been important in Britain, but common law marriages were actually 
                                                 
72 However, marriage law issues such as division of assets on relationship breakdown and support duties during 
the relationship have seen less development.  
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abolished in the Marriage Act of 1753.73 Cohabitation was never made illegal in 
Britain but was rather an aspect of family life ignored by law. This meant that a 
woman and man who lived together outside marriage were not prosecuted under the 
law, but they were also not protected by it (Bradley 2001).  
 
The supremacy of marriage as the preferred family form has been strong amongst 
Labour and Conservative politicians alike in Britain. Hence moral arguments against 
making legal provision for cohabitation, has restrained developments for fear of 
destroying the significance of marriage (Glennerster 2007). It has been argued that 
when cohabitants prefer to live as an unmarried couple, and therefore, unconsciously 
or not, are less likely to pool monetary resources, lawmakers should refrain from 
intervening with statutory regulations (Sverdrup 2009).  The preferred policy stance in 
England has been to limit state intervention into family life (Bradley 2001; Lewis 
2001a; Skevik 2001a). Generally, the British stance has been to treat cohabiting 
couples as married couples only when it is in their disfavour, mainly by limiting the 
access to welfare benefits for cohabiting lone mothers (Hatland 2001:133).  
 
In terms of providing benefits to lone mothers, cohabiting mothers have not been 
eligible. Widows were the one group singled out as in need of special economic 
provision in Britain. In a scheme introduced in 1925, and revised in 1946, the state 
supported the loss of a male breadwinner with a widow’s benefit. All other categories 
of lone mothers, including cohabiting mothers, were provided for under the means-
tested National Assistance scheme (later renamed to National Insurance scheme) 
However, the widows’ benefit was paid at a low rate and many widows had to claim 
National Assistance in addition to the widows’ benefit (Skevik 2001a:136). There 
were strict controls against cohabitation, and benefits were subject to a family means 
                                                 
73 In earlier times the validity of a marriage depended on the consent of the two parties and that this was publicly 
announced, often also symbolically acknowledged by the exchange of rings. The memory of the events and their 
witness is what gave the marriage legitimacy. This is called a common law marriage. Later, the Church and state 
became involved in marriages. Although the practices of common law marriages was abolished in 1753, the 
phrase of calling someone one’s ‘common law wife or husband’ meaning a cohabiting partner remains in the 
English language to date. 
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test, where payments was only legitimate in the absence of income from a male 
breadwinner (Skevik 2001a:140).74  
 
To date there is very little regulation in Britain towards cohabiting couples. The only 
exception is some aspects of property law, which may have implications for division 
of property, and financial assets, in cases where cohabitation ends. The most important 
principle is that if a couple has shared children, and the relationship ends, then an ex-
partner can obtain a court order to stay on the property if it is considered to be in the 
interest of the child. Cohabiting couples have fewer legal rights than married couples. 
The resistance amongst British politicians of making legal adjustments facilitating the 
growth in cohabitation abides. The legal system is instead based on couples 
themselves making private arrangements or seeking mediation, in cases where the 
relationship ends (Bradley 2001).  
 
Hatland (2001) has characterised Britain’s policy response to cohabitations as 
conservative, basically only negatively recognising, or ignoring, cohabitation and 
instead emphasising policy changes with a focus on encouraging marriage as the 
preferred family form. After the changes issued in Norway in the 1990s, regulation for 
access to benefits in both Norway and Britain has been developed so that it is de facto  
and not civil relationship status, that counts as benefit criteria. The countries have 
therefore become more similar on this issue. It has been questioned whether this could 
be seen as reinstating the male breadwinner, as it is assumed that the boundary 
between lone motherhood and cohabitation is drawn with the presence of a man in the 
household. Hence, it could be argued that the underlying assumption about family 
provision is that any new boyfriend will be ready to be a provider for a lone mother 
and her children. On the other hand, denying cohabiting single mothers access to 
benefits can equally be regarded as a flexible system that finds a reasonable balance, 
not discouraging lone mothers from forming new relationships, as well as avoiding 
resentment among married couples with children (Glennerster 2007; Lewis 2001a; 
                                                 
74 The strict enforcement of the cohabitation clause in the National Assistance scheme was very unpopular and 
may have prevented lone mothers in need from applying for NA. However, the clause was never removed 
although controls became less intrusive throughout the 1980s (Skevik 2001a:140).  
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Skevik 2006:256). Furthermore, strong enforcement of benefit criteria (in this case, 
based on cohabitation) could also be interpreted as a trend for the state to withdraw 
from supporting the family economically to an assumption that both men and women, 
including lone mothers, will be in the labour market. This could therefore be seen as 
an erosion of the male breadwinner model and a shift towards the “adult worker” 
policy model. This, in turn, creates other challenges in particular for lone mothers, 
assuming that they will be in the same position as other adult persons to participate in 
paid work. This is a tendency which can be said to be particularly strong in Britain 
(Haux 2010).  
 
Although it is clear that the state holds power through statutory regulations influencing 
the economic outcome of divorce and ending cohabiting relations, in a cross-national 
and comparative context, it is difficult to determine exactly what type of state 
influence this is. As shown above, regulations differ between Norway and Britain, but 
the exact economic impact of these differences remains under-researched. It is very 
difficult to obtain comparative information on how divorce legislation is actually 
applied in specific court cases, and it is therefore problematic to estimate the economic 
impacts of these regulations in a gender income perspective. Household surveys that 
can be compared cross-nationally, like the ones applied in this thesis, do not hold any 
information on whether ex-wives, or ex-husbands, actually make claims for 
maintenance payments, and if such payments are granted, and how regularly and 
completely they are paid or how property and assets are divided after partnership 
dissolution (Andreβ et al. 2006; Andreβ 2003). It is therefore not possible to make any 
firm conclusion as to how existing differences in Norwegian and British divorce 
jurisdictions impacts the economic outcome of partnership dissolution. One certain 
factor, however, is that in both countries alimony payments, typically paid from an ex-
husband to an ex-wife, have become rare. The general societal trend where more 
women are in paid work has impacted on the economic settlements made between men 
and women after partnership dissolution. This is reflected in a greater focus on work 
participation, or activation, in policy development which is addressed in the next 
section. 
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3.3.3 Discussion  
As demonstrated above, the state influences households’ access to money after 
partnership dissolution in many different ways. Marriage law regulates how property 
and assets are divided between the ex-partners after the break. This law’s primary 
concern seems to be to regulate the actual break, where less emphasis is placed on 
regulating the future outcome of the break. One example of this is how it has become 
increasingly rare to pay alimony to an ex-partner after divorce, a trend closely 
correlated with women’s increased participation in the labour market. Another 
development in marriage legislation is that ex-partners are increasingly seen as 
separate economic units, with individual economic interests in need of legal 
protection. This is opposed to the view of regarding marriage or cohabitation as a 
common relationship where resources have been pooled and spent as a one 
consumption unit. Marriage (and cohabitation) has in this sense become more 
individualised. Signs of this trend are found in developments in marriage law that now 
positively recognises inequality as the legitimate outcome of partnership dissolution. 
The “unequal distribution rule” in Norwegian jurisdiction and the “clean break order” 
in the British jurisdiction both allow for divorce settlements where one party is left 
worse off than the other at the end of the relationship. It could be argued that is a 
reasonable legal position, since divorce legislation needs to balance the principle of 
providing fairness in each individual case against the principle of not burdening 
individuals economically for a lifetime with a decision to end a relationship. 
Therefore, it may be regarded as fair that the individual with the most resources at the 
beginning of a relationship should also have most resources at the end of the 
relationship, in particular if the marriage or cohabitation has been a short one. From a 
gender equality perspective, if the likelihood that women more often that men are left 
worse off after divorce, this particular development is not necessarily a step in a 
positive direction.  
 
Another aspect of this is that as long as the law allows for unequal division, the risk 
increases that one of the ex-partners is left in an economically vulnerable position after 
the break. This has societal implications. The welfare states in both Norway and 
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Britain guarantee to meet individuals ‘in need’ with economic provisions. If more 
women find themselves in economic difficulties after separating from an ex-partner, 
this is also a gendered problem. Depending on the generosity of the welfare state 
arrangements, partnership dissolution may therefore directly increase welfare state 
pay-outs, which means that, in the end, the general taxpayer, including couples who do 
not divorce, end up paying the costs for other people’s partnership dissolutions. 
Gender income inequality as a consequence of partnership dissolution therefore 
becomes a social problem with ramifications beyond the private agreement made 
between two individuals to end their relationship. This also means that partnership 
dissolution is a highly relevant topic for discussions on policy development and 
welfare cuts.  
3.4 Policies to support family income and ‘activation’ policies after 
partnership dissolution 
Whereas family law seeks solutions at the level of the individual, gender differences in 
the economic outcome after divorce are also connected to the fundamental societal 
problem of the reconciliation of paid work and care for children. How this underlying 
issue for gender inequality has been addressed by family policy is the topic for this 
section, focussing in particular on family policy measures directed at lone parents. 
3.4.1 Benefits for lone parents in Norway  
A central policy aim in the Scandinavian countries has been to achieve gender equality 
by means of work/family policy (Leira 2002). However, Norway has historically 
differed from the other Scandinavian countries in that it has placed a greater emphasis 
on traditional family values, and especially the role of motherhood (Duncan and Strell 
2004; Ellingsæter 1998; Knudsen and Wærness 2001; Leira 1993). This particular 
aspect of Norwegian family policy is evident in the special benefits Norway 
introduced for lone mothers in 1964. These comprise of transitional allowances, 
educational benefits and child care benefits. In addition, lone parents are entitled to an 
increased level of the universal child benefit at the rate of one additional child.  In 
1971, these rights were extended to divorced and separated mothers, not excluding 
cohabiting mothers. In 1980, this right was extended to include lone fathers (Syltevik 
1999). The aim of these benefits were to lift lone mothers out of means tested social 
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assistance, and provide benefits for them that guaranteed a minimum income. This 
may be interpreted as a state support for lone mothers, allowing them to be primarily 
mothers and carers, and secondarily, wage earners (Skevik 2001b:92; Syltevik 1999). 
 
However, it has been argued that this rather unique Norwegian policy with out-of-
work benefits for lone parents has recently shifted towards a stronger emphasis on 
‘activation’ and employment (Skevik 2001b; Syltevik 1999). First, there has been a 
tightening of the eligibility criteria where, as commented above, cohabitation now 
limits benefit access since the 1990s. An eligibility criterion has also been introduced 
where lone parents with children over three years old can now receive a transitional 
allowance only if they are working at least fifty percent of the time or they are going to 
school. Second, the benefit period has been shortened. Previously, the transitional 
allowance could be paid for a period of up to ten years, but is now paid for a maximum 
of three years. After 1998, lone parents with children over the age of three are required 
to either work, actively be seeking work, or getting an education (Skevik 2001b; 
Skevik 2006). Family policy measures for lone mothers has thus been transformed 
from a strategy guaranteeing a minimum income for single mothers not in paid work, 
into a policy providing a time-limited wage-supplement to single parents who work. 
Despite this development, it should be stressed that compared with Britain, wage 
compensation for lone parents with children under the age of three in Norway is 
generous. For parents with children older than three years however, the transitional 
allowance faces relatively strict work requirements and functions as an in-work benefit 
rather than a benefit remunerating care work (Skevik 2006).   
 
Despite this renewed attention on lone mothers and paid work, it should be stressed 
that activation has always been part of the family policy directed at lone mothers in 
Norway (Skevik 2006). The educational support introduced as early as 1964 can be 
interpreted as a signal from the state that support is given with the aim of making the 
lone mother self-sufficient by increasing her human capital. In addition, the childcare 
benefit has been paid as an allowance to lone parents in need of child-care, and this 
also facilitates participation in paid work for lone mothers. And although Norway has 
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been a laggard in comparison with the other Scandinavian countries in offering day-
care institutions for under school-age children, lone parents were prioritised for the 
places that were available (Vollset 2011:54). Also, the cost of child care has been, and 
still is, heavily state subsidised for lone parents, currently at a rate covering just under 
70 percent of the expenses for lone parents, provided that the parents’ incomes fall 
below a (high) ceiling (Skevik 2001b:96).  
 
Another important part of family policy securing access to money after partnership 
dissolution in Norway is the child maintenance system. Established by the Children’s 
Law of 1957, non-custodial parents, in most instances fathers, must pay maintenance, 
in accordance with ability to pay. 75 In cases where a father has been unable or 
unwilling to pay, the state has guaranteed a minimum payment. In addition, the state 
has made economic payments to lone mothers in the often long waiting period before 
the size of the payment has been agreed between the ex-spouses.76 Any outstanding 
debts from non-custodial parents, again mostly fathers, have been the responsibility of 
the state to collect, relieving the mother of this task. Although Norwegian non-
custodial parents are highly compliant, there are many who do not pay, mounting to a 
substantial debt covered by the state on behalf of fathers (Vollset 2011).77 Initially, the 
size of child maintenance payments was largely based on discretion, however, since 
1989, a system of a minimum fixed percentage of the non-custodial parent’s income 
was set at 11 percent for one child, 18 percent for two children, 21 percent for three 
children and 28 percent for four or more children. For the non-custodial parent, the 
payments made were tax deductible, and for the custodial parent, the payments were 
taxable (Lyngstad 2008:9).78 Although it was possible to pay more than this in 
                                                 
75 Before 1964 the payment of child maintenance and alimony after divorce was the only economical support 
offered to lone mothers in Norway. 
76 The minimum guaranteed payment from the state was in 2009 1350 NOK per month (approx.. 170 EUR). 
77 In 2009 the monthly minimum guaranteed amount paid in child maintenance by the state was 1350 NOK per 
month. In 2001 the Norwegian state paid 1.6 billion NOK in child maintenance (Trygdestatistisk årbok 2002, 
table 12.2). Some of this has later been recovered from non-custodial parents, however according to Aftenposten 
the accumulated debt of non-custodial parents was in 2009 about 2.6 billion Norwegian kroner (approximately 
2.5 million EUR) (article Aftenposten published 26.01.09, downloaded 28.03.2011 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article2887639.ece). In comparison, about 2 billion NOK was paid in 
transitional allowance in 2001 (Trygdestatistisk årbok 2002, table 12.2). 
78 The Norwegian Level of Living survey data analysed in this thesis are from the time period 1997-2002, hence 
the child maintenance system in place was this fixed-rate system. 
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maintenance, these were the rates actually paid in 90 percent of the cases (Bratberg 
and Tjøtta 2008).  
 
In 2003, the child maintenance system was revised and the fixed-percentage system 
was abandoned. The previous system had been criticised for not taking the wage of the 
custodial parent into account when deciding the size of child maintenance payment, an 
argument that became important with more lone mothers working. It was also 
criticised for taking the approach that non-custodial parents were mainly considered 
economic supporters to their children and not regarded as caregivers to the same extent 
as the custodial parent. For instance, the fixed-rate system did not take additional costs 
in relation to visits into account, a critique that can be related to the debate around the 
role of fathers as carers (Lyngstad 2008).  
 
With the new system, attempts were made to meet this critique by taking into account 
the earning capacities of both parents when calculating the size of the child 
maintenance payment.79 Child maintenance was also made non-taxable.80 In addition, 
the new regulations emphasise that both parents have an equal caring and maintenance 
responsibility toward the child. Hence, the new regulation is meant to encourage a 
caring role for both parents as well as to encourage private agreements between the 
parents (Lyngstad 2008:9). 
3.4.2 Benefits and economic support to lone parents in Britain 
Whereas Norway developed special out-of-work benefits for all types of lone mothers, 
including unmarried mothers relatively early, Britain only gave special benefit rights 
to women who had lost their husbands (Skevik 2001a:135). Issued as early as 1925, 
the widows’ pension demonstrated a strong manifestation of the male breadwinner 
                                                 
79 The size of the child maintenance benefit has now shifted to a standard budget calculation based on the actual 
cost associated with bringing up a child, developed by the National Institute for Consumer Research (Statens 
institutt for forbruksforskning). The costs are stratified according to the age of the child and shared 
proportionally between the parents according to income and personal agreements on visiting arrangements.  
80 A methodological artefact of these changes of making child maintenance non-taxable and at the same time 
encouraging parents to make private agreements on payments means that it is now challenging to find reliable 
statistics on the size of child maintenance payments made as they no longer appear in the end of year tax returns 
and private arrangements are not registered by the authorities. Hence, Statistics Norway has estimated that in 
about 1/3 of the cases the amount paid in child maintenance is not registered (Lyngstad 2008).  The data 
analysed in this thesis are however from before this change was made. 
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assumption in Britain, where the loss of a male income by the death of a spouse was 
considered the only social risk worthy of special state support, a position that has 
endured (Lewis 1992). Other lone mothers (never married, separated and divorced) 
were supported through the means-tested National Insurance scheme (Skevik 2001b).81  
The strong assumption of a male breadwinner was also visible, in that Britain, during 
the forming years of the welfare state, never developed a child maintenance or child 
support system. This can be traced back to the underlying assumption made by policy 
makers, also clear in the clean-break divorce legislation, that people who lost or 
divorced a partner would re-marry. For men and fathers, the economic responsibility 
was focussed on supporting the “new family”, wife and potential step-children, 
whereas it was assumed that biological children would in due course be provided for 
by a new step-father (Smart 2000). To ease the income situation of lone mothers, the 
state would step in and provide National Insurance in cases where lone mothers were 
in need. However, with growing divorce rates and without the expectation being 
fulfilled that women would remarry after divorce, the number of lone mothers on 
means-tested National Insurance grew. At the same time, few fathers paid child 
support, seriously constraining lone mothers’ access to money in Britain (Finch 2003; 
Smart 2000).  
 
Throughout the 1980s, this became a great concern for the government. The question 
for policy makers became how to “tie fathers into families” (Finch 2003:6). Policies 
started catering to this by both strengthening the rights and obligations of fathers 
toward their children, and by establishing a child support system. Rolling out new 
policies in several stages, a first step was taken in 1989 with the new Children’s Act. 
The Act redefined and strengthened parental responsibility for both parents, stating 
that both parents had rights in terms of decisions concerning their natural child’s 
education, health and welfare. These rights are always given to a mother, regardless of 
her marital status, but were only given to married fathers. So, although the Act was 
                                                 
81 However the widows’ pension was never particularly generous and many widows had to top up their incomes 
by applying for National Assistance (Skevik 2001a:136). In addition, most people with children under 16 years 
(or a young person under 20 still in full-time education up to A levels) can claim the child benefit. There are two 
payments rates – a higher rate for the oldest child, and a reduced rate for all other children. It is possible to claim 
child benefit also for persons not working. The benefit is non-taxable.   
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keen on stating parental responsibilities, it failed to give parental rights to cohabiting 
fathers and fathers who had never resided with the mother. Instead, these fathers could 
only get parental rights, and hence the right to a say in their child’s welfare, by a 
written paternity declaration, which needed the mother’s consent. If the mother refused 
consent, paternity rights were subject to a Court decision. The way in which the 1989 
Children’s Act was issued, it served to undermine the caring role of unmarried, 
separated, divorced and never-residing fathers towards their own children, and only 
emphasised their role as economic providers, since fathers without parental rights were 
also required, since 1991, to be economically responsible for their natural children 
(Finch 2003). Since 2003, an addition was made so that unmarried fathers who are 
named on the birth certificate of the child would now automatically gain parental 
responsibilities.82  
 
The economic responsibilities of divorced, separated and never-residing fathers was 
emphasised with the introduction of a child support system in 1991. The aim was to 
transfer the economic burden of supporting lone mothers from the state (Income 
Support) to the biological fathers. This was a radical shift in family policy in Britain. 
Previously, policy makers had taken a ‘hands off’ position in terms of regulating 
internal family affairs, but with the child support system there came clear maintenance 
requirements on non-residing parents, mainly fathers, who were now for the first time 
legally bound to provide financial support regardless of whether they had parental 
responsibility or not (Finch 2003). To enforce this new legislation the Child Support 
Agency (CSA) was established in 1993, which also transferred child support from a 
juridical to an administrative setting.83  
                                                 
82 This is one of the few examples of legislation in Britain that actively grants certain rights to cohabiting 
parents, rights previously only admitted to married parents.   
83 Child Support in UK can be arranged in three ways, either through the CSA (Child Support Agency), through 
a private agreement or through a court order. To arrange child support through a court order involves the parents 
first agreeing on how much is going to be paid and how often. The courts can then turn this agreement into a 
consent order and if the non-resident parent does not pay the right amount at the right time the court can take 
action. However, it is expensive to set up a court order and this is not normally done unless a divorcing couple is 
going to court for other reasons such as dividing property and assets after a divorce. If child support is arranged 
by the CSA then the amount paid is worked out according to one of four different rates of the non-residing 
parent’s ‘net weekly income’. The four rates are: basic rate (for incomes of £200 or more per week), reduced rate 
(for incomes is more than £100 but less than £200 per week), flat rate (if incomes are £5 to £100 per week), and 
nil rate (if incomes is less than £5 per week). For basic rate payment is: 15 percent if there is one child, 20 
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The role of the CSA was to increase child support payments among non-residing 
parents. But the CSA failed badly (Glennerster 2007; Lewis 2001a; Sigle-Rushton 
2009). In 1999, several years into its existence, still only around 67 percent of non-
resident parents were fully compliant in terms of paying child support. In 2003, the 
CSA was reformed again and simpler rules for calculating payments were introduced, 
along with a new IT system. However, this new attempt to make fathers pay also 
failed. The IT system became hugely expensive and did not work as anticipated and a 
large number of cases got stuck in the system or were never processed. In 2006, the 
CSA was given the status by the National Audit Office as one of the largest public 
administration disasters in recent UK history.84 In 2009, a new system for child 
support was introduced called the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission 
(C-MEC) with much stronger means to recover unpaid child support.85  
 
Despite the long and troublesome affair of introducing child maintenance payments in 
Britain, social researchers have questioned whether the economic situation, especially 
of low-income mothers, would have been improved if CSA had been more effective 
(Finch 2003; Glennerster 2007; Sigle-Rushton 2009). In cases where a father started to 
pay child maintenance, other state benefits were withdrawn or shortened for the lone 
mother. The net effect of this was to lower the economic well-being of non-resident 
fathers but without improving the economic well-being of the low-income lone 
mothers (Sigle-Rushton 2009). This has lead researchers to question whether the real 
motive for the child maintenance system really was for the state to save money by 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent if there are two children and 25 percent if there are three or more children. Rebates are then calculated 
for the other rates. Child support is adjusted in accordance with the number of children living with non-resident 
parent, the number of children the non-resident parent needs to pay child maintenance for and whether the child 
stays with the non-resident parent at least one night each week. 
84 Source: National Audit Office Report (2006) Department for Work and Pensions Child Support Agency. 
Implementation of the Child Support Reforms. 
85 C-MEC will have access to all the tools and techniques for obtaining unpaid child maintenance already 
available to CSA (deduction from earnings orders, liability orders, bailiffs, third party debt orders, charges on 
property, orders for sales of property, driving licence disqualification and imprisonment). It will also have access 
to additional powers (removal of the need to apply to the court for a Liability Order, direct deduction from bank 
accounts without going to the courts, applying to the court from disqualification from holding or obtaining 
passport, applying for a curfew, recovery from a deceased persons’ estate). 
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making it primarily the families and in particular fathers, and not the state’s, 
responsibility to secure economic welfare after partnership dissolution (Lewis 2002).  
 
Apart from structuring lone mothers’ access to money by stronger enforcement of 
child maintenance, another important policy strategy in Britain has been to improve 
incomes and reduce child poverty by encouraging lone mother’s labour market 
participation (Marsh 2001). Britain has a long history of providing wage 
supplementation to low income families (Marsh 2006). Both the Family Income 
Supplement (FIS) (introduced in 1971) and Family Credits (FC) (introduced in 1988) 
were designed to encourage employment amongst low income parents by adding 
money to their wages. The idea was to leave these households better off in work than 
out of work (Marsh 2001; 2006). Family Credit for instance gave direct wage subsidies 
to low income couples and lone parents alike who worked at least 16 hours per week, 
typically facilitating lone mothers in part-time jobs.  
 
However, the Family Credits system attracted criticism. Although aiming to facilitate 
at least part-time work, many lone mothers remained out of work, relying on Income 
Support. In addition, large groups on Family Credits also received Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax Benefit, together creating an extensive system of ‘in-work benefits’ 
meaning that many people in work did not actually manage to earn incomes of a size 
sufficient to pay normal living costs without considerable state support. Another 
problem with Family Credits was that wage supplements were reduced at quite a high 
rate as soon as incomes grew. This created an in-work poverty trap and a non-
incentive to increase working hours. Hence, the system was criticised for trapping 
people in poverty and for means-testing persons who actually were working. Critics 
claimed that a dependency on Income Support86 had been replaced by a dependency on 
                                                 
86 Income support (IS) is an income-based benefit available to people on low incomes. To be eligible recipients 
must not work more than 16 hours per week. The amount received includes a personal allowance which varies 
by age and household composition. In addition income support included a child premia until 2003, after this it 
was transferred to the Child Tax Credit (CTC). When Working Families Tax Credits was introduced in 1999, IS 
to children were increased (Stafford and Roberts 2009). Additional benefit support can be received to household 
on income support or household with very low incomes to send children to school. Extra benefits can be 
provided through local council for free school meal, school milk, rebate for school uniforms. In addition, a 
government-led program gives out vouchers for milk, fresh fruit, vegetables and infant milk formula. 
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in-work benefits. In addition, better-off families had received relative tax reductions, 
also causing disgruntlement (Marsh 2001; 2006).  
 
With New Labour in government since 1997, their aim was not only to address the 
economic role of fathers but also to introduce new ‘welfare-to-work’ policies. 
Important targets had been set by this government in terms of reducing child poverty 
by minimising the share of parents out of work. This also applied to lone parents. The 
main policy instrument introduced was tax credits, but also the introduction of a 
national minimum wage87 and ‘New Deal’ activation programmes have been important 
(Sigle-Rushton 2009). Tax credits emerged first as Working Families’ Tax Credits 
(WFTC), introduced in 1999, and later in 2003 revised into Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC).88 The tax credit system designed to enhance work 
incentives and improve the economic position of low-income parents by giving them a 
larger tax deduction, which is reimbursed in the form of a check or direct payment to 
the eligible person. The WFTC and Family Credits were similar in that they were not 
designed particularly for lone parents but for all families with children, however, 
larger deductions are given for lone parent households. In order to be eligible, a family 
or a single person has to have at least one dependent child, at least one person in the 
household working 16 hours or more per week and a low or medium income. Incomes 
below a threshold receive the maximum credit which is gradually withdrawn (the 
taper) as incomes rise up to the level at which eligibility ceases. Where the new system 
differs from the old is that WFTC was more generous than Family Credits due to an 
increased credit for children up to 11 years; a higher income threshold; a lower 
                                                 
87 In 2007, the national minimum wage was £5.52 per hour. 
88 In April 2003, the tax credit system was changed again. WFTC, and the associated Disabled Persons’s Tax 
Credit and Children’s Tax Credit were replaced by Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC). 
WTC is also payable to singles and couples without dependent children, for families with children however 
WTC essentially replicates the non-child element of WFTC. This means that with the introduction of WTC in 
2003 for example persons who do not have dependent children but finds themselves in a difficult economic 
situation after partnership dissolution could be eligible for tax credits. However, this applies only if this person is 
in paid work. The WTC and the CTC comprises a number of elements that are added together to calculate the 
total tax deduction made: basic element, a lone parent/couple element, a childcare element88, as well as 
additional elements for working 30 or more hours per week, having an impairment, or being aged 50 years or 
over.88 WTC and CTC are separate programs but are subject to the same means-test, which is annual income for 
single persons or joint income if a couples (married or cohabiting).  
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withdrawal rate (the taper); by not excluding child maintenance from its definition of 
income; and by having a more generous childcare credit (Marsh 2001; Stafford and 
Roberts 2009:14). Hence, tax credits function both as a work incentive as well as 
redistribution policy, and has been an important policy for reducing child poverty 
(Marsh 2001; Stafford and Roberts 2009).  
 
Research has documented that child poverty and deprivation has indeed improved 
since New Labour came to power in 1997, a development likely to have been caused 
by policy measures introduced, such as improving economic assistance to lone parents 
and low-income couples with children through new tax credits (Hills 2004:234; Marsh 
2006). Improving the number of fathers paying child support, and also changing the 
tax credit system so that the full value of the payment is kept before credits are 
estimated are other examples of policies that have recently improved the incomes of 
lone mothers in Britain (Marsh 2006). 
 
3.5 Recent changes in family policy developments – the adult 
worker model 
As this chapter has demonstrated, family policies have shifted over time. In order to 
assess what this means for the economy of separating couples it is useful to try and 
synthesise these policy changes. Feminist social researchers have suggested that recent 
policy trends can be understood in terms of an ‘adult worker model’, where an ever-
greater emphasis is being placed on income from paid work as opposed to income 
from state transfers (Daly 2011). 89 This shift can be dated back to the mid-1990s and 
indicates a stronger focus on ‘activation’ and ‘employment’. One example of this is 
how policy makers have argued in favour of reshaping or withdrawing benefits for 
lone parents, in an attempt to shift them from benefits into paid work (Millar and 
Rowlingson 2001). This naturally has implications for the economy of divorcing 
couples but also for gender equality in general.  
                                                 
89 The ‘adult worker model’ is said to describe policy development in Europe in general. In Scandinavian 
research it is however more common to discuss policy changes in terms of a ‘dual earner/dual carer’ model 
(Ellingsæter 1999; Ellingsæter and Leira 2006a), which more strongly emphasises policy initiatives directed at 
enhancing the caring role of fathers. There is however no clear cut distinction between the two models and the 
discussion here is concentrated on the adult worker model.  
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For policies around gender and work, the ‘adult worker’ focus represents a clear shift 
away from the sex specialisation model, where mothers were expected to stay home 
full time as carers, and towards an understanding of women (mothers) as paid workers 
(Lewis 2001b; Mätzke and Ostner 2010). This means that family policy is now being 
promoted as improving women’s economic autonomy and reducing their risk of 
poverty, through self-sufficiency in the labour market. This includes single mothers; a 
group for whom benefit reductions have been implemented in both Norway and 
Britain. So although the adult worker model is expressed in gender-neutral language, 
policies have a gendered pretext of pushing women into paid (full-time) work (Daly 
2011; Orloff 2006). The other gendered aspect of this is the increased focus on men, 
and their role as carers (Ellingsæter 2006; Mätzke and Ostner 2010; Orloff 2006). This 
has been particularly emphasised in a Norwegian or Scandinavian context, where it is 
also common to refer to a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ policy model (Ellingsæter and Leira 
2006a). In Norway, there have been vigorous debates regarding the equal sharing of 
children after divorce, which aim to strengthen the role of fathers as economically and 
socially responsible towards own children after divorce (Skevik 2006). But policies 
aimed at fathers as carers are also present in the British context for instance in 
initiatives for making fathers pay child support (Lewis 2002).  
 
In the continuation of ‘activation’ a stronger state interest in children’s development 
and caring needs has followed. This is not limited to a mere facilitation of mothers’ 
work participation by taking child care ‘out of’ the family and into day-care 
institutions, but extends to an ‘investment in children’ welfare strategy (Lister 2006). 
In Britain for instance, debates have been framed in terms of increasingly conceiving 
children in socio-economic terms as a profitable resource for the future of society and 
where this profit is best reaped when a solid investment is made via state intervention 
in children’s skills early in the life course (Lister 2006). The positive side of this 
strategy is that welfare states try to enhance the value of children by turning them into 
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well-functioning future citizens (Esping-Andersen 2009; Lister 2006).90 But this has 
also been criticised for representing a relative neglect of children who are not 
considered to be such a good investment (Lister 2006). An important subtext here, 
albeit perhaps mainly on a rhetorical level, is that a focus on investment in children 
also shifts away from policies issued to improve gender imbalances towards policies 
issued in the best interest of children.91  
 
This point can be extended to another point, namely that the adult worker model has 
been thought of as a ‘farewell to maternalism’. This does not mean that ‘motherhood’ 
has lost cultural support and importance, but that to make claims on state resources on 
the basis of motherhood or care is more difficult in the current political context (Orloff 
2006:232). This point is particularly interesting since this is where Norway has been 
said to differ from the rest of Scandinavia. Norway has traditionally issued policies 
supporting lone mothers as workers, as well as carers, through generous out-of-work 
benefits (Ellingsæter 2003:421; Melby et al. 2008:10; Skevik 2006; Syltevik 1999). 
But also within Norway, policies have shifted in this respect, and the access to 
transitional allowance, for instance, has been reduced (Skevik 2006; Syltevik 1999). 
Recent policy debates have also suggested cutting the out-of-work benefits 
(transitional allowance) completely, something which could be interpreted as an even 
stronger demand on lone mothers towards activation.92 
 
Another facet of the adult worker policy model is the interest policy makers have had 
in the close association between high birth rates and women in employment, a trend 
especially prominent in the Nordic countries.93 In an attempt to both increase women’s 
fertility rates and their labour market participation rates the ‘Scandinavian style family 
                                                 
90 Similar arguments have been used in Norway in particular in terms of emphasising the educational and 
integrating effect child care institutions have on the children of immigrants. 
91 One illustration of this point is the famous pledge made by Tony Blair in 1999 who was Prime Minister in 
Britain at the time, to eradicate child poverty. This, rhetorically at least, disentangles the child’s economic 
situation from that of the mother and father. It also underplays the gendered context of child poverty, as children 
of lone mothers are more frequently poor than other children.  
92 See for instance the report of the so-called Brochmann panel (NOU 2011:7:19), which suggests to phase out 
transitional allowance under the argument that it may act as restrain labour market participation amongst 
immigrant lone mothers in Norway. 
93 It should be noted that neither Norway nor Britain has low fertility rates in a European context.  
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policy’ has been promoted as the answer. This may be seen as a form of  pro-natalism 
to stop the trend of dropping fertility rates in Europe (Mätzke and Ostner 2010). The 
increase of birth rates has however never been an explicit aim of Norwegian family 
policy (Vollset 2011). It is therefore perhaps more correct to interpret high levels of 
female work participation and high birth rates in Scandinavia as successful gender 
equality policies—a larger package than a single focus on fertility.  
 
On a more general level, the adult worker model represents a shift from policies 
supporting the family sui generis, towards a catch-all strategy for governments 
(Mätzke and Ostner 2010:388). Whereas family policy previously was conceived of as 
a relatively closed sectorial policy area, it is now increasingly being promoted as the 
answer to a whole range of societal and economic ends. This includes: improving 
gender equality by enhancing women’s economic independence, reducing poverty, 
improving the future of society by investing in children, strengthening the significance 
of fathers as carers and economically responsible for own children after divorce, and 
as a means to increase population growth (Mätzke and Ostner 2010). Hence, the needs 
of families seems to be increasingly subordinated to other economic, demographic and 
social goals for welfare states (Mätzke and Ostner 2010). This has much in common 
with the de-institutionalisation of the life course thesis, which also presents the idea 
that the agenda for family policy is driven by exogenous logics. Existing cash benefits 
and services are being re-designed to meet societal ends, rather than the idiosyncratic 
ends of the family unit (see also chapter one). Hence, there is a tendency to equate the 
needs of families with the (economic) needs of society at large. This leaves less room 
for the support of family sectorial interests, such as those of mothers or lone mothers 
(Mätzke and Ostner 2010).  
 
The adult worker assumption has also left a bit of a ‘functionalist’ imprint on family 
policy development, where “intervention is being streamlined as functional for 
employment, skill formation and poverty reduction” (Mätzke and Ostner 2010:388 
authors' emphasis). But the adult worker model, with the activation of women and the 
push on fathers into care, can also be understood as a strategy for the welfare state to 
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save money. From the backdrop of economic recession and fiscal constraints, 
governments seem to prefer policies that can reduce welfare expenses. The money-
saving aspect is therefore also an important element of activation policies (Orloff 
2006). There is no doubt that the rationale behind the tax credit system in Britain, for 
instance, fits neatly into this theory. But the idea of providing incentives to push 
individuals into paid work is not new in British policy. Where the policy shift lies is 
therefore in the even stronger emphasis on increasing the work participation rates of 
lone mothers. This is a reoccurring trend in British policies, and is evident in the new 
changes since 2009 where stronger activation criteria for lone mothers on Income 
Support were introduced (Haux 2010). Now those lone parents whose youngest child 
is seven years or older will be transferred from the Income Support scheme to 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, limiting the eligibility of means-tested Income Support for 
lone parents. This strategy has been criticised for not paying sufficient attention to the 
multiple disadvantages of lone parent families with older children relying on Income 
Support and being too optimistic in assuming that the age of the child will determine 
the work ability of the parent (Haux 2010; Lister 2006). The economic recession in the 
late 2000s has only strengthened the discussions on welfare cuts in Britain (Taylor-
Gooby and Stoker 2011). 
 
Although the impact of the recession on welfare budgets has been less pronounced in 
the more stable oil-based Norwegian economy, cutting welfare costs is nevertheless an 
important topic in Norwegian policy debate. For example, it has been suggested that  
the transitional allowance be removed. On the other hand, it is also fair to say that 
family policymaking in Norway over the last decade has been characterised by large 
investments, as Norway has increased the for day-care system for pre-school children 
to full coverage. However, this development also fits neatly into the adult worker 
assumption and the ‘activation’ of mothers.  
3.6 Overview 
There are strong and important arguments in favour of characterising policy 
development in Europe as a trend pushing all adult persons into paid work. But in the 
context of this thesis, the adult worker model has limited analytical application. 
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Describing a general European trend, the adult worker model is less attuned to cross-
national variation. It therefore needs to be underlined that what this chapter has first 
and foremost pointed out are the large differences found in family policy contexts in 
Norway and Britain. Having explored the three policy dimensions as pointed out by 
Millar (2008), differences are found in terms of divorce and cohabitation legislation, in 
benefits and allowances directed as single parents, and in policies promoting labour 
market participation for lone mothers. In sum total, Norway has a more supportive 
welfare system, particularly for single parents, compared with Britain.  
 
However, there is one factor where Norway and Britain do not differ: both countries 
have the same, high, divorce rates. Given large policy variations, one plausible 
argument is therefore that individual’s decisions to divorce or to end a cohabitation 
arrangement is not directly informed by existing family policies. Different family 
policy has not resulted in different divorce rates, which are even higher in Britain with 
the less generous welfare system.94 Hence, no clear link can be identified between 
policy variation and the willingness to divorce – but – policy variation may have large 
implications for the outcome of a decision to divorce. Policy differences are therefore 
vital when interpreting any cross-national differences in the economic outcomes of 
divorce. This is something that will be addressed further over the next three chapters 
when this thesis turns to estimate gender and cross-national consequences of 
partnership dissolution. 
                                                 
94 This may also suggest that the British policy strategy of favouring marriage by avoiding the regulation of 
cohabitation has not really had any great effect on divorce rates. This might also indicate that conservative policy 
has a limited ability to influence or reshape family behaviour. 
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4 Partnership dissolution and poverty risks 95 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the next three chapters, the empirical findings from the analysis of the 
longitudinal survey data will be presented. These contribute in different ways to 
analyse gender income inequality as a consequence of partnership dissolution. 
 
The concern in this chapter is to map out the extent to which households risk falling 
into poverty as a consequence of not having two wage incomes. Applying a 
longitudinal research design, the chapter will achieve this by analysing different life 
course changes – events – that prevent a household from having two wage incomes 
(that is, where they deviate from the ‘dual-earner norm’). These life course events can 
be seen as poverty risks. Two sets of poverty risks are analysed, namely, labour 
market-related events and family-related events. Family events with the potential of 
increasing a household’s poverty risk are related to changes in household composition. 
The event in focus in this analysis is partnership dissolution, which is assumed to 
increase poverty risks by reducing the number of earners in the household, whereas 
adding children to the household can raise a household’s poverty risks by increasing 
its spending needs, as well as limiting women’s employment opportunities. Labour 
market events that may lead to increased poverty risks are related to shifts in 
employment status such as unemployment and reduction in labour market connection 
through part-time work, or simply being ‘inactive’, that is, being outside work for 
other reasons. 
 
The conceptualisation of poverty risk applied in this chapter links to the dynamic life 
course perspective on the personal biography, where family and labour market changes 
may be conceptualised as ‘life course events’ (as opposed to life course transitions) 
(Dewilde 2003; Dewilde 2006), ‘poverty trigger events’ (Dale and Snell 1988; DiPrete 
and McManus 2000; Vandecasteele 2010) or ‘biographical breaks’ (Vandecasteele 
                                                 
95 An earlier draft of this chapter has been presented at the ‘Eight meeting of the European Network for the 
Sociological and Demographic Study of Divorce’ 14-16 October 2010, València, Spain, 
‘Trygdeforskningsseminaret’ 29-30 November 2010, Bergen, Norway, and NOVA seminar 27 April 2011. 
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2010). These concepts all underscore an understanding of poverty as arising out of a 
‘sudden’ change within a central life domain, and where life course dynamics is seen 
in relation to the onset of poverty. This perspective fits in with a longitudinal research 
strategy, where the income situation before and after a risk event is examined.  
 
The overarching aim of the chapter is to get a better understanding of how gender 
relations – that is, relations of inequality between women and men – are underpinning 
poverty risks. This chapter therefore steers attention towards two theoretical arguments 
outlined in chapter one. First, a large share of the progress in gender income equality 
achieved over the last decades has been because of women’s changed economic 
activity. Women shifting their roles from being mainly carers to becoming earners, 
alongside men, have led to a massive increase in the number of dual-earner households 
in the population. Having two incomes secures the household economically. But it also 
means that falling outside the dual-earner norm may increase a household’s poverty 
risk. Welfare states have developed institutional arrangements to protect citizens 
against poverty risks. Welfare policies offering protection against so-called ‘old social 
risk’, typically related to the inability to participate in paid work because of 
unemployment, illness or old age, have largely been successful in combating poverty, 
especially in Scandinavia (Taylor-Gooby 2004). However, a great deal less is known 
about the extent to which welfare states have been, or are being, successful in 
protecting citizens against income loss caused by ‘new social risks’ where partnership 
dissolution or divorce constitutes a particularly important risk factor (Taylor-Gooby 
2004). This thesis will therefore contribute empirical knowledge on how welfare states 
deal with the ‘new social risk’ partnership dissolution in Norway and Britain. 
 
The second aspect this chapter brings to the fore is that the way in which welfare states 
are successful or unsuccessful in protecting against income loss in relation with ‘new 
social risks’, cannot be seen isolated from how the welfare state exists in women’s and 
men’s lives (Daly and Rake 2003). The gendered arrangements between care and 
employment are complex and the welfare state may function both as an opportunity 
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structure, protecting women’s incomes after separation, or a constraining structure, not 
counterbalancing the risk of income loss experienced as an outcome of separation.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: in order to place this analysis more firmly 
into existing research evidence, the chapter first gives an overview of previous 
empirical studies on poverty risks and income changes associated with partnership 
dissolution (section 4.2). On the basis of the discussion of previous studies, a number 
of research hypotheses are formulated regarding the likely impact of poverty following 
the particular life course events designated as partnership dissolution and labour 
market changes, in Norway and Britain (section 4.3). Thereafter follows a description 
of the empirical longitudinal analysis strategy applied in this chapter (section 4.4) and 
a description of sample and variables (section 4.5). Next, the chapter turns to the 
results section (4.6), where first descriptive statistics of poverty rates by labour market 
and family related events are presented. Thereafter, the results from the multivariate 
analysis are presented (section 4.7). The chapter ends with an overview section stating 
the key findings (4.8) 
 
4.2 Previous empirical studies into the economic consequences of 
partnership dissolution 
The impact of biographical breaks on the household income situation comparing 
countries with different institutional welfare state contexts has been the topic of a 
couple of interesting studies. In a study comparing Britain and Belgium, Dewilde 
(2006) estimated pooled logit models of income poverty risks and found a higher risk 
of poverty entry in Britain for both labour market and family-related life course events 
compared with Belgium. Partnership dissolution stood out as a more gendered event, 
involving greater poverty risks for women in both country contexts. DiPrete and 
McManus (2000) compared the impact on changes in household income of family and 
employment changes in the United States and Germany. Estimating fixed-effect 
regressions, a statistical model more robust for measuring change than the pooled logit 
model, they found substantial household income decline for men exiting employment 
in both the US and Germany, and significant but smaller income reductions were also 
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found for women. This study also made comparisons of pre-tax/transfer and post-
tax/transfer income measures, and concluded that tax and welfare policies were 
especially efficient in offsetting negative consequences of labour market events,  and 
more so in Germany than in the US. Therefore, the event of partnership dissolution in 
the short term was the most consequential for negative income changes, especially for 
women. However, it was found that in the longer term, both job changes and partner 
loss had durable negative effects, for men as well (DiPrete and McManus 2000).  
 
Since this thesis is primarily interested in the event of partnership dissolution, a theme 
that will also be followed up in the next two chapters, it is relevant to consider 
empirical studies which focus on the economic outcome of experiencing the single life 
course event of partnership dissolution. A larger number of empirical studies evolving 
around the so-called ‘divorce literature’ has developed in tandem with greater access 
to data from large-scale household panel studies. A range of single-country studies 
have investigated the economic consequences of partnership dissolution and concluded 
that women in the short-term suffer larger economic losses than men: see Jarvis and 
Jenkins (1999) for Britain; Poortman (2000) for the Netherlands; Finnie (1993) for 
Canada; Gähler (1998) for Sweden; Hussain and Kangas (2009) for Denmark; Holden 
and Smock (1991), Peterson (1996), Smock (1994), and Sørensen (1992) for the 
United States. A limitation of these studies when they draw conclusions on gender 
inequality is that the effect of the welfare state and its role in influencing gender 
income differences is undervalued or at least only implicitly addressed in these studies. 
 
Studies that have compared the economic consequences of partnership dissolution in 
several countries have provided more nuanced conclusions. What the cross-national 
divorce literature has highlighted is that women are the economic losers of divorce 
compared with men, but that considerable cross-national variation in income 
consequences exists (Aassve et al. 2007; Andreβ et al. 2006; Burkhauser et al. 1991; 
Dewilde 2002; DiPrete and McManus 2000; Uunk 2004).96  Ranking severity of 
                                                 
96 Dewilde (2002) and Uunk (2004) include only women in their study and compare the economic situation of 
women experiencing partnership dissolution with women in couple relationships in various European countries. 
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income loss after divorce by welfare state regime, Aassve et al. (2007) found the 
lowest post-split income poverty risks in Social Democratic countries, followed in 
ascending order by the Conservative countries, the Mediterranean countries and finally 
the Liberal countries. Regarding gender differences, the largest post-divorce income 
differences between women and men were found in the Liberal regimes and the 
smallest is in the Social Democratic regimes (Aassve et al. 2007). Similar findings 
have also been presented by Andreβ et al. (2006). Their study compared five European 
countries grouped as representing different models of family support (market-, 
extended family-, male breadwinner-, and the dual-earner model). They found that 
post-divorce incomes were negatively affected for both sexes, but more so for women. 
The largest income decline was found in Italy, and the smallest in Sweden. This study 
also focused on the longer-term effects of partnership dissolution, and concluded that 
there were considerable cross-national variations in how quickly individuals recovered 
financially after divorce. British and German women recovered relatively quickly. In 
Sweden, representing the dual-earner family support model, both women and men 
dealt with long-lasting financial consequences after separation, something that did not 
seem to appear to the same extent in the other countries included in the study. None of 
the cross-national studies referred to above included Norway.    
 
The economic consequences of partnership dissolution for men have also been studied. 
For instance, in a cross-national study applying non-monetary deprivation measures or 
housing measures, Aassve et al. (2007) found substantial negative effects of 
partnership dissolution for men. In a study from the United States on separation and 
divorce for men, it was found that a majority of men lose income in relation with 
partnership dissolution as they are not able to fully compensate for the loss of their 
partner’s income and also because of an increase in child support payments (McManus 
and DiPrete 2001). 
4.2.1 Previous studies into the economic consequences of partnership 
dissolution in Britain and Norway 
There are also empirical studies conducted from the two countries of particular interest 
in this thesis: Britain and Norway. The number of studies from Britain is quite 
  
109 
extensive, since BHPS data have been included in numerous cross-national European 
studies, where Britain serves the role as the modal example of the Liberal or the 
market model (Aassve et al. 2007; Andreβ et al. 2006; Dewilde 2002; Uunk 2004). But 
there are also single-country studies of Britain. Jarvis and Jenkins (1999) found that 
marital splits were, on average, associated with substantial income declines for women 
and children, whereas separating husbands’ incomes changed much less. This study 
applied BHPS data from the early 1990s. In a later follow-up study by Jenkins (2008), 
a longer time-series of 14 years of BHPS data from 1991-2004 is used, and the short- 
as well as the long-term economic consequences of marital splits in Britain are studied. 
This study showed larger short-term income declines for women than for men, but also 
pointed out some improvement over the time period in that declines, in particular for 
lone mothers, were smaller in the latter part of the time-period studied. Looking at 
longer-term consequences (the income situation five years after dissolution), this study 
demonstrated that although incomes for ex-wives recovered on average over time, they 
did not reach their pre-split levels. After partnership dissolution, the women without a 
job and women who did not re-partner fared the worst economically. Women with 
paid work and women who found a new partner fared better financially after a 
partnership dissolution (Jenkins 2008).  
 
Norway is not included as a country in any of the cross-national studies referred to 
above and has therefore not been part of the growing number of comparative studies 
on the economic consequences of partnership dissolution. Whereas the international 
research has largely been concerned with exploiting the growing access to longitudinal 
databases with individual level information, the Norwegian research has first and 
foremost been contributing to a national policy debate on the system for child 
maintenance payments. The research has therefore been limited to exploring the 
financial situation of families with minor children in general and the payment of child 
maintenance in particular. Also, the economic situation has not been analysed as a 
direct change following the dissolution but rather has been explored in general terms 
by studying the financial situation of divorced women and men as a group, regardless 
of when the partnership break took place.  
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Based on this approach, there have been diverging findings for the situation in 
Norway. Melby (1997) argued that receivers of child maintenance, mainly mothers, 
have the poorest economy, whereas Bratberg and Tjøtta (1999; 2008) found that 
contributors of child maintenance, mainly the fathers, have the most disadvantaged 
economic situation after partnership dissolution. Kirkeberg and Pedersen (2000) 
explored these diverging findings and concluded that differences in unit of analysis 
(person or household as the unit of analysis), and differences in income definitions 
explain the opposite outcomes. Furthermore, they pointed out that the use of 
administrative register data as applied by Bratberg and Tjøtta (1999) is particularly 
problematic in this type of research. Since the register income data do not capture 
cohabiting couples, all married couples who divorce will be registered as single, unless 
they re-marry straight away (Kirkeberg and Pedersen 2000).  
 
The survey data applied by Melby (1997) and Kirkeberg and Pedersen (2000) have 
information about household composition, and can better control for post-divorce 
household size, but since they use cross-sectional data without information of when 
union dissolution took place, they cannot analyse the income implications as a direct 
consequence of partnership dissolution. Bratberg and Tjøtta (1999) have information 
about the year of divorce, but they do not use this information in their study. The end 
result is the same – these studies included in the group of ‘divorced’ both the financial 
situation of those who newly broke out of a relationship and those who separated many 
years ago. Since the Norwegian research conducted on this topic so far has not 
factored in ‘time since divorce’, studying the effect of partnership dissolution as a 
direct consequence of a biographical break/poverty trigger event has not been done for 
Norway. 
  
A more recent study by Kitterød and Lyngstad (2009) used data from a survey of 
parents comprising resident mothers and non-resident fathers of the same child. They 
found fewer pronounced gender differences as a consequence of partnership 
dissolution, and they conclude that mothers are just as likely to have the highest 
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income after partnership dissolution as the lowest income, compared with the father. 
This Norwegian study concluded that the mother had the highest income in four out of 
ten couples and the lowest income in the same proportion of couples. This study did 
not have access to longitudinal data and therefore also did not directly factor ‘time 
since divorce’ into the analysis.  
 
The general lack of longitudinal data applied and the lack of control for time since 
divorce make it difficult to distinguish between the long- and short-term effects of 
partnership dissolution in the findings from Norway. Hence, direct comparison with 
the international literature referred to above is difficult but there can seem to be a 
tendency to have fewer clear-cut gender differences in the economic consequences of 
partnership dissolution in Norway. 
4.3 Hypotheses – gender relations and welfare state effects 
On the basis of the review of the previous studies, two key hypotheses can be 
formulated, which will be studied in this and the next two chapters. The hypotheses 
may be backed up by different arguments, which differ in how they view gender 
relations and how they view the welfare state. 
 
Turning first to the research findings from Britain they uniformly predict that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Economic consequences of partnership dissolution are more severe 
for women than for men in Britain.  
 
According to research findings from Norway, the evidence is more mixed, but they 
seem to point in the direction of gender equality in the income situation following 
partnership dissolution. The next hypothesis may therefore be:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The economic impact of partnership dissolution will be the same for 
women and men in Norway. 
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There are a number of arguments that can be used to support or explain this expected 
difference in outcome between Britain and Norway. Looking at the first hypothesis 
predicting gender inequality in Britain, this may be related to gendered caring and 
earning practices within the private household. In other words, the hypothesis rests on 
the presumption that income inequality after dissolution is the outcome of an 
incomplete fulfilment of the dual-earner norm prior to dissolution. Women’s weaker 
positions in paid work and their heavier caring burden puts women’s economic 
situations at risk following dissolution because women then lose access to a male 
(higher) income at the same time as they see their caring needs increase relative to 
men. This argument is, in other words, conditioned upon an inequality in gender 
relations, and that this gender inequality is ‘revived’, ‘activated’ or ‘made visible’ by 
the partnership dissolution event. Not expecting much in terms of British welfare state 
interference to alter this situation, it can be anticipated that this gender inequality will 
remain unaltered. 
  
For Norway, there is evidence supporting the assumption that gender equality as a 
more likely outcome following dissolution. This can be backed up by two arguments 
with different assumptions on gender relations and the welfare state. First, it is 
possible to argue that gender equality in outcome after partnership dissolution is the 
result of a genuine shift in gender relations. If employment (and caring) practices have 
changed in such a way that the dual-earner (and carer) norm has been fulfilled, then it 
can also be anticipated that if a relationship ends, the economic impact of this event 
will be the same for women and men. What this entails is that the central condition 
generating gender inequality, namely gendered earning and caring practices, has been 
broken.  
 
Oppenheimer (1997) has commented on this situation, claiming that with the dual-
earner norm being largely fulfilled in a society, then a situation of mutual 
interdependence between women and men inside a household is generated. The 
partners start to rely on each other’s incomes for securing the household’s welfare. It 
can therefore be argued that the likely outcome of a fulfilment of the dual-earner norm 
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is that gender becomes obliterated as a social marker of inequality. Instead, a new 
demarcation of inequality is being drawn between (intact) dual-earner households and 
(separated) one-earner households. Hence, the inequality related to partnership 
dissolution is no longer directly linked to gender but to the number of earners in the 
household. Any household that relies on only one earner become economically 
vulnerable. Therefore, single parents, and other one-earner households alike, risk 
poverty. In terms of partnership dissolution, this would entail a sharing of the 
economic risks associated with partnership dissolution between women and men 
(Sørensen 2001). 
 
However, the economic loss of one earner can be compensated by welfare state 
transfers. An alternative explanation, also supporting gender equality in outcome for 
Norway, rests on a welfare state explanation. The lack of gender differences in income 
following dissolution does not necessarily entail a genuine shift in gender relations. On 
the contrary, gender inequality in employment and caring practices may still prevail, 
but these may be ‘glossed over’ by the welfare state. If the state economically 
compensates women for their lower labour market incomes and greater caring 
responsibilities, the welfare state will act as a ‘buffer’, protecting women against 
income loss. Underpinning this hypothesis is therefore a situation of gender inequality 
in Norway, as also was the case for Britain. The difference between the two countries 
consists in degree of welfare state generosity.  
  
These different assumptions on the role of the welfare state, equality/inequality in 
gender relations and the economic outcome of partnership dissolution will be further 
examined in this as well as the next two chapters.  
 
In this chapter, however, a second event that may jeopardise the fulfilment of the dual-
earner norm is also examined. Falling outside the labour market, for one reason or 
another, may reduce household income, and thus increase poverty risks. The interest 
here is not in analysing the links between shifting labour market associations and the 
welfare state per se. That is a large undertaking, and one which falls outside the scope 
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of this thesis, where the primary aim is to analyse partnership dissolution. What is 
suggested is that it may be useful to examine the impact of labour market events as a 
‘contrast case’ to underpin the arguments on inequality in gender relations, as outlined 
in the hypotheses above. To be better equipped to understand whether and to what 
extent gender relations have shifted to greater equality in earning patterns, it may be 
useful to compare the poverty risk associated with partnership dissolution, with 
another event that also may also disqualify a household from fulfilling the dual-earner 
norm, namely ‘negative’ changes in labour market affiliation.  
 
Following the same argumentation as above, if women and men tend to differ in their 
earning practices, households tend to rely more on a male income. If this gender 
inequality prevails, it can then be anticipated that the impact on the household income 
would be more negative if a man lost his job than if a woman lost hers. Hence, if the 
gender inequality hypothesis has any substance, then the reversed gender inequality 
outcome should follow from downgrading labour market association, leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The gender gap in the impact of changes in labour market 
connection will be in the disfavour of men in Britain. 
 
For Norway, an alternative scenario was outlined that there had been a genuine shift in 
gender relation towards greater gender earnings equality. If this is the case, then 
women and men should become similar in their poverty risks profiles, including their 
labour market connections, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: In Norway, labour market events represent the same poverty risk to 
the household regardless of whether experienced by a woman or a man.  
 
But it was also indicated above that gender relations had not necessarily shifted in 
Norway but were made less significant in their consequences due to welfare state 
support. Which of the two hypotheses are best fitted for Norway will be discussed in 
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the results section below; if the strongest support is found for hypothesis 4, than this 
can be used to back up hypothesis 2 above. If, however, hypothesis 4 is rejected, then 
this can be taken in favour of the welfare state explanation rather than the genuine shift 
in gender relations for Norway.  
 
The complicating factor is what to expect in terms of welfare state buffering and how 
this will impact gender inequality and cross-national variation in poverty risks related 
to labour market changes. On a general basis, it is to be expected that the Norwegian 
Social Democratic regime provides better income protection against job loss than the 
Liberal regime. In addition, it may also be expected that there would be a difference in 
poverty risks related to what caused the labour market event. It may be that becoming 
unemployed or suffering a long-term illness evokes a more generous welfare state 
response than being without paid work for a reason not supported by a welfare benefit. 
Therefore, it may be that poverty risks are higher for these groups.  
4.4 Empirical strategy for the multivariate analysis: pooled and 
fixed-effects models 
Following up the theme presented in chapter two, this chapter makes use of two 
different statistical models for analysing panel data, a methodological approach fitting 
a longitudinal research strategy. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, poor or 
not poor, a logistic regression is used. Model 1 is a pooled logistic regression (pooled 
cross sectional) model, and model 2 is a fixed-effects regression. Both models are 
estimated in Stata using the logit (model 1), and xtreg with the fe option commands 
(model 2).  
A logistic model displays coefficient estimates in terms of changes in logged odds, 
rather than the often more intuitive changes in probabilities. However, the logged odds 
coefficients can be transformed and interpreted in terms of changes in odds. Further 
information on transformation and interpretation of logged odds are found in annex A.  
 
The two models, pooled and fixed-effects, hold different properties that can be 
exploited in the analysis. The most important in this instance is that the models can 
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substantively be related to two different research questions, reflecting different aspects 
of poverty risk (c.f. Petersen 2004). 97 
 
A pooled model (model 1) holds the property that it studies poverty risks between 
different groups in the population, which shares the same observed characteristics. 
This means that the first model can be used to answer the research question of whether 
(the group of) separated people have higher poverty risks compared with those in 
(intact) couple relationships. Similarly, for labour market events, the model queries 
whether full-time earners have lower poverty risks compared with people having other 
more marginal labour market connections. The pooled model is similar to an ordinary 
cross-sectional regression model. The only difference being that it pools variables 
from several waves of data and thereby increases sample sizes compared to an 
ordinary cross-sectional survey. But in essence it answers the same research question 
as a cross-sectional regression model. 
 
To better make use of the longitudinal and dynamic aspect of the panel data, the fixed-
effects model is estimated. The fixed-effects model analyses within-person changes on 
poverty risk. This gives rise to a more dynamic research question: When a person is 
experiencing life course events such as partnership dissolution, or a ‘downgrading’ in 
labour market status, does this affect this person’s poverty risks? The fixed-effects 
model thus analyses within-person change and supports the conceptualisation of 
poverty risks outlined at the beginning of this chapter, as a ‘poverty trigger’ (DiPrete 
and McManus 2000; Vandecasteele 2010). 
 
The important difference to note between the two models is that the pooled cross-
sectional model compares poverty risks between groups of persons sharing the same 
observed characteristics. In the fixed-effects model, it is taken into account that the 
same individual may be observed in different statues during the observation period. 
                                                 
97 Choice of panel estimator may be decided based on statistical testing or based or more pragmatically be linked 
to which estimator holds the qualities most suited to analyse the research question (Petersen 2004:334). Here a 
decision on model has been made on pragmatic grounds in that the fixed effects estimator is superior in terms of 
analysing within-person change. 
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The comparison is therefore not that between two groups, i.e. couple households 
versus single households. Instead, the model focuses on individuals when they change, 
i.e. the poverty risk of an individual who first was in a couple then became single 
(Allison 2009; Petersen 2004). Put differently, while the counterfactual in the pooled 
model is couples (or full-time workers), the counterfactual in the fixed-effect model is 
the same individual when he or she changes relationship status (or labour market 
status). For further model specification of the fixed-effects logistic regression model, 
see annex B. 
 
The special property of the fixed-effects model of providing estimates for within-
person changes is of particular use here since the primary aim is precisely that—to 
calculate the poverty risk associated with one person’s changing family or labour 
market status. The fixed-effect model is superior in that, compared with other panel 
data estimators (such as the pooled estimator in model 1), it provides a very precise 
answer in terms of the effect on the dependent variable when individuals change 
values on independent variables (Petersen 2004:334). The fixed-effects model 
therefore corresponds better to a longitudinal or ‘dynamic’ approach to analysing 
women’s and men’s income risks following partnership dissolution.  
 
Apart from substantively supporting the research question of interest, there is a further 
favourable property to the fixed-effects model. It provides a statistically more ‘robust’ 
estimator than the cross-sectional (total) estimator, by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Petersen 2004). The fixed-effects model acknowledges the panel 
structure of the data and thereby provides controls for both time-varying and time-
constant observed characteristics, as well as time constant individual unobserved 
characteristics, such as social competence, cognitive ability, loyalty, devotion or 
beauty (Allison 2009; Petersen 2004).98 If family and work characteristics are 
observed and measured without error, then the estimates of the pooled model will be 
                                                 
98 Although panel data contains a time component, it has been argued that the greatest benefit of panel data 
models, such as the fixed effects (and random effects specifications) is that it model this period’s state of the 
dependent variable (1 or 1) as a function of explanatory variables and an individual unobserved time-invariant 
effect, αi. The great advantage over cross-sectional estimations is thus the inclusion of unmeasured variables in 
the fixed effect model (Petersen 2004) 
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unbiased. Standard pooled regression models are potentially biased by a correlation 
between the independent variables in the model (here: family and work statuses) and 
the unmeasured individual specific effects. For example, a person who already has a 
weak economic position might be more likely to separate from his or her partner than a 
person with a stronger economic position. Likewise, a person with stronger career 
motivation might be more likely to work full-time than part-time. A standard pooled 
logistic regression model would erroneously count such effects as consequences of 
separation or of part-time work. By controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
fixed-effects model can better handle the fact that the association between pre-
dissolution income situation and post-dissolution income situations may be a spurious 
relationship caused by an unobserved factor that is not included in the model 
(Dougherty 2007:408-21; Elliot 2002:234; Wooldridge 2002:668-76). The fixed-effect 
model provides a better control for this bias caused by unobserved time-constant and 
individual specific personal ‘traits’.99  
 
The fixed-effect model also has some drawbacks. The model only provides estimates 
for independent variables that change during the observation period. This means that 
respondents who do not experience any observed changes during the observation 
period are not contributing to the regression coefficients (Petersen 2004). In this 
context, this can be seen as an advantage as coefficients then solely reflect within 
person change, which is of primary interest. But this also means that the fixed-effects 
model does not provide any coefficient estimates for (observed) time-invariant 
variables. This is a problem since the primary variable in this study is the time-
constant variable gender. In order to integrate gender into the analysis, separate 
models are run for women and men and the regression outputs are compared.100  
                                                 
99 It may be that previous income position in cohabitation or marriage is endogenous to the process of 
partnership dissolution. In other words, an association between previous economic status inside the relationship 
is likely to be a spurious relationship, so that both previous and current economic status are the result of a 
separate factor which is not included in the model (Elliot 2002). Access to panel data and the application of a 
statistical model with include an individual-specific error term (such as fixed effects model) and thereby controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity represents an approach that can avoid some of this problem. 
100 A random effects model would have provided an alternative analysis method as it also controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity and in addition provides a coefficient estimate for time-constant variables such as 
gender. However, the random effects model does not capture within-person change in the same way as the fixed 
effects model does. Another alternative to get coefficient estimates for time-constant variables in the fixed 
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Another drawback of the fixed-effects model is that by only taking into account those 
individuals who change on one or several time-varying observed variables, the fixed-
effects estimator omits from the model individuals where no changes are observed 
over time. The fixed-effects estimator therefore uses the data more inefficiently. The 
price to pay for this is (considerably) lower sample size, and increased standard errors 
(Allison 2009).  
4.5 Sample and variables 
The primary aim in this chapter is to analyse differences in poverty risks for 
households that have been disqualified from having two earners in the household. To 
this effect, the sample therefore comprises all couple households (potential dual-
earners) and single person (one-earner) household. The latter includes those couples 
who during the observation period experiences partnership dissolution. Both 
households with and without children are included in the sample.  
 
The sample is restricted to people of working age.101 In the British sample, working 
age population was defined in accordance with the pre-defined BHPS variable 
denoting whether a respondent is of working age, i.e. 16-59 years for women and 16-
64 for men respectively, reflecting the different age limits for old age pensions for men 
and women in Britain. For Norway, working age was set at being between 18 and 60 
years for both men and women in the first wave (1997) of data. This ensured that 
everyone in the sample was below the official retirement age of 67 years in the last 
wave (2002).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
effects model is to run interaction variables, e.g. between gender and number of children. However, since the 
model includes a range of independent variables this enlarge the number of interaction effects. Therefore 
separate analyses are instead run between women and men, this gives an expression of interaction effects 
between women/men and the independent variables, but the differences between women and men cannot be 
significant tested. 
101 People living in ‘mixed’ households where for example adult persons share a dwelling with own parents, 
grandparents, siblings or friends are not included in the sample. A crucial assumption made in this study is that 
persons living in the same household pool economic resources and share the same level of living, an assumption 
more reasonable made on couples and single parent households than for persons sharing a dwelling with a friend.  
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Students have been included in the sample. This is a group often omitted from poverty 
studies. The reason to include students here is that in Norway one of several criteria 
for receiving additional transitional allowance is to enrol in an educational programme. 
To pick up on this factor, students have been included in the analysis. In addition, 
including students increases the sample size. 
4.5.1 Dependent variable  
To provide a measure of economic loss in relation with a life course event, income 
poverty is used a dependent variable. This is a dichotomous variable checking whether 
a household falls below an income threshold set at 60 percent of the median equalised 
household income in association with a life course event.102 Income equalising is 
carried out according to the modified OECD scale, see section 5.2.1 for further 
information. 
 
A poverty line as an indicator of loss in welfare is useful for several reasons. First, it is 
highly likely that incomes would change to some extent following partnership 
dissolution. The poverty line can be used to distinguish between smaller income shifts 
and more severe income loss, following an event. Second, poverty is intrinsically 
linked to inequality. Therefore it can also be argued that if certain life course events 
increase poverty risks for women but not for men, then it can also more convincingly 
be argued that gender income equality, at the very least, has not been achieved.  
 
Third, a poverty line approach is commonly applied in the research literature, and thus 
facilitates the possibility of comparing this study with other studies. The findings from 
the analyses carried out in this chapter are therefore comparable to a wide range of 
studies into poverty, divorce and the links between family events and labour market 
events (c.f. Andreβ et al. 2006; Bourreau-Dubois et al. 2003; Dewilde 2002; 2006; 
Fritzell and Henz 2001; Uunk 2004; Vandecasteele 2010).  
 
                                                 
102 The basis for this income measure is total household income, including labour market incomes (both own and 
partner’s where one is present), welfare state transfers, private transfers, and minus tax. Household income is 
measured before expenses, such as housing costs.  
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Fourth, where Norwegian politicians generally have been more committed to issue 
policies with an explicit aim of achieving gender equality, it is less clear how 
committed British politicians have been to this issue. However, there seems to be a 
shared and much stronger normative imperative to issue polices to tackle poverty in 
both national contexts. Hence, identifying poverty threating life course events should 
make for a relevant approach for informing policymakers in both national contexts. 
Linking poverty risks to family and labour market dynamics may therefore 
meaningfully contribute to the debate on gender inequality at large in both country 
contexts. By analysing the poverty risks associated with women’s and men’s shifting 
family and employment circumstances, this chapter therefore seeks to contribute to the 
larger discussion on economic vulnerability for households falling outside the dual-
earner norm and to the discussion of gender income inequality at large. 
4.5.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables are divided into two groups: family related variables and 
labour marker related variables.  
4.5.3 Family related variables 
 
Relationship status – including partnership dissolution 
In the model, three different relationship statuses are distinguished: ‘couple’, 
‘separating’ (i.e. partnership dissolution) and ‘single’. In the multivariate analysis, the 
effect of relationship status is analysed as a dummy variable with couple as reference 
category. 
 
Couple includes all married and cohabiting couples in the sample.  
 
Single comprises all persons observed as being single (with or without children) during 
the observation period, but excluding ‘separating’.103 
                                                 
103 Left censoring combined with a relatively short observation period also makes it problematic to determine 
whether a person identified as single in fact rather recently separated, but that the separation took place (just) 
before the study observation commenced. The BHPS provides better opportunities to create full overview of 
people’s changes in family and work situations, both because more waves of data are available (in total 18 
waves) and also because (since wave 8) respondents have also been asked about previous marriage and 
cohabitation experiences. Information about previous marriage and cohabitation experiences is not available in 
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Separating is identified when partnership dissolution takes place during the 
observation period. That is, when a person is first observed in a relationship in wave t 
and then observed as a single-person household (with or without dependent children) 
in wave t+1 (see also chapter two). This is the main variable in the model.104  
 
The ‘separating’ (i.e. partnership dissolution) category is generated by lagging the 
‘single’ variable one wave and checking whether the single person was in a 
relationship in the previous wave. This is the only way to determine whether someone 
in the sample has experienced partnership dissolution (see chapter two for details). An 
advantage to applying this lagging approach is that it is possible to determine the 
‘direction of change’ in the model when analysing the ‘separating’ variable, taking this 
into account in the regression model.105 Hence, the interpretation of the fixed-effects 
estimator for ‘separating’ therefore more strongly supports a conclusion related to the 
order in which events took place (causality order of events). The disadvantage is that 
lagging variables always reduce the sample size available for analysis, since the first 
wave of observations is lost due to coding purposes.106  
 
Child variables 
An important argument in this thesis is related to the potentially negative income 
effect of having caring responsibilities. This effect is controlled for in the analysis by 
adding two variables, measuring different aspects of caring for children. The first 
                                                                                                                                                        
LKU. According to Statistics Norway this information should be available for the years 2000 and 2001, but the 
data only contains 14 observations of previously married, so the LKU data file available for analysis was 
unfortunately incomplete for this question. Since this information was not available in the Norwegian data set, 
no effort has been made in order to distinguish between people who were single before entering a couple, and 
people who continued to stay single after partnership dissolution.  
104 The analysis thus operates with two different ‘single’ categories on the relationship status variable. 
‘Separating’ holds a special interest in this study as it specifies the actual transition between the couple and the 
single relationship status. All other single statues, including ‘never in a relationship’ and ‘recently experienced 
separation’ are in included in the single category. It is only possible to be in the ‘separating’ category for one 
consecutive wave. If a person is experiencing partnership dissolution she or he is coded first as separating. If the 
persons do not find a new partner the person is for consecutive waves coded as single.  
105 It has however been argued that although panel data contains a time component and can facilitate the analysis 
of causal relationships through this lagging approach its prime concern is not to estimate what could be labelled 
‘duration dependence’, namely how the length of time already spent in poverty affect this year’s probability of 
exiting poverty. 
106 The other relationship statues ‘couple’ and ‘single’ do not make use of the lagged approach and therefore do 
not to the same extent support a causal explanation in terms of order of events.  
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variable, the birth of child, indicates whether a baby is born into the household (or a 
foster baby aged less than one year enters the household). In the multivariate analysis, 
this variable estimates the immediate impact on poverty risks of the birth of a child.  
 
The second child variable controls for number of children in the household under the 
age of 18. The effect of this variable may be interpreted differently between the pooled 
and the fixed-effects model. In the former model, it is pertinent to pick up the effect of 
having more children in the household and thereby a larger family size, and in the 
latter model it can be interpreted as the effect of adding additional children to the 
household as well as the effect of (adult) children leaving the household. In terms of 
anticipated effects, larger family sizes may be associated with higher poverty risks 
because it increases a household’s size and therefore its spending needs.  
4.5.4 Labour market related variables 
The second group of explanatory variables is related to labour market status. A 
distinction is made between one’s own labour market status and one’s partner’s (where 
present) labour market status. Labour market status and working hours are self-
reported. Since men and women are analysed separately, one’s own labour market 
changes refer to men in the analysis of men, and partner’s labour market changes to 
that of a female partner, and vice versa in the analysis of women.  
 
Own labour market status 
The variable estimating the effect of one’s own labour market status has four 
categories: ‘full-time work’, ‘part-time work’, ‘forced inactive’ and ‘inactive’.  
 
Full-time work is classified as working 30 hours or more per week. This corresponds 
to a short full-time week. This is done in order to take into account that the number of 
hours constituting a normal week may vary by national context and occupational 
category. Operating with a short full-time week reduces the risk of drawing 
conclusions on changes in work status between full- and part-time work based on what 
could be classified as variations of a full-time working schedule (McGinnity and 
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McManus 2007). Part-time work designates people working less than 30 hours per 
week.  
 
‘Forced inactive’ refers to persons who are not working but have sought work or are in 
a life situation where, given the opportunity to work, could have done so (for a similar 
approach see Dewilde 2006). This does not refer to a subjective preference of work-
status. For Britain, ‘forced inactive’ includes the following self-reported categories of 
current economic activity: long-term illness, unemployed, participating in a 
government training scheme and maternity leave.107 For Norway, ‘forced inactive’ 
refers to self-reported unemployment and long-term illness.108  
 
‘Inactive’ labour market status refers to those who are not working. For Britain, this 
includes family care, being a student or another reason for not participating in paid 
work. For Norway, this is defined as ‘not normally unemployed’ and not receiving 
long-term illness benefit.  
 
Partner’s labour market status  
The coding of the partner’s labour market status is the same as for one’s own labour 
market status, except that the categories of inactive and forced inactive labour market 
status have been merged into one category. This is done due to a relatively large 
amount of missing information in terms of working hours. This variable should 
therefore be interpreted with some caution in the analysis. Women and men are 
analysed separately, hence in the multivariate analyses for women, changes in a 
partner’s labour market status always refer to a man and vice versa for men.109 
 
  
                                                 
107 Maternity leave is included in ‘forced inactive’ category for Britain but included in full/part-time work for 
Norway. The reason for this is that a near full wage compensation is made for a year in Norway whereas 
maternity leave does not imply the same wage compensation in Britain. This means that maternity leave is 
economically juxtaposed with being in work, something that is less the case in Britain.  
108 For Norway forced inactive contains unemployed and long-term sick. Unemployment status is self-reported, 
tried to find work but is not currently employed. Long-term sick is defined as receiving sick pension or disability 
pension. This information is taken from registers. People normally working but who are on maternity or 
paternity leave are in Norway recorded as in work, otherwise as inactive labour market status. 
109 This thesis does not include any same-sex couples. 
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Other control variables 
In addition to controlling for family and labour market status, the models also control 
for educational level and age. Level of education is divided into three categories: 
higher education, upper secondary and lower secondary school, where higher 
education is used as baseline.  
 
The model also controls for age, which is included in the model as a continuous 
variable. 
4.6 Descriptive results 
In table 4.1, descriptive statistics is presented by country and gender.  
 
Family characteristics 
Table 4.1 shows that the most common relationship status is couple. More than 70 
percent of the sample respondents live with a partner (married or cohabiting). In 
Norway, 72 percent of women and 70 percent of men live in couple relationships. The 
corresponding numbers for Britain are 78 percent women and 85 percent men, 
respectively.  
 
There are more single persons in the Norwegian sample than the British sample. In 
Norway, there are 30 percent single men and 25 percent single women in the sample 
and for Britain, 14 percent single men and 21 percent single women. The lower share 
of British single men is highly likely to be caused by higher sample attrition for this 
group.110  
 
Relatively more separations are observed in Norway in comparison with Britain. This 
should indicate a higher probability of partnership dissolution in Norway than Britain. 
Based on other available statistics (see chapter one), it is however no reason to 
anticipate large differences in divorce and separation rates between these two 
                                                 
110 In the BHPS there is a proportionally higher dropout rate amongst people with the following characteristics: 
young, never married, unemployed, no qualifications, in the bottom 40% of income distribution, not active in 
any organizations, local authority or housing association tenant or resident in Inner London, West Midlands or 
Merseyside (Lynn 2006:76) 
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countries. Another likely explanation is therefore that the difference is due to higher 
attrition in the British sample among separating persons.111  
  
In terms of number of children, there is not a great deal of cross-national variation. It is 
most common to have either one or two children, with about 20 percent of the sample 
being in either of these two groups. Less than five percent experience birth of a child 
in their household during the observation period, the numbers being somewhat higher 
in Britain than in Norway. In reality there is little difference in birth rates between 
Norway and Britain112, so the slightly higher number of births registered in the British 
sample could be caused by the two year longer observation period. Alternatively, the 
explanation is that families with children are overrepresented in the British sample.  
 
In sum, table 4.1 demonstrates a great deal of similarity in family characteristics 
between Norway and Britain. This makes for a good starting point for making a 
comparison, as differences in poverty risks are then more likely driven by other 
factors.  
                                                 
111 Since partnership dissolution is defined as an event, measured as the change in marital status between two 
consecutive waves, i.e. it is possible to be recorded as ‘partnership dissolution’ for one wave only. Hence the 
numbers for partnership dissolution appear low when calculated as a relative share of the pooled sample and 
compared with the ‘stable’ relationship statuses of ‘couple ‘ and ‘single’ respectively. 
112 Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman) has in the period 1997-2007 varied between 1.63-
1.90 in UK and 1.75-1.90 in Norway (Eurostat 2010: table 2.14).  
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Labour market characteristics 
Table 4.1 also displays variations in labour market status. Among men in both 
countries it is most common to be in full-time work. Nearly 84 percent of Norwegian 
men and just over 80 percent of British men in the sample work full-time. Full-time 
work is less widespread among women, about half of all Norwegian women work full-
time (52 percent), and in Britain, less than half of women are full-time workers (42 
percent). It should be noted that full-time work is measured as working 30 hours or 
more per week, which means, for instance, that women who are working a long part-
time week have been classified as full-time workers. Despite this ‘generous’ full-time 
definition, there are clear gender differences. In fact, gender differences are much 
more pronounced than cross-national differences. 
  
Looking more carefully at the other labour market categories, part-time work has a 
high prevalence among women in both countries, just over 26 percent of women 
working part-time. Part-time work among men is rare, only three percent of British 
men and five percent of Norwegian men are part-time workers. 
 
More women are inactive in the labour market than men. If the two ‘inactive’ 
categories are analysed jointly, the results show that over a fourth of British and about 
one fifth of Norwegian women are not in ordinary paid work. The corresponding 
figures for men in both countries are just over 10 percent. If the two inactive work 
statuses are analysed separately, it can be seen that it is more common for women to 
be ‘inactive’ than ‘forced inactive’, that is, being out of work for another reason than 
suffering a long-term illness or being unemployed. 
 
The household data analysed here also has information on the work status of other 
persons in the same household. Table 4.1 therefore also show the labour market status 
of the spouse where one is present in the household. This confirms a gendered pattern 
in terms of labour market status. It can be useful to cross-reference spouses’ labour 
market status with the labour market status of the opposite sex in the same country, as 
it is a likely assumption that these should be similar. For example, the working 
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patterns of the (male) spouses of British women can be compared with the working 
patterns of British men. When doing this comparison, spouses’ working status shows 
lower numbers for being in (full-time or part-time) work for all the groups. 
Furthermore, in Norway the share of the population with an inactive spouse is low, 
whereas in Britain it is rather high. Particularly the sample numbers for inactive male 
spouses of British women at 25 percent seems to be higher than expected. It is difficult 
to say exactly why this is the case, but again this could be due to sample attrition or 
non-unit response on this particular question. Since the working patterns of spouses 
deviates from the main respondent’s, it is necessary to treat partner’s working status 
with some caution in the analyses that follows below.113  
 
Summed up, in terms of labour market status, the descriptive statistics indicates large 
gender differences in both countries. Men tend to work full-time or otherwise be 
‘forced inactive’ (that is either on sick leave or unemployed), which shows that they 
would have been in paid work given the chance. Women show more diverse 
associations with the labour market. A majority is in paid work, either on a full-time or 
part-time basis. There is also a substantial share of women outside the labour market, 
as ‘inactive’, and who consequently are not drawing a wage income. With a higher 
share of Norwegian women in full-time employment, it could be argued that Norway 
is closer to a realisation of the dual-earner norm than Britain. However, with the 
diverse employment affiliations found among women in both countries, it is at the 
same time evident that the ‘dual-earner, full-time working couple’ is not practiced by a 
majority of households in any of the countries.  
 
Other independent variables 
In addition to family and labour market status, the multivariate analyses follow 
controls for education level and age. Table 4.1 shows a higher educational level in the 
British sample than the Norwegian sample. Since there is little reason to suspect large 
variations in education level between these two countries this may, as also indicated 
                                                 
113 In table 4.1 it can be seen that the categories for spouse’s work status do not add to 100 percent. This is 
because information about spouse’s work status is missing in 27 percent of the cases for Norwegian men, 21 
percent for Norwegian women, 23 percent for British men and 7 percent for British women. 
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above, be caused by higher attrition rates among those with no qualifications in the 
British sample (Lynn 2006). In terms of age variation, few differences are found 
between the groups. The average sample age is around 40 years for all groups. 
 
Poverty rates by family and work characteristics 
In this section, descriptive statistics of poverty rates between different population 
groups are presented. It shows differences in poverty rates between so-called ‘new 
social risk’ and ‘old social risk’ population groups. The bar charts below use the same 
scales so the length of the bars can be meaningfully compared between figures 4.1 – 
4.5.114  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the overall poverty rates for women and men in the two countries. As 
could be expected, poverty rates are lower in Norway than Britain. In descending 
order, the highest poverty rates are found among British women (15 percent), British 
men (11 percent), Norwegian women (10 percent), and Norwegian men (8 percent).  
 
Figure 4.1 Poverty rates in percent by country and gender 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 See table 4.2 for more details. 
  
131 
Next, poverty rates for different family statues are presented (‘new social risk’ group). 
Figure 4.2 shows that poverty rates are considerably higher than the overall poverty 
rates in figure 4.1, and they are higher for those separating (partnership dissolution) 
than for couples. This applies across all four groups. However, for British men there is 
little difference in poverty rate between separating men and men in couple 
relationship.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows poverty rates for women and men with different labour market 
statues (‘old social risk’ group) in Norway and Britain. For households where at least 
one person is working full-time, poverty rates are lower than overall sample poverty 
rates (see figure 4.1). Part-time work displays higher poverty rates for men than for 
women. Nearly 22 percent of British and 24 percent of Norwegian part-time working 
men are poor. However, it must be taken into account that very few men in the sample 
work part-time (see table 4.1), but for those who do, poverty seems prevalent.  
 
The working status associated with the highest poverty rates is found amongst 
individuals who do not work. Poverty rates are highest for those in the ‘inactive’ 
category, that is, people not employed for a reason other than being unemployed or 
receiving illness benefits. Over half of all British men in this category are poor. The 
lowest poverty rates for ‘inactive’ are found for Norwegian women at 21 percent, 
which is still quite high.  
 
For ‘forced inactive’, which is the out-of-work category most presumably associated 
with some welfare state reimbursement, poverty rates are much lower in Norway than 
in Britain, which indicates that out-of-work economic compensation is higher in 
Norway. Nevertheless, poverty rates are also considerable for this group in Norway.  
 
The most pronounced cross-national variation is found in relation to the birth of a 
child. Whereas 20 percent of women and 16 percent of men in a household who have a 
new baby fall below the poverty line in Britain, poverty rates associated with child 
birth are 5.5 percent for women and 3 percent for men in Norway (figure 4.4) 
  
132 
 
Figure 4.2 Poverty rates by relationship status, gender and country 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Poverty rates by selected labour market statuses, by gender and country 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Poverty rates for birth of child, by gender and country 
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Table 4.2 Percentage poor by selected independent variables, by country and gender 
(unweighted) 
 
 Norway Britain 
 Men Women Men Women 
Couple 3.5 4.7 9.7 9.1 
Separating 19.7 29.7 12.8 43.8 
Single 17.6 23.7 21.6 34.5 
     
Birth of child 3.1 5.5 16.1 19.8 
     
Full-time work 4.2 4.6 6.2 3.9 
Part-time work 24.4 10.9 21.7 13.2 
‘Forced’ inactive 19.6 15.0 42.2 27.0 
Inactive 35.8 27.8 52.9 37.3 
     
Total 7.9 10.1 11.4 14.8 
     
Number of person 
years 
5803 5534 18097 18577 
N 1652 1538 3492 3605 
 
 
4.7 Results from the multivariate analyses 
In this section follows the results from the multivariate regression models. Separate 
models are run for Norwegian men and women and British men and women. Findings 
from the pooled model (model 1) are presented before the findings from the fixed-
effects model (model 2).  
Results from the pooled model (model 1) 
The pooled model 1 in table 4.3 shows the effect of independent variables on the risk 
of experiencing income poverty between different groups in Britain and Norway 
respectively. Commenting first on poverty risk among groups with different 
relationship statues; a significant and positive estimator for the single and separating 
categories indicates that one-earner households have significantly higher poverty risks 
than couples, controlled for other variables. The same trend is found for both women 
and men and in both countries. 
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Figure 4.4 displays the odds ratio for the ‘separating’ category (i.e. partnership 
dissolution) on the risk of poverty, which is the variable of most interest to this 
thesis.115 The pooled model (figure 4.4) shows that the highest risk of income poverty 
is found among the group of British women, with an odds ratio of 11.22.116 This means 
that British women who separate have 11 times higher odds of being poor compared 
with women in a couple relationship. The odds for British separating men are much 
lower, where the odds for being poor for separating persons are 1.8 times higher than 
for couples. 
  
For Norwegian women as well, the odds for separating is high. The odds of poverty 
for Norwegian separating women are nine times as high compared with women in 
couples. For Norwegian men experiencing partnership dissolution, the odds of poverty 
are 4.8 times as high as for those men in a couple.  
 
To a large extent, these findings confirm hypothesis 1 of a large gender gap in poverty 
risk for Britain, where separating women are more often poor than women in a couple 
relationship. The gender gap is also found in Norway where separating women display 
high odds of poverty. Hence, hypothesis 2 is not fully confirmed for Norway. It needs 
to be stressed that poverty risks are clearly high for men who separate when compared 
with poverty rates amongst men in couples. However, the evidence from the pooled 
model for separating, exploring between group poverty risks, points in direction of the 
gender inequality hypothesis for both countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 See annex A on how to transform logged odds into odds ratio. 
116 Exponentiating the logged odds expresses the coefficients in odds (or odds ratio). The difference of a 
coefficient expressed as odds from 1 exhibits the increase or decrease in the odds for a unit change in the 
independent variable. Taking the odds coefficient minus 1 and times 100 gives the percentage increase (if above 
1) or decrease (if below 1) due to one-unit change in the independent variable (Pampel 2000:23). 
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Figure 4.4 Odds ratio of poverty for ‘separating’ (i.e. partnership dissolution) (Reference 
category = couple) 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Odds ratio of poverty for ‘forced’ inactive labour status (Reference category = 
full-time work, working at least 30 hours per week) 
 
The next question is whether the findings from the labour market estimator support the 
gender inequality hypothesis, and what is to be looked for is ‘reversed’ gender 
inequality effects (in the disfavour of men) associated with downgrading in labour 
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market status. Staying with the pooled model (model 1), table 4.3 shows positive and 
significant coefficients for all labour market statuses, which implies that poverty risks 
are higher for persons outside full-time work, net of other differences (family status, 
child birth, number of children, education and age). This effect applies to women and 
men in both countries alike.117  
 
Looking more carefully at the findings from the ‘forced inactive’ group (mainly ill and 
unemployed), exponentiating the estimator provides the coefficient in odds ratio, 
plotted in figure 4.5. The pooled model shows that in Britain the effect of being forced 
inactive is larger for men than women. Forced inactive British men have an odds of 
poverty that are 10.5 times as large as for full-time working men. The odds are also 
considerable for British women, where forced inactive have an odds of poverty that are 
5.8 times as large than for full-time working women. This gives some support to 
hypothesis 3 of a ‘reversed’ gender income inequality effect, pertaining to British 
unemployed and long-term ill men. But the high odds for both women and men are 
also an indication that the British welfare state is not particularly successful in 
protecting against income loss in relation with so-called ‘old social risks’.  
 
For Norway the ‘reversed gender’ effect is not found in the pooled model (figure 4.5). 
Rather being ‘forced inactive’ reveals the highest effect for women, but gender 
differences are not very large. Figure 4.5 shows that the odds of poverty are 4 times as 
large for ‘forced inactive’ women and 3.5 times as large for ‘forced inactive’ men, 
compared with those in full-time work.118 This lends some support to hypothesis 4, 
that labour market events represent the same poverty risk to both women and men, i.e. 
a possible indication of a shift towards the dual-earner norm in Norway.  
 
                                                 
117 It is hardly surprising that people working part-time or who are inactive in the labour market have lower 
incomes than full-time workers. The model is not estimating downward income shifts per se but poverty risks. It 
is therefore interesting to note that any work status outside full-time work is associated with significantly higher 
poverty risks for all groups in the sample, in Norway as well.  
118 What is perhaps more surprising are the relatively high poverty risks associated with being ‘forced inactive’ 
in Norway. It could perhaps been expected that the Norwegian welfare system would offer better poverty 
protection against ‘old social risks’ related to being unemployed and long term ill. 
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Whether gender relations have shifted towards more equality in respect of earnings can 
also be studied further by analysing the coefficient for partner’s work status in the 
model. Moreover if a household relies more on a man’s income, then women’s poverty 
risks will be greater following a negative shift in partner’s labour market connection, 
than her own (DiPrete and McManus 2000). This seems to be the case as British 
women whose partner work part-time has a much higher poverty risk than British 
women whose partner work full-time. Having a part-time working partner does not 
raise men’s poverty risks. Similarly for Norway, it is found that women with an 
‘inactive’ partner have higher poverty risks compared with women who have a full-
time working partner. This coefficient is not significant for men. Analysing partner’s 
labour market status therefore points in the direction of hypothesis 3 in both countries, 
which is based on the gender inequality in work and caring practices. 
 
Hence, the conclusion for Britain in terms of gender inequality in working relations is 
quite clear, whereas evidence is somewhat more mixed in Norway based on the pooled 
model.  
 
In connection with the pooled model, the effect of the children variables should also be 
briefly commented upon. Although having children is not directly linked to the 
research question related to poverty risks associated with deviations from the dual-
earner norm, caring responsibilities can impact women’s ability to work and it also 
increases household size and spending needs, which again may raise poverty risks. For 
Norway there are no significant effects for any of the child variables (birth of child and 
number of children in the household) (table 4.3, model 1). This means that households 
with children do not have any increased poverty risks compared to households without 
children, net of all the control variables in the model.  
 
For Britain there is a different story, where the coefficient for the total estimator 
(model 1) shows a significant and positive effect. This indicates that adding more 
children to the household, and thereby increasing family size, is associated with a 
higher poverty risk, for both women and men. There is therefore no gender difference 
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in the effect of having children in the household, which is perhaps unsurprising, given 
the pooled income measure which is used. 
 
The other child variable, giving birth to a child, is not significant for British men but is 
found to have a significant, but negative effect for women. This means a reduced 
poverty risk among the group of British women who give birth. However, rather than 
interpreting child birth as a poverty protector this result could be the outcome of a 
selection effect. It could be that only those households who can afford to have a baby 
actually plan to have one. An alternative explanation is that any poverty risk associated 
with having children may take time to manifest itself at the individual level. Therefore 
to identify the effect on the household economy of having a baby would require a 
longer time frame, say two or three years, in order to assess its real impact.  
 
4.7.1 Results from the fixed-effects model (model 2) 
Analysing the pooled cross-sectional model associates poverty with variations in group 
characteristics. However, the longitudinal approach and the life course perspective see 
poverty more as the outcome of changes in life circumstances and occurring as an 
outcome of life course events. Therefore, the next part is to examine the empirical 
findings from the fixed-effects model, which analyses the second substantive research 
question related to within-person poverty risks: Do individuals have a higher risk of 
poverty the year they separate (or experience another ‘event’) compared to the years 
they were in a couple relationship (when they did not experience the ‘event’)?  
 
Of primary interest are the findings from the ‘separating’ coefficients for the fixed-
effects model (model 2) in table 4.3. This is also plotted as odds ratio in figure 4.4. 
Given the specific coding of the partnership dissolution, this coefficient also expresses 
change in a particular direction (from being in a couple to experiencing partnership 
dissolution). The estimator can therefore be interpreted as a poverty trigger, supporting 
a causal explanation that partnership dissolution is the intervening event that triggers a 
change in the household economy resulting in income poverty.  
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Looking again at the odds ratio of experiencing poverty for ‘separating’ in figure 4.4, 
but this time interpreting the fixed-effects model, reveals some interesting results 
regarding gender inequality. Turning first to Britain, it was predicted in hypothesis 1 
that gender income inequality would be the outcome of partnership dissolution. This is 
indeed confirmed. The results show that the odds for a British woman to experience 
poverty in relation with partnership dissolution is nearly 18 times as large than when 
that same woman was in a relationship. Interestingly, for British men the estimator is 
not significant, meaning that partnership does not act as a poverty trigger for British 
men. A British man who separates does not have higher odds of poverty following this 
event than prior to separation.  
 
Looking next at Norway, the odds of poverty for a man experiencing partnership 
dissolution is about 4 times higher the year he experiences partnership dissolution 
compared to when that same man was in a couple. For a Norwegian woman, the odds 
are nearly 19 times higher of experiencing poverty the year she experiences 
partnership dissolution, compared to when she was still in a couple. Partnership 
dissolution acts therefore as a poverty trigger for both women and men in Norway, but 
the effect is much stronger for women. This evidence does not back up the gender 
equality in outcome hypothesis for Norway. Indeed the outcome of partnership 
dissolution is negative for both women and men, but the effect is strongest for women, 
which points in the direction of a gender inequality in earning hypothesis (hypothesis 
1), for Norway as well. 
 
The second issue raised here was whether this explanation can be supported by the 
findings from the labour market variables, i.e. the ‘reversed gender inequality’ effect. 
The odds ratio bar charts for poverty risks for ‘forced inactive’ in figure 4.5 indeed 
support this hypothesis, for both countries. Again the interpretation is in terms of 
poverty risks related to when an individual was in the ‘forced inactive’ status 
compared to when that same individual was in a full-time work status. For men in both 
countries the effect is very similar: for a man, the odds of poverty are 3.8 (Britain) and 
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3.1 (Norway) times as large when ‘forced inactive’ compared with when the same man 
was in full-time work. For British women, the effect is lower at 2.2 times higher odds 
for poverty, whereas for Norwegian women there is no significant difference of 
poverty for the same woman when she is ‘forced inactive’ compared to when she was 
in full-time work. This could mean that Norwegian women are less dependent on their 
own work incomes for supporting themselves and that other income sources are more 
important for keeping women out of poverty. This could be income sources such as a 
male partner’s income or income from the state in the form of benefits, or a 
combination of the two (a question to be further examined in chapter five). 
 
The first explanation is the one which is best ‘tested’ in the regression model in table 
4.3, and there is some empirical evidence to support it. Both in models 1 and 2 for 
Norwegian women the variable ‘partner’s employment status being inactive’ is 
strongly significant in the model. It therefore seems that poverty is triggered as a 
consequence of male rather than female changes in work relations in Norway. This 
could suggest a more gendered model of family provision, or that both men and 
women in Norway rely on men’s incomes to avoid poverty.  
 
To sum up, based on the findings from the fixed-effects model measuring within-
person changes, there seems to be a great deal of support for the gender inequality 
hypothesis which predicts that the poverty risk will be greater for women in relation 
with partnership dissolution and greater for men in relation with negative labour 
market changes. This tendency is particularly pronounced in Britain, but is also found 
in Norway for ‘forced inactive’ (i.e. unemployed/long-term ill). Partnership dissolution 
acts as the greatest poverty trigger for women, but is also a substantial poverty 
triggering factor for men.  
 
4.8 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter has been to explore gender differences in income poverty risks 
associated with events that disqualify a household from fulfilling the dual-earner norm. 
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At the beginning of this chapter, it was discussed whether gender differences in 
income poverty risks could be subscribed to a difference in earning and caring 
practices between women and men, and it was further anticipated that this scenario 
would be found in Britain. It was also argued that gender relations in Norway had 
possibly changed to create a gender equality scenario where women and men have 
started to be more equal in their earning practices (a fulfilment of the dual-earner 
norm) and therefore also more similar in their poverty risk profiles (Oppenheimer 
1997; Sørensen 2001). 
 
It was found that the most important ‘disqualifier’ for women was partnership 
dissolution, which was associated with high poverty risk for women in both Norway 
and Britain. For men the findings were more mixed. British men did not display high 
poverty risks when experiencing partnership dissolution but rather their poverty risk 
was associated with falling outside the labour market. For Norwegian men both 
partnership dissolution and being ‘forced inactive’ (that is being out of work due to 
unemployment or long-term sick leave) represented poverty risks.  
 
Although the evidence of gender differences in poverty risks was less clear cut in the 
findings from Norway, there were some gender differences in the effect of the poverty 
risk. Women were more badly affected by the experience of partnership dissolution 
than men. Hence, no clear evidence was found to support the hypothesis that women 
and men had developed a similar poverty risk profile.  
 
The use of fixed-effects models revealed that the poverty triggering effect was much 
larger for women losing a male partner than for men losing a female partner, in both 
Norway and Britain. This finding therefore underscored the importance of the second 
aim of this chapter, namely to demonstrate the benefit of applying appropriate panel 
data analysis techniques (such as the fixed-effects model) for exploring gender 
inequality. It also revealed that much greater gender differences in poverty risk were 
associated with ‘new social risk’ (partnership dissolution) than the ‘old social risk’ of 
falling outside the labour market, in both countries.  
 5 The role of welfare state redistribution on post-
dissolution household economics. A basis for gender 
and cross-national variation?  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was established that partnership dissolution is a gendered 
poverty risk, and thus a potentially major life course event in terms of increasing 
gender inequality in society. In this chapter, what economic role the welfare state plays 
on steering the outcome of partnership dissolution in the direction of equality or 
inequality between women and men will be analysed. In this chapter, the focus in not 
just on the individuals with the lowest incomes (i.e. those who experience poverty as 
an outcome of partnership dissolution), rather the examination of which income 
sources women and men rely on following partnership dissolution will be emphasised. 
The issue of gender inequality may also be examined not just by looking at income 
level (i.e. the poverty line approach) but also by studying whether the fact that women 
and men rely on different income sources following dissolution can inform the 
empirical investigation of gender income inequality (Daly and Rake 2003; Ruspini and 
Dale 2002:264). Exploring whether individuals obtain economic resources in their own 
right (from the labour market), whether resources are obtained from the welfare state 
(as benefit claimants) or are obtained as a consequences of family status (such as lone 
motherhood), is important for enhancing our understanding of the gender differences 
in economic dependencies. 
  
An income decomposition analysis may therefore give important insights into how the 
welfare state provides different opportunities and constraints on women’s and men’s 
post-dissolution incomes. Again, a longitudinal design is favoured, where income 
shifts are explored by comparing household income before and after dissolution, for 
different income measures. The types of research questions that are asked in this 
chapter are: What role does the welfare state play in limiting gender income inequality 
following partnership dissolution? Why do both women and men end up as economic 
losers after dissolution in Norway, when women alone seem to bear the economic 
burden in Britain? How is this related to women’s participation in paid work and how 
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is it related to welfare state redistribution? To what degree do welfare states support 
the household economy after dissolution and what consequences does this have for 
gender income inequality? 
 
This chapter follows the same line of argument as presented in the previous chapter, 
namely that researching the relationship between partnership dissolution and income 
changes is crucial for discussing two claims related to women’s earnings and gender 
equality. The first claim is that more equality in earnings before partnership 
dissolution means more equal sharing of the economic risks associated with 
partnership dissolution (Oppenheimer 1997; Sørensen 2001:99). The second claim is 
related to a general debate on women and the welfare state and stipulates that the 
welfare state is more crucial for women’s than for men’s incomes, and therefore that a 
‘women friendly’ welfare state is pivotal in achieving gender earnings equality (Daly 
and Rake 2003; Hernes 1987). Relating this to the first claim, it can therefore be 
assumed that behind a more gender-equal sharing of income risks as a consequence of 
partnership dissolution lies a welfare state with stronger gender redistribution effects.  
 
In the next section is an outline of the analytical strategy for this chapter consisting of 
the three measures used in the income decomposition analysis (section 5.2). Next 
follows a short presentation of the sample (section 5.3). Thereafter follows the results 
section presenting the empirical investigation into economic resources available to a 
household before and after dissolution (section 5.4). This analysis demonstrates the 
extent to which the welfare state acts as a protective “buffer” against gender income 
inequality. Last, the chapter is rounded off with a summary of the main findings that 
constitute an important backdrop when the next chapter turns to an analysis of gender 
differences in individual level characteristics as important factors for gender income 
differences in post-dissolution household economies (section 5.5). 
5.2 Analytical strategy – measuring income changes 
In order to examine the welfare state redistributive effect on the post-dissolution 
income situation, this chapter will apply the method that has become a tool for 
revealing income redistribution (DiPrete and McManus 2000; Poortman 2000; Smock 
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1994). Decomposing net household income into its separated income sources, that is 
into which shares of the income that comes from employment, transfers and taxation 
respectively, makes it possible to determine whether there are gender differences in 
income dependencies after dissolution. In this way, for example, the extent to which 
women depend on economic transfers more than men, and the extent to which welfare 
state redistribution ‘buffers’ the incomes of women can be illustrated.  
 
The income decomposition analysis splits household income into three separate  parts: 
disposable net household income, labour market income and gross income. The 
incomes measures applied are summarised in figure 5.1. 
 
Disposable (net) income reflects the economic resources a household has available to 
spend or save. Loss of disposable income over time indicates a loss in welfare for a 
particular household, since this means that this household has less resources to spend 
or save than previously. Disposable income consists of labour market income or 
income from self-employment, capital, welfare and private transfers but minus taxes 
(post-tax, post-transfer income).  
 
In order to address the importance of market and welfare state on household income, 
two additional measures are estimated.  
 
Labour market income displays the share of a household’s income which comes from 
employment. This is an income measure reflecting economic situation prior to welfare 
state influence (pre-tax and pre-transfer).  
 
The gross income measure shows household income after transfers has been added but 
before taxation (post-transfer, pre-tax). This is a measure of the economic impact of 
welfare (and private) transfers on the household economy. 
 
By subtracting taxes from the gross measure, one derives at the disposable income 
measure. Comparing income changes between market and gross income show the 
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impact of benefits and transfers on the household economy. A comparison between 
gross and disposable income shows the effect of taxation on the household economy.  
  
Figure 5.1 Household income measures used in income decomposition analysis 
Labour market incomea 
Pre-tax, pre-transfers 
Market income    
Gross incomeb 
Pre-tax, post-transfers 
+ State benefits    
Disposable (net) incomec 
Post-tax, post-transfers 
- Tax 
 
a Labour market income includes: income from work (wages, net income from self-employment), capital income, 
dividend income other market income and occupational pension. 
b Gross income includes: Labour market income plus non-taxable state benefits and pensions (e.g. child benefit, 
housing benefit, tax credit for dependent children, study scholarship, social assistance and social loans, basic and 
attendance benefit in case of disablement, supplementary benefit, cash benefit, child birth lump sum benefit, 
non-taxable childcare benefit, other non-taxable payments) but is prior to taxes 
c Disposable (net) income includes: labour market income, plus non-taxable state transfers, plus taxable state 
transfers (e.g. (state benefits and pensions, unemployment benefits, child maintenance payments and other 
benefits),  less taxes. 
 
As opposed to the previous chapter which analysed incomes changes in terms of 
poverty risks, this chapter makes use of change in median household income for 
studying the economic consequences of partnership dissolution. Median household 
income in many ways constitutes a better starting point for assessing the income shifts 
related to partnership dissolution since it includes the incomes shifts for the whole 
population of separating couples, rather than focussing uniquely on those households 
that fall below a fixed poverty line. Median income is used instead of mean income as 
the median is not influenced by outliers in the sample.  
 
Changes in median income cannot  in the same way as income poverty said to be used 
to measure economic inequality. To address the issue of inequality in the analysis a 
gender income gap is estimated as the relative difference in post-dissolution median 
income between women’s and men’s incomes (e.g. figure 5.3). A large gender income 
gap signifies gender inequality. Decomposing household income into its different 
sources and estimating gender income gaps are analytical strategies for illustrating the 
extent to which the welfare state acts as a “buffer” for the household economy after 
separation. The significance of the welfare state on reducing or reinforcing gender 
inequality is also examined in a cross-national comparison. Comparing differences in 
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post-dissolution incomes between Norway and Britain provides an empirical basis for 
discussing the gender equalizing effect of nation-specific policy frameworks on the 
household economy after dissolution. 
 
However, there are limitations to this income de-composition approach for 
understanding the impact of the welfare state on the household economy. First, it 
should be stressed that these measures do not fully capture the “total” welfare state 
impact on household income. The welfare state, as pointed out in chapters one and 
three, is a complex agent and much of its economic influence will be indirect and 
consequently not measurable by analysing household income alone. Such an analysis 
does not reflect the extent to which the welfare state, via its policies, influences the 
market-based (or pre-transfers, pre-tax) distribution of income (Esping-Andersen and 
Myles 2009). For instance, ‘de-familialisation’ policies and the active support of a 
work-life balance may raise women’s labour market participation rates, which again 
may impact positively on their post-dissolution incomes. (Daly and Rake 2003). 
Second, income decomposition also does not take into account the fact that individuals 
might have changed their behaviours and worked more in the absence of government 
intervention (Burkhauser et al. 1990, Jarvis and Jenkins 1999).  
5.2.1 Income adjustment 
In all analyses based on household income, there is an issue in making the measures 
comparable between households that differ in size and age composition. In addition, 
since this is a longitudinal study that measures incomes at different points in time, this 
needs to be considered when comparing income changes. 
 
These factors are taken into account by making two adjustments to the household 
income: first weighting them to equalise (‘normalise’) incomes to meaningfully 
compare incomes of households differing in size and age composition, and second to 
adjust household incomes for inflation. 
 
First, to cope with the impact of inflation and to be able to compare household income 
changes over time, all incomes have been indexed to 2001 price levels. For LEVAPN 
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Statistics Norway’s consumer price index has been applied, and for BHPS the “Before 
Housing Costs index” has been used. 119 
 
Second, it is common to adjust household income for differences in size and age 
composition. Unadjusted income measures show the exact monetary value a particular 
household disposes of, before the researcher has made any income adjustments. 
However, because unadjusted income measures do not take into account differences in 
household size and spending needs, it is common to adjust incomes before comparing 
them. If, for instance, women have larger caring responsibilities for children after 
partnership dissolution, they will typically have larger household sizes and greater 
spending needs than men. This is not reflected in unadjusted household income 
measure. To take account of this, incomes have been adjusted using the ‘modified 
OECD equivalence scale’ also called the ‘EU scale’, which applies the following 
weights: first adult of the household weighted 1, all other adult household members 
weighted 0.5 and all children weighted 0.3.120 All household members are thus 
presumed to receive the same equivalent income, which means that all household 
members share the same level of welfare.  
 
Income changes after partnership dissolution may vary considerable based on whether 
incomes have been adjusted for changes in household size or not (Jarvis and Jenkins 
1999). To get a feel for how much equalising incomes impact on ‘real’ incomes, both 
unadjusted and adjusted income measures are presented in the results section below.  
 
There may be a separate reason for presenting the unadjusted measures, as well. For 
instance, in the data there is no information on how people feel about their own 
                                                 
119 The BHC index is based on monthly price indices provided by the Information Directorate of the Department 
for Work and Pensions ‘(Levy et al 2006, appendix 7). 
120 There is no universally accepted equivalence scale, and different scales exist. In the research literature, two 
commonly applied scales are the modified OECD scale and the square root scale, which return almost the same 
outcome. Using household size as the determinant, equivalence scales can be expressed through an "equivalence 
elasticity", i.e. the power by which economic needs change with household size. The equivalence elasticity can 
range from 0 (when unadjusted household disposable income is taken as the income measure) to 1 (when per 
capita household income is used). The smaller the value for this elasticity, the higher the economies of scale in 
consumption. The elasticity of the OECD modified scale is 0.53, and of the square root scale 0.50 (OECD 
Project on Income Distribution and Poverty, via www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality) 
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economic situations after partnership dissolution. It could nevertheless be argued that 
when most people assess their own personal economy, it is likely to be in terms of an 
unadjusted rather than an adjusted income measure. Hence, any subjective assessment 
of one’s own income development after partnership dissolution is likely to be closer to 
the unadjusted measure. For instance, a separated man may assess his own income 
development as negative after partnership dissolution and feel that the ex-partner has 
profited better than he has. Such a subjective assessment may be based on the fact that 
many men pay child support to their ex-partner after separation, and thereby feel their 
incomes are reduced. Such a feeling may not be unjustified. Partnership dissolution, 
which involves dividing a household into two parts, means that it is highly likely that 
both ex-partners will experience an income loss compared to the situation before the 
dissolution. Both ex-partners will lose the other partner’s income and therefore see 
their incomes reduced as a consequence of partnership dissolution. This fact may also 
contribute to strengthening a general feeling amongst people having experienced 
partnership dissolution of having had a negative income development after the break. 
This means that there are sound reasons for including the unadjusted income measure 
in the analysis. 
 
What the unadjusted measure cannot, answer is whether this negative income 
development represents a real loss in welfare. In order to address this question, it is 
necessary to draw on the adjusted measure that makes it possible to compare the 
income development of households of different size and age composition. The 
adjusted measure takes differences in caring responsibilities into account by adjusting 
for household size and consequently constitutes the better scientific basis on which to 
draw conclusions regarding gender differences in income inequality as a consequence 
of partnership dissolution. 
5.3 Sample  
The sample analysed in this chapter is of women and men who were either married or 
cohabiting in the period between 1997 and 2002 for Norway and between 1997 and 
2004 for Britain. The data sets applied were described in chapter two. The household 
income situation before partnership dissolution is compared with the household 
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income situation the year after dissolution. Partnership dissolution is defined as 
making a transition from being in a couple-relationship at time t to be living alone 
(with or without children) at time t + 1. The time interval applied is years.121  
 
Table 5.1 shows sample numbers for partnership dissolution. The sample sizes are 
fairly small. This is a common problem in European divorce research based on panel 
data (Burkhauser et al. 1991; Dewilde 2002; Jarvis and Jenkins 1999; Poortman 2000).  
 
In order to examine the income situation both before and after the split, the sample 
sizes are further reduced due to left censoring of income data.122 The sample numbers 
for the total number of partnership dissolutions, with and without valid income, is 
displayed in table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1 Sample numbers and income information for persons experiencing a partnership 
dissolution. Norway (1997-2002) and Great Britain (1997-2004).  
 
 Norway Great Britain 
 Men Women Men Women 
With valid pre-dissolution income 118 130 244 305 
With valid pre- and post-dissolution income 89 89 203 255 
 
More women than men are identified as experiencing partnership dissolution, a trend 
more pronounced in the British data. This is likely caused by a higher attrition rate for 
separating men than for separating women in the BHPS, as previously documented by 
Jarvis and Jenkins (1999:242) (see also chapter two). 123 
                                                 
121 In the event that someone experiences multiple separations within the time-period observed, only the first 
observed event of partnership dissolution is included in the sample.  
122 Complete income information was not available for the partnership dissolutions taking place between the first 
and second waves and between the second last and the last waves. 
 
 
123 This is not to say that the BHPS sample of splitters consists only of “pairs”. There is not a perfect correlation 
in the sample of individuals who were once partners and now are single persons, but there will be some 
correlation here.  
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5.4 Results 
In this section, first the pre- and post-dissolution net (disposable) household incomes 
for women and men will be examined before the net measure is compared with the 
labour market and gross income measures in the income decomposition analysis.  
5.4.1 Net income change after partnership dissolution 
Tables 5.2 present median net incomes in Norwegian kroner before and after 
partnership dissolution and table 5.3 presents median net income in British pounds. 
Before partnership dissolution, disposable (net) household incomes are approximately 
the same for women and men. This is expected since a pooled household income 
measure is used, reflecting the economic situation of a couple. The small income 
discrepancy between women and men can be subscribed to the fact that the analysed 
subsamples do not completely consist of couple-pairs.  
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Table 5.2 Median unadjusted and adjusted net income before and after partnership 
dissolution in Norwegian kroner, and median percentage change. Men and women, Norway.  
 
 Median income 
pre dissolution 
 Median income 
post dissolution 
 Median 
percentage change 
  Percentage with income 
decrease 
  
Men 
 
Women 
  
Men 
 
Women 
  
Men 
 
Women 
   
Men 
 
Women 
            
50 
 
50 Unadjusted 276584  267174  138121 178052  -50 -33   
Adjusted 119302 121214  90799 98652  -24 -19   
             
Base n 118 130  89 89        
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Median unadjusted and adjusted net income before and after partnership 
dissolution, in British pounds and median percentage change. Men and women, Britain.  
 
 Median income 
pre dissolution  
 Median income 
post dissolution 
 Median 
percentage change 
  Percentage with income 
decrease 
  
Men 
 
Women 
  
Men 
 
Women 
  
Men 
 
Women 
   
Men 
 
Women 
            
41 
 
56 Unadjusted 20222 19268  16094 11586  -20 -40   
Adjusted 10292 10067  13816 8027  34 -21   
             
Base n 244 305  203 255        
 
 
Disposable post-dissolution income gives a better insight into gender income 
differences. Looking first at the unadjusted measure, it shows that all groups 
experience a net income loss after dissolution. This is unsurprising, since dividing the 
household income between two households does not increase the income for anyone 
unless welfare state transfers exceed the ex-partner’s income, which is a highly 
unlikely scenario.  
 
Although the unadjusted measure does not correct for differences in household size, it 
shows nevertheless what people have available to save or spend after separation. It is 
interesting to compare the size of income loss for women and men. The unadjusted 
measure for Britain shows a greater income loss for women than for men. Women lose 
forty percent of their incomes and men twenty percent. In Norway, women’s incomes 
drop by 33 percent, whereas men stand out as the economic losers, having their 
incomes halved in absolute terms. These income reductions give good reasons for all 
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groups to feel that their incomes have deteriorated as a consequence of partnership 
dissolution. The unadjusted measure may correspond well with how people feel about 
their own household incomes after having separated from a partner. The question is  
whether all groups have experienced the same loss of welfare. In order to answer that 
question, it is necessary to look at the adjusted measures, which takes into account that 
a comparison is made between households of different size and age composition.  
 
Figure 5.2 shows the differences in income change after partnership dissolution for 
Norwegian women and men and British women and men according to the unadjusted 
and adjusted net household income measures. This shows that the household income 
improves for all groups, comparing the unadjusted with the adjusted measure (see 
figure 5.2). This is unsurprising as all households in the sample will have a smaller 
household size after dissolution than before, and this had been corrected for.  
 
The results for Norway show that the gender differences initially observed in the 
disfavour of men have been evened out, and women and men end up with 
approximately the same negative income development after partnership dissolution. 
Both experience an income loss of about 20 percent (table 5.2 and figure 5.2). This 
means that both women and men experience a negative welfare development after 
dissolution, equivalent to disposing over 20 percent fewer resources in relative terms. 
In one way, this could be interpreted as a form of ‘gender equality’, in that the relative 
income loss is the same for both women and men, hence the economic disadvantage of 
partnership dissolution is being equally shared between separating women and men in 
Norway.  This could be interpreted as a sign of having achieved gender equality in the 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution, i.e. strengthens hypothesis 2 for 
Norway, in the previous chapter. 
 
For Britain, a different picture emerges. Adjusting for household size and composition 
strengthens gender income differences. Interestingly, for British men, an income loss 
is turned into an income gain. This can be interpreted as British men seeing their 
economic welfare improved as a consequence of partnership dissolution. Instead of an 
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income loss of 20 percent, the adjusted measure shows an income gain of 34 percent 
compared with pre-dissolution income. British women, as in line with Norwegian 
women and men, continue to have a negative household income development and their 
incomes shift down by about 20 percent on the adjusted measure (see table 5.3 and 
figure 5.2), i.e. evidence to support hypothesis 1 for Britain.  
 
Figure 5.2 Post-dissolution income change in percent by country and sex. Unadjusted and 
adjusted net household income measures. 
 
 Change in median household income is a statistical measure for central tendency. This 
means that behind the median income measure there will be households that 
experience both income gain and income loss. In order to get a better feel for 
dispersion in the sample, the share of separating persons who experience a negative 
income change is calculated (see tables 5.2 and 5.3). In Norway, half of all persons 
experiencing partnership dissolution, women and men, experience an income loss 
(table 5.2). In Britain, a majority of women, 56 percent, experience an income loss 
after partnership dissolution, whereas less than half of British men (41 percent) see 
their income reduced after separation (table 5.3). This again gives an indication of 
stronger gender income inequality in Britain than in Norway. What cannot be 
determined based on the net income measure is what drives these income 
developments. To get a better idea of market and state influences on household 
income, the analysis turns next to the other two income measures, and carries out an 
income decomposition analysis. 
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5.4.2 Income decomposition analysis – analysing the gender income gap 
Decomposing the household income into market and gross income makes it possible to 
analyse gender differences in state-market dependencies. In table 5.4 for Norway and 
table 5.5 for Britain, the full results for unadjusted and adjusted median income 
changes for all three different income measures are presented. On the basis of this 
information, it is possible to estimate a gender income gap, which is plotted in figure 
5.3. The gender income gap is calculated as women’s incomes relative to men’s for all 
three income measures. That is, the graphs in figure 5.3 represent women’s incomes in 
Norway and Britain respectively, whereas the 100 percent line represents men’s 
incomes. The distance between the graphs and the 100 percent line is the gender 
income gap. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Gender income gap by different income measures. The incomes of women after 
partnership dissolution relative to the incomes of men after partnership dissolution, three 
different income measures.  
 
 
The 100 percent income level indicates men’s incomes.  
 
Figure 5.3 shows a large gender income gap in both countries for the labour market 
income measure. In Britain, after dissolution women command incomes over sixty 
percent lower than men’s, and the corresponding number for Norwegian women is 34 
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percent. This finding is particularly interesting for Norway as what was shown above 
based on the net income measure was a situation of an equal income loss for both 
women and men. What figure 5.3 shows is that by taking away all welfare state 
“buffering”, a large gender inequality is revealed amongst separated women and men 
in Norway. This points in direction of hypothesis 1 in the previous chapter, predicting 
gender income inequality as the outcome of partnership dissolution.  
 
Looking next at the gross income measure, which adds welfare transfers (including 
child benefit payments from non-residing parents), this raises women’s incomes 
relative to men’s in both countries, but more in Norway than in Britain. The gross 
measure for Britain shows a gender income gap where women’s incomes are 37 
percent lower than men’s. In Norway, the gender gap is almost closed, showing a 
discrepancy of only three percent between women and men. Next, subtracting taxes 
bring incomes to the net income measure. In Britain, this ‘takes away’ some the 
positive effect of welfare transfers and increases the gender income gap, so that 
women end up with a disposable income that is 42 percent lower than men’s. In 
Norway, women experience a positive income shift relative to men after taxation. Not 
only is the gender income gap closed, in fact, women’s median disposable incomes 
exceeds men’s by nine percent after separation.  
 
Looking at the gross income measure separately for each country (see tables 5.4 and 
5.5), it is also interesting to notice that for Norway, although the income level on 
average is improved from the original to the gross income measure, there is still 
downward income mobility for both genders post-dissolution. In Britain, we again find 
gender differences. Adjusted gross median income is higher after separation for men 
and lower for women. One explanation for this finding could be that state benefits in 
Norway tend to be universal and that all households, particularly those with children, 
will be recipients. This means that the welfare state does not intervene on the basis of 
the partnership dissolution as such but rather contributes on a general and 
universalistic basis, before partnership dissolution, as well. The findings for Britain 
could indicate that state transfers are particularistic and limited to periods where 
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households are particularly ‘in need’. These situations of need can arise as a 
consequence of specific life events such partnership dissolution. Examples of such 
British policies are the child tax credit that ‘favours’ single parents in particular, who 
tend to be female.  
5.5 Overview 
What this analysis shows is that by carrying out an income decomposition analysis and 
by calculating a gender income gap, it is revealed that women command a much 
smaller share of market income compared to men after partnership dissolution. This 
indicates that women in both Norway and Britain are to a large extent similar in that 
they do not in any way obtain household incomes on par with men from the labour 
market. This also reveals very different economic dependencies for women and men. 
Women depend more on the welfare state and men rely more on the labour market for 
their economic welfare after separation. Although this gender difference is greatest in 
Britain, it is also considerable in Norway.  
 
Where their economic situations after partnership dissolution differ is in terms of 
welfare state redistribution. The welfare state has a substantial impact on raising 
women’s incomes, relative to men’s, in Norway. After separation, women in Norway 
only draw about three-fifths of their incomes from the market but exceed men’s 
disposable incomes. The story for British women is different. Although welfare state 
transfers benefit women relatively more than men in Britain, the “buffer” effect is 
much weaker and large gender income differences continue to prevail as little income 
redistribution takes place.  
 
Economic autonomy for Norwegian women after partnership dissolution therefore 
rests on a strong alliance with the welfare state. The state, including the administration 
of child maintenance payments, secures the economic foundation for separated 
women. If this disappears, and no other change takes place, there will be little 
economic autonomy left for Norwegian women after partnership dissolution. It is not 
unlikely that they will end up with a pattern more similar to the one observed for 
British women where the economic foundation of separated women is less based on 
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welfare state interference, and where it was illustrated in the previous chapter that they 
to a large extent risk poverty following partnership dissolution.  This also to a large 
extent rejects the scenario outlined in chapter four that gender equality in outcome in 
Norway can be subscribed to a genuine shift in gender relations. Rather, it seems as 
though gender differences are pronounced in Norway but that women’s incomes, on 
average, are better protected by the welfare state. This also strengthens the argument 
that if the welfare state retracts, a gender income gap in the disfavour of women will 
also emerge in Norway.  
 
Seen from the perspective of the welfare state, the initial lower labour market 
participation rate of British women also means that the British welfare state has a 
relatively larger gender income gap to close.  This means that part of the cross-national 
difference observed may stem from the fact that individuals separating in Britain have 
fewer resources before they separate, compared to Norwegian couples. There may be 
some truth in this, as it was also pointed in chapter two (table 2.1), more separating 
couples are in the lowest income group in Britain than in Norway before they separate.   
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6 Gender differences in individual characteristics – What 
role do caring and employment play for the post-
dissolution household economy?  
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter continues the exploration of gender inequality in post-dissolution income 
situations in Norway and Britain. In this chapter, the focus is turned to the sources 
underpinning gender inequality, namely differences between women and men in their 
caring responsibilities and employment orientations. The explanatory power of these 
two sources is tested in a multivariate analysis using income as a dependent variable. 
The chapter therefore continues the exploration of hypotheses 1 and 2 as outlined in 
chapter four (section 4.3) on gender inequality and gender equality following 
partnership dissolution.  
 
The descriptive analyses presented in the previous chapter demonstrated a large gender 
income gap in post-dissolution incomes in Britain but also revealed that for Norway 
this gap was closed by welfare state redistribution. These previous analyses can 
however be biased by differences in key family and employment characteristics 
between separated individuals, which may contribute to either reducing or 
exacerbating the size of any observed gender income gap. The multivariate analyses in 
this chapter control for differences in individual characteristics and therefore better 
handle any such biases.  
 
As opposed to the previous chapter, which relied on descriptive measurements, this 
chapter makes use of a multivariate framework, which holds some specific advantages. 
Descriptive findings may be biased by differences in personal characteristics between 
groups. For instance, if a separating woman in Britain has lower labour market 
participation rates and consequently a weaker connection to work before dissolution 
compared to British separating men, this may reduce her chances in the labour market 
after separation and consequently increase the gender income gap. This gender income 
gap difference may be much smaller in Norway where the welfare state more actively 
supports the combination of paid work and unpaid care work for women and men. 
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Hence, the group of separated women in Britain may represent an initially more 
disadvantaged group than the separated women in Norway, leaving the British welfare 
state with a more gender unequal group to deal with. This may explain the cross-
national difference in gender income gap as British women are assumed to be a more 
economically vulnerable group before separating. The use of a cross-national 
comparison seeks to take these welfare state effects into account. 
  
The chapter follows the same multivariate and longitudinal research strategy as 
previously applied by Poortman (2000) for the Netherlands and Smock (1994) for the 
United States. Enquiring into the bases of gender inequality, it is asked: to what degree 
do women have an economic disadvantage following partnership dissolution which 
can be subscribed to children’s living arrangements after separation (i.e. caring 
responsibilities) and/or differences in women’s and men’s investments in employment 
and education (i.e. ‘human capital’) prior to separation? This moves the analyses 
closer to a ‘life course’ perspective on partnership dissolution, and improves on cross-
sectional designs, as economic outcomes are understood in light of both past and 
present individual circumstances. Hence, the analysis contributes to further the gender-
sensitive research approach by means of longitudinal data analysis by investigating the 
impact of a particular life course event on women’s and men’s economic 
vulnerabilities.  
 
By linking the explanations for gender differences to the employment sphere as well as 
the family sphere, the chapter explicitly takes into account the argument frequently 
made by feminists, that gender inequality in household earnings must be seen as the 
outcome of how paid work and care work is distributed between women and men. This 
is tied in with gendered social processes that occur within the family (Daly and Rake 
2003:118; Stang Dahl 1994; Wærness 1984).  
 
The analysis presented here extends the studies by Poortman (2000) and Smock (1994) 
by also adding a cross-national dimension. Comparing Norway and Britain which 
differ in their family support contexts, the chapter also asks: what impact do 
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differences in welfare context have on economic vulnerability following separation? 
Moreover, will a highly redistributive welfare state (such as Norway) offset gender 
income inequality compared with a less redistributive welfare state (such as Britain)? 
Exploring how gender income differences intersect with cross-national variation in 
policy context can enhance the understanding of how the private decision to separate is 
embedded in, and influenced by, the wider societal context. This more firmly 
establishes in the empirical analyses the links between micro and macro social 
explanation. The cross-national dimension further examines the issues which were 
raised in chapter four (section 4.3) of whether gender relations in Norway have shifted 
so that gendered earning and caring practices hold little explanatory power in terms of 
post-dissolution economic outcomes in Norway.   
 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. It starts with a presentation of the caring and 
employment hypotheses and how they are likely to vary between women and men in 
Norway and Britain (section 6.2). Next follows a short methodology section (section 
6.3) before the analytical strategy and the different income measures and variables are 
presented in section 6.4. Thereafter, the results from the two OLS models are 
presented in section 6.5. The chapter ends with a short discussion and outline of key 
findings (section 6.6).  
 
6.2 The employment and caring hypotheses 
So far in this thesis, evidence has been found to support the ‘gender inequality’ 
hypothesis (hypothesis 1), namely that women are more negatively affected 
economically by partnership dissolution. This lends support to the inequality in gender 
relations scenario, previously outlined in chapter four, arguing that gender differences 
in caring and employment will induce income differences between women and men, 
which will prevail unless the welfare state intervenes with income supplements. In this 
chapter, it is further studied which of these two explanations, if any – caring or 
employment – can explain income gender differences.  
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In terms of employment, women in both Norway and Britain have relatively high 
labour market participation rates, but they are somewhat higher in Norway than in 
Britain (see figure 1.2 in chapter one). But in both countries, more women than men 
work part-time. This means that women have an initial disadvantage with regard to 
partnership dissolution, as they contribute a smaller share to the household economy 
during the relationship and at the same time lose the male (higher) income after the 
relationship. A low investment in the labour market before dissolution may depreciate 
women’s positions in the labour market over time. The employment hypothesis may 
therefore read: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Women’s incomes are more negatively influenced by partnership 
dissolution because of women’s weaker labour market connection prior to dissolution. 
 
Several factors may explain women’s and men’s differing labour market earnings. 
These may include different job markets for women and men, where women to a 
greater extent tend be involved in (lower paid) caring and teaching professions. This 
again may pertain to gender differences in educational and occupational choices. 
Differences in network, socio-economic segmentation and discrimination have also 
been suggested as important factors.  
 
The point made here is that when someone has worked part-time for a longer period of 
time during a relationship, many women may find their chances of finding full-time 
work after separation to be limited, and even if a woman did manage to increase her 
working hours after separation, her wages would still be lower than her male partner’s, 
and the best opportunities to capture the better paid jobs may have passed her by. Part-
time work may therefore be economically disadvantage for women not just in the 
short, but also in the longer run. Gender differences in employment involvement prior 
to dissolution may further reinforce gender income disparities after dissolution 
(DiPrete and McManus 2000; Poortman 2000; Smock 1994). 
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The other factor that may contribute to explaining women’s relatively poor economic 
situation is that it is mostly mothers who get custody over children after partnership 
dissolution. The caring hypothesis posits that women are not only primarily 
responsible for children during the relationship, which reduces their ability to work 
full-time, but continue as primary careers after the relationship has ended. The 
presence of children in the household is therefore likely to have several constraining 
effects on women’s incomes, which may be stronger after, rather than during a 
relationship. The caring hypothesis therefore states that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Women’s incomes are more negatively influenced by partnership 
dissolution due to women’s greater caring responsibilities after dissolution. 
 
First, children cause time restrictions on women’s working hours. Not only is it 
necessary to have access to affordable day care, but it is also necessary to have a 
flexible employer and/or access to additional help from relatives or friends as single 
parents are alone with the responsibility of both bringing and picking up children from 
day care. This may reduce women’s opportunities to take up full-time work as single 
parents. But whereas flexible employment may help women in reconciling caring and 
paid work, it can also become a route into poverty because these forms of employment 
often are low-paid and insecure. This may be the case for working women in the UK 
in particular (Ruspini 2002:17). Partnership dissolution may therefore lower single 
mother’s market incomes and increase their economic vulnerability.  
 
Second, children also increase a household’s spending needs. For women, this means 
that after partnership dissolution they not only lose access to a male income, but they 
also experience constraints on their own working capabilities. Consequently, women 
have their household spending needs increased and their incomes decreased after 
partnership dissolution.  
 
Third, working hours may, in complicated ways, interact with welfare support 
payments. The general gist of ‘adult worker polices’ is to make full-time work pay. 
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This may drive policy measures in the direction of making part-time work 
economically undesirable by reducing or cutting welfare payments. Such policy 
developments may therefore harm women more than men, given women’s higher 
caring burdens and their prevalence to work part-time. The constant development in 
family policies means that how women’s incomes are affected by welfare state 
intervention will vary both within one country over time and between different 
countries (Andreβ et al. 2006; DiPrete and McManus 2000; Uunk 2004). This was also 
extensively discussed in chapter three. Care for children and participation in 
employment interact during women’s life courses and may position them in a more 
economically vulnerable position than men. This vulnerability becomes particularly 
acute during partnership dissolution.  
 
However, one factor may counteract this development. A highly redistributive welfare 
framework which channels economic resources towards single mother households, in 
combination with policies supporting women’s employment, can protect women’s 
incomes after dissolution. Based on chapter three outlining cross-national differences 
in family support policies and the findings in chapter five, it is likely that Norwegian 
women will experience greater economic compensation for having children, both 
before, and after, partnership dissolution, compared with their British counterparts. 
This could in turn be the source of substantial cross-national differences between 
Norwegian and British women in how they experience the outcome after dissolution. 
Comparing the two countries will reveal the extent to which this is the case. 
 
6.3 Data and sample 
The same data and sample are analysed in this chapter as in chapter five. The data are 
from BHPS and LKU and the sample consists of all women and men who are observed 
as either married and cohabiting in at least one wave and reports to be living alone 
(with or without) children in a subsequent wave. Further information on the sample is 
found in chapters three and five. 
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6.4 Analytical strategy, measures and variables 
6.4.1 Income measures – dependent variables 
In this chapter, two ordinary least square (OLS) regression models of post-dissolution 
income are estimated. The first uses post-dissolution labour market income as 
dependent variable and the second uses post-dissolution (net) household income as 
dependent variable.124 The logarithmic transformation of these measures is used 
because of the skewness of the income distribution. All income amounts are adjusted 
for inflation and are presented in 2001 Norwegian kroner/British pounds.125 
 
The choice of these two measures means that this analysis sees gender differences in 
income after separation as the result of women’s and men’s different positions in the 
labour market and in their caring roles as parents (Smock 1994). The first dependent 
variable highlights how much women and men rely on their own economic resources 
for their well-being after dissolution. The second measure explains overall differences 
between women and men in their economic well-being after dissolution, taking all 
sources of income into account. In addition, the net household income measure is 
adjusted for differences in household size and age composition. By comparing the two 
measures, it is possible to explore the extent to which women’s pre-dissolution 
incomes come from their own employment efforts and how much of the household 
income can be related to public and private transfers and taxation measures. This gives 
an insight into the gendered process between market, family and welfare dependencies 
for separated persons in two different national contexts. 
6.4.2  Independent variables 
Two sets of independent variables are used to account for individual level differences 
in economic well-being after separation between women and men: pre-dissolution 
investment in employment, and post-dissolution presence of children in the household. 
                                                 
124 These are two of the same income measures as used in chapter 5. See that chapter for details on how these 
variables are constructed. 
125 For Norway the consumer price index used is taken from Statistics Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/08/02/10/kpi/kpiregn.html. For Britain all incomes are indexed to January 2001 prices 
using the ‘Before Housing Costs’ index. The BHC index is based on monthly price indices provided by the 
Information Directorate of the Department for Work and Pensions ‘(Levy et al 2006, appendix 7). See also 
chapter 5. 
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The selection of independent variables was guided by past empirical research 
(Poortman 2000; Smock 1994) as well as the motivation to “test” the dominating 
position within feminist research which sees gender income inequality as the outcome 
of gender differences in employment and caring practices, with reference to the 
theoretical perspective outlined in chapter one (e.g. Daly and Rake 2003; Gornick and 
Meyers 2005; Ray et al. 2010; Stang Dahl 1994; Wærness 1984). 
 
Pre-dissolution investment in employment (‘human capital’) 
Two measures are used to capture investment in employment prior to dissolution. 
First, the total number of hours worked per week in the year before dissolution (t-1) is 
included. This variable is likely to have a positive effect on post-dissolution income. 
Those who have high involvement in paid work before the relationship ends are also 
likely to be better off economically afterwards, both because they are less likely to 
have to seek new work when the relationship ends and also because they already have 
more immediate work experience beforehand (Smock 1994). 
 
In addition, an indicator of educational attainment is included. Investment in education 
is also used as an indicator of individual investment in labour market participation. 
Higher education is likely to result in higher income, hence educational level is also 
expected to have a positive effect on post-dissolution income (Poortman 2000). This is 
measured as a dummy variable of the highest achieved educational level (out of three 
levels) obtained in the year before dissolution (t-1). Lower secondary school is used as 
reference category and the other categories are higher education and upper secondary 
school.  
 
Post-dissolution caring responsibility 
A central argument for gender disparity in post-dissolution economic well-being is the 
greater caring responsibility imposed on women. This study follows the same strategy 
as Poortman (2000) and Smock (1994) and applies number of children present in the 
household after dissolution (t+1) as an indicator for care work burden. In addition, the 
different impact of having children in the household after dissolution for women and 
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men is tested by adding the interaction effect between gender and children in the 
household to the regression models. 
 
However, it is not straightforward to argue why this variable needs adding to the 
regression equation. For instance, it could be said that if women’s roles as primary 
carers leads to a higher prevalence for part-time work and a looser connection to the 
labour market, this effect is already likely picked up by the variable measuring 
working hours prior to dissolution (Smock 1994). Hence, the model would require no 
further controls other than the working time variable, as outlined above.  
 
But instead of using hours worked as a proxy for caring responsibilities, what is 
argued here is that the critical life event, partnership dissolution, provides an 
opportunity for survey-based research to more directly observe gender differences in 
time use between care work and paid work. This is because a gendered disparity in 
time use between paid work and care work is made “visible” through the highly 
gendered patterns of children’s living arrangements after dissolution.126 Children are 
far more likely to continue living with mothers and not fathers after dissolution. This 
can be taken as a proxy for gendered norms and practices existing more generally in 
society. Hence the presence of children in the household following partnership 
dissolution can be used as proxy for differences between women and men in their 
parenting roles, and controlling for children in the regression model will take the effect 
of caring on income into account. 
 
Children are expected to impact negatively on net household income because children 
increase household size and consequently spending needs. This is probably true for 
both women and men; however, given prevailing caring norms, it is likely more 
women than men that share a household with a child after separation. Hence, this 
                                                 
126 For instance, a study from Norway has shown that only about one in ten couples with children that end their 
unions have a shared responsibility for the children after the relationship ended (Skjørten et al. 2007). There is 
little reason to believe the situation in Britain to be any different.   
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variable is likely to account for much of the gender differences in the economic 
consequences of partnership dissolution (Poortman 2000; Smock 1994).127 
 
However, in a cross-national comparison, especially one that includes a highly 
redistributive welfare state, there is a further issue to consider when adding children to 
the regression equation. Children evoke additional expenses, but may also lead to 
additional economic transfers. Economic redistribution towards single parent 
households is likely to benefit women’s incomes more than men’s after dissolution. 
Hence, women with children are likely to have the greatest expenses after dissolution, 
but they are also the ones most likely to have money added to their incomes as a result 
of public and private transfers related to having children. It could therefore be 
questioned whether the effect of having children in the household after dissolution 
fully captures the economic situation for men. Although many men do not live with 
their own children after partnership dissolution, payments of child support may 
nevertheless reduce men’s post-dissolution net incomes.128 To explore this effect, the 
two regression models, using personal labour market income and net household 
income, will be compared. The expected difference between these two measures for 
Norway, which is the most redistributive welfare context, is that the presence of 
children in the household after partnership dissolution is on the net household variable 
correlated with an income increase for women and an income decrease for men. On 
the labour market measure the effect is thought to be the other way around, as it is 
assumed that gendered caring practices inside the household before partnership 
dissolution will reduce women’s working hours more than men’s. In Britain, where 
fathers are less compliant in terms of child support payments, the presence of children 
in the household after dissolution is thought to impact negatively on women’s incomes 
                                                 
127 Since the sample analysed also comprises childless women who are likely to maintain strong labour market 
attachments while still in a relationship, a full correlation between hours worked prior to dissolution and number 
of children after dissolution is avoided, which otherwise would have been problematic in a OLS regression 
model. 
128 For a fuller discussion of compliance with alimony payment in Norway and Britain see chapter 3. [Child 
Support Agency in Britain: low take up rate of alimony payment, more rights to choose level of pay, few 
sanctions in connection with low compliance. Norway: state guaranteed minimum of alimony pay to custodial 
parent (in cases where non-custodial parent do not pay), high take up rate, strong sanctions against non-
compliance]. 
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and positively on men’s on both the labour market and the net household income 
measures. 
 
Control variables 
Three other variables are included in the equation as controls. First, previous studies 
have found a positive effect of economic status before partnership dissolution on the 
economic position after dissolution (Poortman 2000; Smock 1994). It is therefore 
likely that pre-dissolution income is correlated with earnings, and for those not 
employed, with earnings potential (Smock 1994). This effect is likely caused by 
homogamy tendencies in union formation where men with high incomes more often 
engage in relationships with women with high incomes or high earnings potential and 
low income men form relationships with low income women (Kalmijn 1998). To pick 
up the effect of heterogeneity in economic status between separating persons, pre-
dissolution economic status is controlled for in the model measured as total household 
income at (t-1), in thousands of pounds Sterling and ten-thousands of Norwegian 
kroner. 
 
Second, age before separation (t-1) is included as an indicator of both total work 
experience, which is assumed to have a positive effect on post-dissolution income, and 
relationship duration (Poortman 2000). Lastly, the analyses controls for gender, 
included as a dummy variable with men as the reference category.   
 
6.5 Multivariate results  
Table 6.1 displays the means and standard deviations of the dependent and 
independent variables for women and men, and for Norway and Britain, separately. 
Educational attainment differs only slightly between women and men, but shows that 
more women than men are in the highest educational level in both countries.  
 
For Norway, pre-dissolution working hours show that men on average work 38.5 hours 
per week compared to 29 hours per week for women. The situation is reversed in 
Britain, where men have the shortest pre-dissolution working week at an average of 
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23.4 hours compared with 24.8 for women. This shows very low working hours in 
particular for men. This estimate has a high standard deviation indicating that there is a 
large dispersion in working hours between individuals.129   
 
The largest difference between women and men is found, as expected, for children. 
Women are much more likely than men to have children in their households after 
partnership dissolution. The average number for women in Norway is 0.92 children in 
contrast to 0.17 for men. A very similar situation is found in Britain where women 
have on average 1.0 child in the household compared with 0.16 for British men. This 
means that the same gendered caring practices are being observed in both countries. 
 
Statistics for the other control variables indicate that women and men in the sample are 
of similar age, at around 33-34 years in both countries. Pre-dissolution incomes differ 
little between women and men, the numbers being on average 281,000 NOK for men 
and 284,000 NOK for women in Norway, and £20,700 for men and £20,400 for 
women in Britain. The difference occur in Norway because the sample analysed are 
separate for women and men separating, and not cases where the men and women 
were married to each other (see also chapter two on LEVPAN which used the 
individual as a sampling unit). The difference in BHPS, which is a true household 
panel, occurs because the BHPS has not managed to interview all persons in a 
household after dissolution, and there is not a perfect match between separating 
persons and previous couples. If this had been the case, pre-dissolution income would 
have been the same for women and men.  
 
                                                 
129 Most likely this figure reflects a relatively large number of in particular men, with no working hours. Also 
previous research has indicated that the BHPS data waves 1-4 have high proportion of husbands not working 
prior to the marital split (Jarvis and Jenkins 1999: footnote 4), and the same effect seems to be found also in this 
study based on BHPS waves 8-14. This is also confirmed by the large difference found between mean and 
median working hours were the median are 34 hours per week for men and 36 for women.  
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Table 6.1 Means and standard deviations of variables by gender a 
 
 Norway Britain 
 Men Women Men Women 
Dependent variables     
  ln (post-sep labour market income) 11.82 
(1.09) 
11.56 
(1.39) 
9.84 
(0.75) 
9.24 
(1.24) 
  ln (post-sep net adjusted hh inc)  11.16 
(0.92) 
11.20 
(0.86) 
9.47 
(0.60) 
8.94 
(0.76) 
     
Control variables     
  Net hh income (unadjusted) at t -1   (in 
10.000 NOK/ £1.000) 
28.19 
(12.17) 
28.41 
(14.53) 
20.71 
(13.98) 
20.44 
(10.90) 
     
  Age 34.94 
(9.31) 
34.76 
(10.70) 
33.21 
(9.84) 
33.68 
(9.76) 
Pre-dissolution human capital     
  Hrs worked per week in year t-1 38.50 
(10.84) 
29.03 
(11.62) 
23.39 
(18.71) 
24.79 
(18.70) 
  Higher education 0.22 
(0.42) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
  Upper secondary 0.64 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
  Lower education 0.11 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
Caring responsibility     
  Number of children living with  respondent 
at t + 1 
0.17 
(0.48) 
0.93 
(1.05) 
0.16 
(0.53) 
1.01 
(1.10) 
     
N 89 89 203 255 
a Sample consisting of separated men and women not remarried or cohabiting at t+1, the survey year after 
partnership dissolution. All income information is indexed to 2001 price levels using “Statistics Norway 
consumer price index” for LEVPAN and using “Before Housing Costs” index for BHPS. Income is adjusted to 
take account of variations in composition and size between households using the modified OECD (EU) 
equivalence scale.  
 
 
6.5.1 Personal labour market income  
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the effect of independent variables on the natural logarithm of 
post-dissolution labour market income for Britain and Norway respectively. First, the 
results from Britain will be commented upon and then the results from Norway will be 
presented.  
 
Personal labour market income – Britain  
Model 1 shows the regression equation with gender as the only independent variable. 
The negative and significant coefficient, with men being the reference category, 
indicates that being female leads to lower post-dissolution incomes. This is in line with 
the descriptive statistics presented in the previous chapter.  
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In model 2, a control for pre-dissolution household income is added. The effect of 
gender stays negative, which means that given the same pre-separation income, 
women have a 42 percent lower post-dissolution income from work than men 
(calculated as 100*[1–exp(–0.540)]). 
 
In model 4, the caring hypothesis is tested by adding the child measure to the equation. 
When number of children is controlled for in model 4, women’s post-separation 
income is 27 percent lower than men’s income. Comparing the coefficient for gender 
between models 3 and 4 shows that the coefficient is 43 percent lower in model 4. This 
shows that 43 percent of the gender difference in work income can be explained by 
differences in the number of children after dissolution, having controlled for difference 
in pre-dissolution family income and age.  
 
In model 5, the employment hypothesis is tested by controlling for differences in 
working hours and education. Educational level is not significant in the model, but the 
number of hours worked per week has a positive and significant coefficient. Assuming 
that women and men work the same number of hours and have the same level of 
education before dissolution, this results in women having about 44 percent lower 
labour market incomes than men after dissolution. Comparing the gender coefficient 
between models 3 and 5 shows a 6 percent lower coefficient, meaning that about 6 
percent of the gender difference in post-dissolution labour market income can be 
subscribed to differences in employment and education. Hence, caring (43 percent) 
explains a great deal more than employment (6 percent) of gender differences in post-
dissolution labour market incomes in Britain.  
 
This is further confirmed in model 6 where the two explanations are studied together, 
and which shows about the same coefficient estimates for children and employment as 
in models 4 and 5 respectively.  
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The variable measuring pre-dissolution economic status of the household shows a 
positive effect on post-dissolution income from work. This means that prior household 
income tends to be positively correlated with earnings, or earnings potential, when a 
relationship dissolves. The interaction effect between gender and children in the 
household prior to dissolution was also tested but yielded no significant results (results 
not shown).  
 
Personal labour market income – Norway  
Table 6.3 displays the effects of independent variables on the natural logarithm of 
post-dissolution labour market income for Norway. Model 1 shows that the effect of 
gender is not significant, which supports the null hypothesis that there are no 
significant difference between women and men in post-dissolution labour market 
incomes. The coefficient for gender stays insignificant in all the models tested for 
Norway, meaning that women have no post-dissolution personal labour market income 
disadvantage, net of other factors. This means that in the labour market income 
regression model there are not found to be any significant differences between women 
and men, as was the case in Britain, and hence the other control variables must be 
interpreted as differences between groups sharing different characteristics and not as 
differences between women and men. As previously mentioned, the model was tested 
for the interaction effect between gender and number of children, but none of the 
interaction effects proved significant.  
 
The caring hypothesis tested in model 4 shows a significant, strong and negative effect 
of children’s living arrangement on post-dissolution labour market income. Hence, the 
presence of children in the household lowers the level of post-dissolution labour 
market income, compared with not having children in the household. Having one child 
in the household on average lowers the income by 32 percent (calculated as 100*[1–
exp(–0.378)]) compared with not having any children in the household, after having 
controlled for gender, age and pre-dissolution income status.  
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As mentioned above, gender is not significant in the model. Pre-dissolution household 
income also shows to have a small positive significant effect on post-dissolution 
labour market income, meaning that higher household earnings, or earnings potential, 
prior to dissolution are positively correlated with higher post-dissolution earnings.  
 
In model 5, the impact of previous employment on post-dissolution labour market 
income is tested. The positive coefficient for hours worked prior to dissolution 
indicates that working more before dissolution is correlated with having a higher 
income after dissolution. Education is not significant in the model, and gender is not 
significant in the model. 
 
Model 6 displays the effects of the full set of independent variables, hence testing both 
for differences in caring and employment on income from paid work after dissolution. 
Gender is not significant in the model, meaning the women fare about as well as men, 
controlled for differences in caring and ‘human capital’. The interaction effect testing 
whether having children in the household have different effect for women and men 
proved not to be significant 
 
As in line with the British findings, the same two sources explaining post-dissolution 
labour market income are identified in Norway, namely hours worked prior to the 
dissolution and having children in the household after dissolution where the strongest 
effect is found for the latter explanation. The differences between the two countries are 
that gender is not significant in the model for Norway.  
 
The question that then lingers is whether the support found for the caring and 
employment hypotheses can be seen disconnected from gender in Norway, given that 
gender was not found to be significant in the model? One way of approaching this 
question is to take a closer look at the strength of the regression coefficient for gender 
in the model. Although it is not statistically significant, which is an indicator for the 
precision of the estimator, it is nevertheless worth noticing what effect the coefficient 
  
177 
contributes with in the model as a statistical significance test does not strictly speaking 
test the practical significance of the research finding (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). 
 
Looking then at the gender coefficient, apart from not being statistically significant, it 
shows about the same effect as in the British analysis for the first three models, namely 
that women’s incomes from work after separation are lower than men’s (model 3).  
 
In the model 4, testing the caring hypothesis, it shows that once children are taken into 
account in the model, the effect of gender diminishes and becomes close to zero. What 
this indicates in substantive terms is that women have an economic disadvantage in 
their post-dissolution labour market incomes compared with men, and that this 
disadvantage can be subscribed to children’s living arrangements after dissolution. In 
reality women have more caring responsibility for children after dissolution, however 
in a multivariate regression assuming no differences in caring between women and 
men the effect of gender disappears – or put differently – women’s post-dissolution 
labour market income disadvantage is fully explained by children’s living 
arrangements in Norway. The same effect is documented also by Smock (1994:252) in 
her study from the US. 
 
This argument is further strengthened in model 5, which tests the employment 
hypothesis. Here the regressor for gender again is large and negative as it was in model 
3; indicating that little of the gender difference can be explained by differences in pre-
dissolution working hours, hinging less explanatory support to the employment 
hypothesis. Women and men with similar levels of labour market attachment before 
separation have no significant differences in post-dissolution labour market incomes. 
 
In model 6, however, where both the living arrangement of children and pre-
dissolution working time is added, the coefficient for gender again becomes small but 
positive (0.013). Hence, assuming that men and women work an equivalent number of 
hours and have the same caring responsibilities, women suffer no disadvantage in their 
post-dissolution labour market incomes relative to their male counterparts, it can in 
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fact look as if they have a slight advantage (given the positive coefficient), but the 
effect is small (close to zero, and also not statistically significant). 
 
This underscores another important point that is worth considering when interpreting 
the results from Norway in particular. It was argued above that the labour market 
income measure is used to explore gender disparities in the absence of private and 
public transfers, and that a comparison between the labour market and net income 
measures expresses the impact of transfers on the economic well-being after 
dissolution. One weakness is that this analytical approach is unable to pick up other, 
and relevant, redistributive effects related to welfare state activity on income from 
employment.  
 
Family friendly policies in Norway may have left their ‘imprint’ on women’s post-
dissolution labour market income leading to an overall high employment rate among 
Norwegian women, made possible through affordable day care and flexible employers 
in Norway. This indirect welfare state effect on women’s incomes is not possible to 
capture in the regression models presented here – but should not be disregarded as an 
explanation for the lack of significant gender differences in the model. 
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6.5.2 Net household income 
 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the results from the second OLS regression of the effect of 
independent variables on the natural logarithm of post-dissolution net household 
income for Britain and Norway respectively. The net household income measure is a 
crucial measure since it is adjusted for household size and age composition and is 
therefore a better measure for differences in economic well-being than the labour 
market income measure. 
 
Net household income – Britain  
Comparing table 6.2 and 6.4 shows that very few changes take place in the results for 
Britain when switching from the labour market to the net income measure. The 
regression coefficient estimates reduce only slightly but show the same direction and 
significant levels, and almost the same effects. The interaction variable between 
gender and number of children in the household after dissolution was also not 
significant in the post-dissolution net household income regression (results not 
shown). 
 
What this implies is that for Britain the same picture of gender disparity in the 
economic disadvantage experienced after partnership dissolution remains. Directly or 
indirectly, mothers’ responsibilities towards children after dissolution are associated 
with their lower economic well-being after dissolution compared with men. Although 
it is known from the previous chapter (see figure 5.2) that British women receive 
private and public transfers to a greater extent than men after dissolution, this is not 
enough to compensate them for the greater needs of their households due to children. 
The lack of difference between the labour market income and net income regressions 
illustrates that public and private transfers do not contribute to level out the negative 
effect for separated women versus separated men, which remains clearly gendered. 
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Net household income – Norway  
Turning to the situation for Norway and comparing tables 6.3 and 6.5, a different 
picture emerges. Whereas the regression using post-dissolution labour market income 
showed that both caring and employment could explain loss in post-dissolution labour 
market income, these explanations do not find support in the regression model for net 
household income.  
 
Since the same variables are controlled for in both OLS models, the difference 
between them must be subscribed to how the dependent variable differs between the 
two regressions. There are two differences. First, unlike labour market income, the 
adjusted net household income measure is directly influenced by the number of 
dependents in the household. Second, the net household measure includes income 
from sources other than the labour market. In the case of the sample analysed here any 
additional income is most likely subscribed to public and private transfers, and tax 
benefits related to having children, such as child benefits, child maintenance payments, 
tax rebates, transitional allowances and child day care rebates. It is already known 
from the descriptive statistics that women are far more likely than men to remain with 
their children after partnership dissolution. Consequently, most of the economic 
transfers related to having children will go to women. The complete lack of significant 
findings and the very low R-square indicates that no real difference that could indicate 
inequality between any group can be identified in terms of post-dissolution net 
household income. Hence differences for age, gender, education, working time and 
caring responsibility do not lead to income differences.  
 
Summarising the findings in terms of the employment (hypothesis 5) and caring 
(hypothesis 6) hypotheses, empirical support is found for both in Britain. However, it 
is the caring hypothesis that proves to be most important, namely those women’s 
incomes are more negatively influenced by partnership dissolution because of greater 
caring responsibilities after the break up. In Norway, no significant effects were found 
on the net income measures, suggesting a rejection of both explanations in Norway. 
Comparing the coefficient estimates for having children in the households after 
  
183 
dissolution between Norway and Britain can serve as a proxy for the direct private and 
public economic contributions to the household economy related to having children. 
The very small change in the coefficient estimate for children between the labour 
market and net household income regression models for Britain provides a good 
indicator that little income is directly “added” to women’s post-dissolution household 
economies. In Norway, the large reduction in the regression coefficient for children 
between the two models signifies a relatively large money transfer, related to having 
children, i.e. that the welfare state is successful in smoothing out gender income 
differences by compensating economically for the additional costs of having the caring 
responsibility for children in Norway. Without such compensation, it is highly likely 
that the caring effect will be applicable in a Norwegian context as well. Or put 
differently, the lack of gender income differences in Norway (i.e. support for 
hypothesis 2) is hinged on the welfare state economically replacing the extra costs of 
having children. Without large economic transfers, where women have to rely on their 
own earning powers, hypothesis 1, of gender inequality, is likely also to be observed in 
Norway.  
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6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it has been a key aim to determine whether the same sources can be 
identified as mechanisms behind gender income inequality after partnership 
dissolution in Norway and Britain. Two different income measures were applied, 
focussing on different aspects of a separated person’s economic situation. Post-
dissolution individual labour market income reflects the way in which women and men 
have positioned themselves in paid work after dissolution. The net income measure, 
which takes all income sources into account and is adjusted for household size and 
composition, was used as a measure for economic well-being. A comparison between 
the two measures provided an insight into differing economic dependencies for women 
and men on the labour market and on welfare transfers, respectively. In addition, 
comparing the results between Norway and Britain, provided an analytical strategy 
whereby individual differences in caring and employment practices could be attributed 
to the their different national institutional contexts.  
 
In both multivariate analyses for Britain, it was found that the main source for 
women’s income disadvantage stemmed from responsibility towards children after 
dissolution. This is much in line with previous research from Britain which has 
concluded that partnership dissolution worsens the economic situation of women and 
even improves the economic situation for men (Jarvis and Jenkins 1999). In the 
analysis for Britain presented here, there is also a clear positive effect of both hours 
worked prior to dissolution as well as the household’s economic status prior to 
dissolution. This means that those who work more hours have better economic 
prospects after dissolution than those who work fewer hours, but this difference in 
working time does not contribute to explain much of the gender differences.    
 
Some of the same story is revealed in Norway for the labour market income analysis. 
Both caring responsibility and employment contribute to explain differences in income 
from paid work after dissolution, but do not contribute to an explanation of gender 
income differences.  
  
187 
Comparing the results from the regression models based on personal labour market 
income and net income respectively revealed little differences in Britain. This is an 
indication that the lack of impact of any redistributive effects of welfare transfers and 
child benefit payments in Britain. It seems as though the highly gendered caring 
practices turns out to be a “double disadvantage” for British women; both constraining 
their labour market earning capacities before dissolution and increasing the household 
living costs after dissolution. There is no evidence in the analysis carried out here that 
the British welfare system in any way manages to make up for this economic 
disadvantage of having children in the household. Consequently, British women and 
children are left vulnerable to welfare loss after partnership dissolution. This echoes 
the finding from chapter four, that partnership dissolution is a strong poverty trigger in 
Britain. 
 
The multivariate analysis for Norway revealed no significant effect of gender, a 
finding which indicates that women are not markedly worse off than men, measured 
both on post-dissolution individual labour market income and post-dissolution net 
household income. This lack of gender disparity is perhaps not so surprising for the net 
household measure. As previously described in chapter three, there are a number of 
policies in place which redistribute economic resources to households with children 
after partnership dissolution, e.g. child support from a non-custodial parent, child 
benefit, and transitional allowance. It has also been documented by previous research 
from Norway, that economic transfers related to having children are of greater 
importance for women’s incomes after separation than they are for men, who tend to 
rely more on income from paid work and capital income (Kitterød and Lyngstad 2009; 
Lyngstad 2008:35).  
 
It is therefore perhaps more surprising that no gender differences were documented in 
this study for the labour market income, which disregards these economic transfers 
that women depend upon. Given that women work part-time more often than men and 
also are more frequently in low paid occupations (NOU 2008), and also related to the 
descriptive statistics showing the gender income gap between women and men in 
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Norway based on personal labour market income (see figure 5.3),  it was expected to 
find gender differences here, for Norway as well.  
 
There could be a number of explanations for this. As pointed out in chapter two, to 
study the economic consequences of partnership dissolution based on panel survey 
data leaves the analysis exposed to the problem of small sample sizes. Hence, it could 
be that with a larger sample, the gender coefficient would have turned significant. One 
element which might support this explanation is that it was indeed found that the 
gender coefficient was impacted by the variable controlling for number of children in 
the analysis.  
 
Another explanation which has frequently has been debated in the divorce literature is 
possible selection effects. Although not tested here, for the Nordic countries, and 
Norway in particular, previous research has documented a negative relationship 
between educational attainment and a couple’s divorce risk on a couple’s odds of 
divorce (Jalovaara 2003; Kravdal and Noack 1989). A recent study from Norway 
found this study to be particularly strong, estimating that a couple where both spouses 
have low education ran a four times higher risk of divorce compared to couples where 
both have higher education (Lyngstad 2004). If anything, then, a sample of separated 
individuals in Norway should be skewed towards the lower income spectrum. But as 
discussed in chapter two, the sample of separated persons analysed here does indeed 
show higher economic resources among those who separate compared with ‘intact 
couples’ in the LKU. This could lend support to the explanation that this is a possibly 
biased sample of high resource individuals. However, it would require further research 
to determine this selection hypothesis. 
 
Another explanation could be related to the indirect welfare state effect on women’s 
employment. The average number of hours in work prior to separation for Norwegian 
women is rather high, and although it is lower than the average working week for 
Norwegian men, it is longer than what is the case for British women and men. This 
means that Norwegian women have a strong position in paid work prior to dissolution, 
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and it highly likely that this contributes to the lack of a gendered effect on post-
dissolution labour market income. The high rate of women in paid work and the 
relatively long working hours of both women and men, not only contributes to even 
out gender differences but also works a direct protection for income loss after 
separation. This may be interpreted as an indirect effect of the welfare state, where 
policies supporting the combination of paid work and care work in Norway benefit the 
wage incomes of Norwegian women, securing women’s post-dissolution incomes. 
This means that the welfare state, through enabling many women to have paid work, 
have already evened out gender income differences. When in the next instance the 
welfare state ensures compensation for the added economic burden of having children 
in the household, all group differences in post-dissolution incomes are eradicated in 
the model (see table 6.5). In addition, Norway has a relatively compressed wage 
structure, where incomes are relatively similar between different occupations and 
industries, and where relative gain to income of increasing the number of hours 
worked is smaller. However, it needs to be underscored that what have been examined 
here are the short-term economic consequences of partnership dissolution. Some 
welfare state transfers are only paid out for a certain period of time, such as the 
Norwegian transitional allowance. This means that gender income differences may be 
larger some three of four years after dissolution than directly after dissolution.  
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7 Summary and conclusion  
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis has examined the income differences that arise between women and men as 
a consequence of partnership dissolution. Two national contexts, the Norwegian and 
the British, have been analysed and compared. The study has rested on two central 
assumptions. First, that the impact of partnership dissolution on women’s and men’s 
economic situations is best studied by a longitudinal (‘dynamic’) approach. Second, 
that the national configuration of state, family and market institutions influences the 
consequences of partnership dissolution and generates different economic outcomes in 
different countries. Therefore, it is vital to have a thorough understanding of the 
specific national context in which the dissolution takes place in order to understand its 
consequences. 
 
In this concluding chapter, the main results from the empirical analyses are 
summarised before the chapter ends with a few reflections regarding the two main 
assumptions. The first issue points out some of the limitations that apply to the 
methodological strategy deployed in this study. The second issue is more related to 
policy, and puts forward a few points regarding the likely future impact of recent 
policy shifts on the economic outcome of partnership dissolution for women and men. 
7.2 Summary of key findings 
In this thesis, the economic situation of households after partnership dissolution in 
Norway and Britain has been examined and compared by means of longitudinal panel 
survey data. The study has been anchored in feminist literature on care, the 
comparative welfare state literature, and the life course perspective. Partnership 
dissolution has been analysed as a dynamic event, where the outcome of the event is 
seen as a function of both past and present life circumstances.  
 
In the international ‘divorce’ literature, there has been a general finding that women 
experience a drop in economic status following partnership dissolution, i.e. the 
commonly held ‘gender inequality’ hypotheses. However, previous national studies 
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have suggested that the situation might be different in Norway, and that the economic 
consequences would be more evenly distributed in this national context. An alternative 
‘gender equality’ hypothesis was therefore suggested, stating that partnership 
dissolution represents the same economic risk factor to both women and men in 
Norway.  
 
For Britain, this study largely confirmed what previous research has pointed out, 
namely, that pronounced gender income differences appear after partnership 
dissolution. Analyses of net adjusted household income revealed a large gender 
income gap. The incomes of British women dropped by about 20 percent, whereas 
men saw their incomes increase by more than 30 percent (figure 5.2). For Norway, the 
results revealed less of a gender difference. Both women and men experienced an 
income decline after partnership dissolution of about 20 percent (figure 5.2). The 
analysis of net income changes before and after dissolution could be taken as evidence 
supporting the gender inequality hypothesis in Britain, namely, that women and men 
experience very different economic welfare after this event. In Norway, women and 
men lost income in equal proportions after dissolution, which is evidence pointing 
towards a more ‘gender equal’ outcome of partnership dissolution in Norway.  
 
In chapter four, it was examined whether inequality in gender relations served to 
generate different poverty risks for women and men. The income situation of a 
household may shift after dissolution, without this necessarily involving ‘inequality’. 
Determining poverty risk as a consequence of partnership dissolution is thus a more 
direct way of identifying economic vulnerability. Two sets of poverty trigger events – 
labour market changes and family changes – were compared. The household economy 
was analysed before and after a trigger event and the dependent variable determined 
whether the intervening life course event shifted the economic situation of the 
household below a fixed poverty line. The analysis demonstrated that, in both 
countries, women were more likely than men to enter poverty as a direct consequence 
of partnership dissolution, (see figure 4.4, fixed effects model). Partnership dissolution 
also triggered poverty for Norwegian men, but not to the same extent as for Norwegian 
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women. However, partnership dissolution did not act as poverty trigger for British 
men. Losing access to paid work was a greater poverty trigger for men than 
partnership dissolution, and more so in Britain than in Norway. Loss of paid work was 
a smaller poverty trigger for British women, but not a significant poverty trigger for 
Norwegian women. The analysis thus confirmed gendered poverty risk patterns – 
women being more affected by family changes and men by labour market changes. 
The analysis therefore provided evidence to support the gender inequality hypothesis 
in both countries. 
 
The income decomposition analysis (see figure 5.3) explored the extent to which 
women and men differed in their market and welfare state dependencies following 
dissolution. The results showed that, in both Norway and Britain, men relied heavily 
on employment as their main source of income after dissolution. Norwegian women 
relied in almost equal measure on labour market earnings and on (public and private) 
transfers. Hence, Norwegian women were found to be highly dependent upon 
economic support in order to achieve the same economic outcome after dissolution as 
men. British women were left in a difficult economic situation after partnership 
dissolution; drawing relatively low incomes from wage work and receiving little in 
terms of transfers. It was thus demonstrated how the Norwegian welfare state acted as 
an effective buffer, compensating for the income loss experienced by women after a 
breakup. The welfare state mattered greatly in terms of ‘altering’ unequal gender 
relations by strengthening the economic position of women vis-à-vis men. The British 
welfare state proved to have less ‘buffering’ power and did little in terms of improving 
the post-dissolution economic situation of women, leaving a large, unclosed gender 
income gap. Hence, the analysis revealed gender differences in economic 
dependencies – women being more dependent upon state transfers for securing the 
post-dissolution household economy, and men on their wage incomes.  
 
In chapter six, the study sought to discover which factors that could explain 
differences in post-dissolution incomes between women and men. Two factors were 
examined, namely, the employment situation prior to dissolution and the caring 
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responsibilities after dissolution. In Britain, the most important factor for generating 
post-dissolution income inequality was women’s greater responsibility for children 
after dissolution (table 6.4, net household income as dependent variable). In Norway, 
there were no significant gender differences in post-dissolution incomes (table 6.5, net 
household income as dependent variable). It was then asked what the driver behind a 
lack of gender income inequality in Norway was – could it be subscribed to welfare 
state support related to having children (i.e. the same ‘buffering effect’ as documented 
in chapter five), or had women and men started to take on the same pre-dissolution 
earning patterns (a ‘genuine’ shift in gender relations) so that women’s and men’s 
personal labour market incomes did not differ significantly? This question was 
addressed through an analysis of labour market income (table 6.3), controlling for 
employment and caring variables. The results from Norway supported the caring 
explanation, suggesting that having children in the household after dissolution had the 
strongest negative effect on post-dissolution labour market income. From this it was 
concluded that without welfare state transfers, there would be a significant and high 
risk of income loss for households with children following partnership dissolution in 
Norway as well. Gender was not significant in the model, indicating that any 
household with children after dissolution would experience this negative impact. 
However, more women than men have children in the household following partnership 
dissolution in Norway, hence it was suggested that caring responsibilities more 
frequently reduce women’s personal labour market incomes, but that this income loss 
is generally replaced by welfare transfers. Thus, this analysis again confirmed the 
important role of the Norwegian welfare state in ‘eliminating’ the economic risk factor 
of having children at partnership dissolution.  
  
Although there are many findings in this thesis, as demonstrated in this summary, 
there is perhaps one that needs special attention. In a cross-national context, what this 
thesis finds for Norway is exceptional, namely, that there is no gender income gap 
following partnership dissolution (see figure 5.3). Other studies from Scandinavia 
reveal a smaller or larger income gap between women and men after partnership 
dissolution (Andreβ et al. 2006). Previous studies from Denmark (Hussain and Kangas 
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2009) and Sweden (Gähler 1998) have concluded that the post-dissolution situation is 
worse for women than for men. This thesis also confirms that women’s economic 
vulnerability is greater in Britain. The explanation for why Norway differs, this thesis 
suggests, is linked to the welfare state. Norway has a number of policy measures 
directly compensating lone parents for the additional expenses of having children in 
the household (e.g. child care rebates, additional child allowances and transitional 
allowance). The publicly funded child care system also supports women’s employment 
activity. In addition, there is an efficient system of child maintenance payments. The 
latter contributes to the redistribution of income between women and men, but this is 
in part an outcome generated by ‘lowering’ men’s incomes through child maintenance 
payments. It should therefore be noted that when this thesis confirms a gender-equal 
economic situation after dissolution in Norway, this equality is in part generated by a 
reduction of men’s incomes relative to women’s, partly by welfare state transfers, and 
partly by women’s own personal labour market incomes.  
 
However, whether an ‘equality’ achieved in terms of sharing the income loss after 
partnership dissolution constitutes a situation of ‘gender equality’ is a different 
question – and is a difficult one to answer by means of quantitative data alone. There 
are findings from this study that indicate that despite a relatively gender-equal income 
situation after dissolution in Norway, women’s economic vulnerability is nevertheless 
greater: women display higher welfare dependencies after dissolution, and women 
have higher poverty risks after dissolution than men. However, it is questionable 
whether partnership dissolution can be seen as the sole cause of gender income 
inequality. Rather, it would be more precise to regard partnership dissolution as an 
event that discloses gender income differences that have been there all along – but 
that, to varying degree, the welfare state is capable of making these gender differences 
insignificant.  
 
Given that, to a large extent, the welfare state was supporting women’s incomes in 
Norway, it actually turned out to be particularly important to be sensitive to gender in 
this country’s context, which at first glance could appear to be ‘gender neutral’. 
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Whereas British women were identified as being the economic losers regardless of 
what income measure was used, it was necessary to apply income measures other than 
that of post-dissolution net income to disclose that the same inequality generating 
factors were also present in Norway. Caring for children was a risk factor for income 
loss in Norway as well, but with generous welfare state support, some of this risk was 
eliminated. Thus, for any future study into the economic consequences of partnership 
dissolution, adopting a dynamic methodology should be an important aspect of the 
research project, while simultaneously keeping a keen eye on examining differences in 
women’s and men’s economic dependencies. Future ‘feminist inspired’ studies should 
therefore concentrate on analysing the rich data sources available in cross-national 
panel surveys as well as applying the appropriate statistical methods to analyse such 
longitudinal data in order to determine the gender dimension of experiencing life 
course changes.  
7.3 Some methodological limitations  
Despite several advantages with the longitudinal ‘event’ approach taken in this study, 
some methodological limitations apply. It is important to highlight these in order to 
point out any potential sources of error or biases in the findings from this study. First, 
this study is based on a relatively small sample of people experiencing partnership 
dissolution, a common problem to studies investigating the short-term economic 
impacts of partnership dissolution based on general household panel surveys. Despite 
the high numbers of partnership dissolutions in the population, relatively few can be 
observed in a survey with a limited sample size. This may affect the accuracy of the 
estimates made.  
 
Second, the small sample size also makes it difficult to divide the sample into 
subgroups. This means that even though the conclusion for Norway is that gender 
income inequality following partnership dissolution is limited, it cannot be ruled out 
that gender inequality is pronounced for certain segments of the population. For 
instance, there might be large differences between women with and without children. 
The economic outcome of dissolution may also differ considerably between different 
social classes, educational groups or for couples with different ethnic backgrounds. In 
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Britain, there might be better opportunities to provide more nuanced evidence on the 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution for different groups in the 
population by assessing the new ‘Understanding Society’ survey, which samples 
40,000 UK households. In Norway, it is also possible to analyse Norwegian state 
registry data, which is currently being updated with address information. This will 
provide opportunities to analyse cohabitants as well as married couples. Although not 
comparable to the extent that the BHPS and LEVPAN studies are, these data sources 
could provide the opportunity to produce a more nuanced conclusion on group 
differences in the economic consequences of partnership dissolution.  
 
Third, the sample of individuals experiencing partnership dissolution analysed in this 
thesis does not include ‘other’ household types. For example, this would be 
households where adult persons share a dwelling with their parents, grandparents, 
siblings or friends. A limitation of the current study is therefore that people who, for 
example, divorce but move directly in with their parents, siblings or a new partner are 
excluded from the study. Including these groups in the study could have contributed to 
further nuance the conclusions regarding the economic changes after dissolution. 
 
Fourth, only a relatively short panel has been available for data analysis, and this 
situation applied particularly for Norway. This has made it impossible draw 
conclusions on longer-term economic consequences. In Britain, the longer-term 
economic consequences of partnership dissolution can better be studied, and indeed, 
research has concluded that the economic position of British women improves over 
time post dissolution but does not reach pre-dissolution levels (Jenkins 2008). 
 
Fifth, a further restriction of this study is that it is based on two cases, Norway and 
Britain, where it is assumed from the outset that they will differ notably in terms of 
gender income inequality. It could therefore have been interesting to broaden this 
study with a greater range of countries. Analysing a larger number of countries across 
Europe would have provided a broader basis on which to assess the gendered impact 
of ‘new social risk’ in a European context. Given that this study concludes that the 
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Norwegian welfare state seems to be particularly successful in protecting women’s 
incomes, it could also have been interesting to include Norway in a ‘most similar case 
design’, drilling further into differences and similarities in an intra-Scandinavian 
context.  
 
Sixth, this study has been restrained to analyse gender inequality and welfare loss 
defined in relatively narrow terms as loss (or gain) in household income. Partnership 
dissolution may however have an impact on a broader set of factors that could have 
complemented the discussion on gender inequality. Examples of such indicators could 
for instance have been how partnership dissolution affects individuals’ general 
material situation, such as housing and access to material goods, social and work 
integration, health situation, or general ‘well-being.’ Assessing these factors would 
have provided a broader intake to understand gender inequality and loss of welfare 
related to partnership dissolution, where one working hypothesis could have been that 
women perhaps ‘lose out’ economically but are ‘coping better’ socially following 
separation. This could have been the topic of qualitative study allowing for ‘thick 
descriptions’ of women’s and men’s life course narratives.   
 
Lastly, in this thesis, partnership dissolution has been analysed and interpreted as a 
‘sudden’ event. However, rather than seeing partnership dissolution as an ‘event’ 
approach, it could have been argued that partnership dissolution should be seen as the 
end point of a longer process which has taken place inside a household for some time. 
According to the life course perspective, advantages and disadvantages accumulate 
over time. The economic consequences of partnership dissolution could therefore be 
seen as depending on a whole range of factors and decisions at the individual level, 
often taken before the relationship ends. For instance, decisions such as whether to 
marry or cohabit, whether to have children or not, and whether to work full- or part-
time, may all have economic implications when a relationship is ending. These are 
decisions often not steered by individuals making economic and rational ‘choices’, but 
are decisions closely linked with norms for what constitutes appropriate gendered 
behaviours. However, there are limited opportunities for quantitative researchers to 
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study and map out the complex, individual social processes that lead up to the ending 
of a relationship. Therefore, this thesis has suggested that it is a useful methodology to 
focus the analysis on the actual ‘break’ or ‘event’, and to examine the income situation 
immediately before and after the event. At least this gives quantitative researchers 
access to a small ‘window’ through which the outcome of dissolution can be observed. 
7.4 Partnership dissolution and family policy – what will the future 
bring? 
Over the past decade, social research has been concerned with analysing how citizens’ 
welfare and social integration is increasingly being linked to their participation in the 
labour market. This was also discussed in chapter three where it was argued that 
family polices in Europe are shifting in the direction of an ‘adult worker model’. 
However, more recently, another dimension has started to take the highest priority in 
discussions on welfare and the future of the welfare state. The current economic 
recession in Europe has left politicians concerned with rising unemployment and 
weaker state finances from which to fund social protection systems. Britain has been 
one of the countries most deeply affected by the economic crisis and where cuts to the 
welfare budgets are currently being discussed. Norway, on the other hand, is probably 
the country in Europe that is has been the least affected by the current economic 
downturn. Given that this thesis finds that the economic consequences of partnership 
dissolution already differ between these two countries, there is reason to worry that 
this is a difference that will only increase in the near future. One conclusion from this 
thesis is that women, more than men, rely on the welfare state to protect their incomes 
after dissolution. This also means that if economic recession leads to large welfare 
cuts, these cuts may hit women harder than men. Hence, in the worst case, gender 
income differences could increase as a consequence of the economic recession.  
 
Another worry related to the current economic crisis is the rise in unemployment. 
Given that welfare states are already leaning heavily on a social protection model 
based on the adult worker, it is a great worry for the stability of the welfare state to 
have large numbers of people unable to find jobs. Although there is no direct link, 
research has concluded that unemployment increases the risks of marital dissolution 
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(Hansen 2005). People who separate from their partners also tend to end up living in a 
one-income household, making them particularly vulnerable if they find themselves 
out of work. Therefore, it is important for future studies to address how degrees of 
family ‘fluidity’ may interact with larger macro-economic shifts, and to map out how 
the economic recession may impact the welfare of different population groups, where 
those who are recently separated will constitute one of several risk groups. 
 
Apart from the economic crisis, there are also a number of other policy trends with 
possible implications for the economic situation of separated persons and the issue of 
gender inequality. Inherent in the adult worker model is a valorisation of paid 
employment as the most important activity. This could be regarded a positive factor 
for gender equality – encouraging economic independence and self-sufficiency for 
women. In Norway, in particular, the strong support for the reconciliation of working 
and caring activities has strengthened the economic position of women, including that 
of separated women. On the other hand, a strong and one-sided focus on ‘activation’ in 
paid work may also reinforce the normative expectation that all groups in society, 
regardless of sex and caring commitments, should be wage earners. This means that 
the very same welfare state that enables women’s economic independence through 
work and family policies, also becomes an active agent in terms of marginalising and 
de-valuing caring activities, by not regarding them activities that need support in their 
own right but as ‘hurdles’ to participation in paid work. Even though the policy line 
applied in Norway of offering subsidised child care to lone parents is preferable to the 
‘non-intervention’ line in Britain, it does not meant that this policy is flawless. For 
instance, offering institutional day care for children does not address the issues of how 
the labour market is structured by gender, what jobs women and men hold, and 
important in this context, what responsibility (if any) employers may have for 
facilitating employment and lone parenthood. These are also important issues to 
consider in discussions on gender equality and the possibility of combining 
employment and caring tasks.  
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An important aspect of the ‘adult worker policy package’ has been to make welfare a 
private matter realised through the employment route, and where welfare support is 
limited to a narrow route of economically compensating households for the additional 
costs of having children. Family policies in Norway have traditionally been 
particularly generous in this respect, supporting lone mothers in their role as mothers, 
rather than as workers. The ‘irony’ of this policy intervention is that women in 
Norway have ended up ‘earning’ money for having children in the household after 
partnership dissolution (relative to men). However, more recently, public policy debate 
in Norway has shifted towards a much stronger focus on the role of fathers after 
separation. This is not limited to a focus on ‘making fathers pay’ (as has been the 
subject of campaigns in Britain) but includes fathers as active carers after divorce. 
There is thus a much stronger normative focus on ‘equally sharing’ the children after 
divorce. This, it may be argued, is an important step towards greater gender equality, 
by strengthening the bonds between children and fathers after divorce. On the other 
hand, for separated mothers, this may mean that they will be deprived a source of 
income. A more equal sharing of the children after divorce will result in lowering 
economic transfers to lone mothers, especially putting low-paid and/or part-time 
working women at greater economic risk following dissolution.130 This also means that 
achieving gender equality following the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ norm, may have the 
possibly unintended side effect of seriously reducing the incomes of low income 
separated women, and increasing the significance of gender inequality. It therefore 
poses a particular challenge to the welfare state especially on how low income women 
are to be economically protected after dissolution. It also means that stronger attention 
should be paid in future research on the possible interaction between partnership 
dissolution, the welfare state and social class. 
 
Although policy development may be broadly categorised as the development of an 
‘adult worker model’, it needs to be underscored that what this thesis has found is that 
family policies are efficient in creating different outcomes in different countries. 
                                                 
130 In addition, the ‘sharing’ of children after divorce introduces another possible issue, not addressed in thesis, 
of whether it is good for children to separate their time equally between two different houses, rather than having 
a single base at one of the parents’ homes.  
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Rather than converging into one European family policy model, it therefore seems as 
tough the legacies of past family policies have laid a foundation for future policy 
developments, which leaves a different imprint on the routes family policy might take 
in the future, even if the broader transformations which are taking place are the same 
(Daly 2010; Esping-Andersen 1999; Mätzke and Ostner 2010; Orloff 2006). Working 
from a cross-national perspective, the adult worker model may therefore imply 
different things in different national settings. In the British context, it involves 
stepping away from the assumption of a male breadwinner model, in which women 
and children will be supported by the husband, and towards a stronger focus on lone 
parents as workers. Without a state-support system for care, this policy line is also 
likely to leave divorced women with children at economic risk in the future. In a 
Norwegian context, with its historical legacy of supporting lone mothers in their role 
as caregivers, and more recently in their combined role as caregivers and workers, 
adult worker polices represent a weakening of policies supporting care within the 
private household and a strengthening of care provision outside the family. This is 
done to facilitate mothers’ labour market participation. In addition, the tendency in 
Scandinavia to regard both parents as caregivers and workers (the ‘dual-earner/dual-
carer’ family assumption) indicates an emphasis on shared parenting responsibilities, 
even when parents no longer live together. This may give women a foundation for 
being economically independent after dissolution, but the success of this policy in 
terms of generating equal incomes for women and men after divorce is hinged on 
women being integrated into the labour market to the same extent as men. This has not 
yet happened. 
 
With the current rate of divorce and relationship breakdown, a gender income gap as a 
consequence of ending a relationship is a potentially significant factor in hampering 
progress in gender income equality. Comparing the economic outcome of partnership 
dissolution between different national contexts has highlighted how the outcome of 
risk events experienced at the level of the individual are linked to the larger macro 
welfare structure. Given that the tendency to end a relationship is similar in both 
Norway and Britain, it seems likely that differences in welfare policies between 
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counties holds little impact on individuals’ willingness to end their relationships. 
However, the economic outcome of partnership dissolution is clearly linked to the 
welfare state. The welfare state matters for the extent to which gender inequality is the 
outcome of partnership dissolution.  
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Annex A – Odds  
The dependent variable, poverty is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a 
household is poor or not poor. Poor households are coded 1, not poor households are 
coded 0. A dependent variable with two categories violates the basic assumption made 
in linear regression; normality and homoscedasticity of the error term. Also, a linear 
model applied to a dichotomous dependent variable can result in predicted values 
lower than 0 and higher than 1, when the true probabilities are restricted to the interval 
between 0 and 1 (Pampel 2000). Transforming the regression into a nonlinear function 
can eliminate the problems related to dealing with a dependent variable constrained by 
a floor and ceiling value. Here a logit transformation is made, giving rise to the logistic 
regression model. In the logit model observed changes in the independent variables are 
related to the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable (Pampel 2000).  
 
In a logistic regression model, the coefficients estimates are expressions of the linear 
determinants of the logged odds or logit (Pampel 2000:18). This also changes the 
interpretation of coefficients from changes in probabilities to less intuitive changes in 
logged odds.  Exponentiating the logged odds or logit returns the odds ratio or odds, 
which makes for more meaningful interpretation. The odds are multiplicative (rather 
than additive), which affects the interpretation of exponentiatied coefficients. In an 
additive equation, a variable has no effect when its coefficient equals 0. In a 
multiplicative equation, the predicted value of the dependent variable does not change 
when multiplied by a coefficient of 1. Therefore, 1 in the multiplicative (logistic 
regression) corresponds to 0 in an additive equation (such as OLS regression). 
Furthermore, the exponential of a positive number exceeds 1 and the exponential of a 
negative number falls below 1 but above 0). The interpretation of odds (which are 
exponentiatied coefficients) is therefore: 
a coefficient of 1 leaves odds unchanged,  
a coefficient greater than 1, increases the odds, 
and a coefficient smaller than 1 decreases the odds (Pampel 2000).  
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Annex B – Fixed-effects logistic regression 
 
Following (Allison 2009:28) the fixed-effects logistic model can be expressed by the 
following basic model: 
 
 log (pit / 1 – pit) = ut + βxit + γzi + αi,   t = 1, 2,…,T 
 
where pit is the probability that the response variable is equal to 1, 
xit is a vector of time-varying predictors,  
zi is a vector of time-invariant predictors, 
and αi represents the combined effects of all unobserved variables that are constant 
over time. 
 
In the analysis pit is the probability that ‘poverty’ = 1 is observed during the 
observation period. 
xit is a vector of the following control variables, conditioned on observed change in 
these variables during the observation period: relationship status, birth of child, 
number of children, labour market status, education level and age. 
zi is a vector of  the time-constant variables, which refers to the same variables as 
above, but conditioned on them not changing during the observation period. 
αi is an unobserved time-invariant disturbance term (e.g. ability, career orientation, 
personal motivation, laziness). 
 
The dependent variable, logit, varies for all possible combinations of values of the 
time constant and time varying dependent variables in the range +/- infinitely. The 
estimated (unknown) coefficients in the model the γ and β parameters, state the effect 
of the (time-invariant and time-varying) on the logit (Pampel 2000).This means that 
the logistic regression estimators express the linear determinants of the logged odds or 
logit. Or put differently, the logit model express the linear relationship of the (natural) 
logarithm of the odds of being poor in relation to not being poor (Pampel 2000). 
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